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Abstract 
This thesis examines whether the process to redress complaints of labour rights violations 
provides an effective remedy to migrant domestic workers (MDW) in Hong Kong. The 
term ‘effective remedy’ is a ‘term of art’ used to identify a range of actionable human 
rights obligations to ensure redress measures are appropriate to the nature and gravity of 
the harm caused. If the necessary due diligence is exercised in fulfilling the government’s 
obligations, many labour rights violations should be recognised as more serious violations 
of human rights in the form of forced labour. However, the Hong Kong government is 
failing to recognise its affirmative obligations to provide a process that ensures effective 
remedies. 
A seven-month research study in 2015 of 80 MDWs in Hong Kong resulted in four 
significant findings; first, there is a high prevalence of forced labour which is not 
recognized or are miscategorised as simple labour disputes. 53 of the 80 MDWs studied 
were identified as being in forced labour situations. Interrelated with this finding, many of 
the victims did not identify themselves as such and did not seek a remedy. Only 12 MDWs 
made claims to the Labour Department, while 41 chose not to. In instances with no claims 
made, 24 MDWs returned to their employer accepting the mistreatment as part of their 
situation. Second, some indicators of forced labour were difficult to apply and had to be 
specially adapted to the nature of domestic work. Third, the research confirms the gross 
imbalance of power in the relationship between the MDW and the employer.  Fourth, 
MDWs experience a variety of barriers to obtaining a remedy, which are significantly 
exacerbated by government policies and private actors. The study also exposed a lack of an 
appropriate legal and regulatory scheme to protect MDWs, further undermining any 
effective remedy. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
The focus of this thesis is on the policies, legal framework and redress mechanisms 
adopted by the Hong Kong government to address labour rights violations of 
Migrant Domestic Workers (MDWs). Labour rights violations occur on a continuum, 
ranging from contractual violations on one end to varying degrees of exploitation to 
the most serious forms of violations of forced labour. To examine the question, I will 
draw on the international human rights law and accepted conventions that: highlight 
Hong Kong’s obligations to provide effective remedies; define the concept of an 
effective remedy; identify the barriers MDWs face in securing a remedy; and the 
effectiveness of conciliation in mitigating the barriers to remedies. 
Although Hong Kong is specifically obligated under the Forced Labour Convention 
No.29 (1930) and other international conventions that should offer protection, 
MDWs who arrive in Hong Kong often find themselves in forced labour situations 
with no mechanism for appropriate and effective redress. This thesis will identify the 
affirmative obligations for Hong Kong as a party to the Convention, linking it to 
existing convention obligations and domestic applications to protect and redress 
breaches of the covenant. It will cover two issues. First, whether effective remedies 
are available for the human rights violations of forced labour, and secondly, whether 
the remedies for domestic labour disputes are effective and fair. 
The research conducted for this and other research studies conducted on the plight of 
MDWs have established that MDWs are in forced labour situations contrary to 
International Human Rights law.1 Many of the documented abuses suffered by 
MDWs are also very clearly criminal in nature. Despite these findings, the Hong 
Kong government is failing to ensure effective access to remedies and continues to 
view all issues related to MDWs as labour issues which are directed to non-judicial 
mechanisms such as conciliation, a form of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). 
These redress mechanisms are inadequate and in contravention of International 
Human Rights Law, and a violation of Hong Kong’s obligations as a party to various 
international conventions and to the domestic Labour Ordinance. The redress 
                                                
1 International Labour Organisation (ILO), Forced Labour Convention, C29, 28 June 1930, C29 
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mechanisms established by the government for what are classified as MDW labour 
issues, coupled with official government policies as they apply to MDWs, fail to 
protect them from abuse, fail to adequately redress their grievances, fail to serve as a 
deterrent to future abuse and exploitation, and fail to penalise the employers, the 
recruitment and associated lending agencies when there are violations of domestic 
and international law. 
While addressing the obligations of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
(HKSAR) throughout the thesis I will use the term ‘state, party or government’ to 
refer to the Hong Kong government. This distinction is necessary since Hong Kong 
is a Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China and not a state 
as normally understood in international conventions. Hong Kong enjoys a great deal 
of autonomy in its domestic affairs under the ‘one country, two systems’ framework. 
This separation of domestic management is the underpinning of the ‘Joint 
Declaration’2 between the United Kingdom and China on the return of Hong Kong to 
Chinese rule.  
This thesis is divided into nine chapters. Chapter 1 will briefly outline the research 
study, provide a brief background of the research, its conceptual framework, the 
legal obligations and abuses experienced by MDWs, the purpose of the study, the 
research questions, highlight the significance of the research, and lay out the 
organisation of the thesis. 
1.1 Background 
Migrant domestic workers whose employment contracts are prematurely terminated 
are directed to file any grievances or disputed claims with the Labour Department. 
Generally, the disputed claims are related to remuneration and entitlements that are 
set out in the employment contract and the domestic Labour Ordinance. Some 
examples include unpaid wages, denial of rest days or vacation pay and refusal to 
provide return passage to their country of origin. The Hong Kong Labour 
Department uses a two-step system to address almost all of the issues related to 
                                                
2 Government of the United Kingdom Signed by:Margaret Thatcher and others, Joint Declaration of 
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of 
The People’s Republic of China on the question of Hong Kong (Beijing, 19 December 1987) 
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MDWs, identifying them as labour claims. The first step after a labour claim is filed 
by a MDW is the scheduling of a conciliation meeting where the claimant MDW is 
expected to discuss settlement options directly with their employer with the aid of a 
Conciliation Officer. The second step is dependent on the outcome of conciliation 
and the sum of money in dispute. Claims that are $8,000 and below are filed with the 
Minor Employment Claims Adjudication Board (MECAB). The hearing before 
MECAB is administrative in nature under the purview of the Labour Department and 
is presided over by an Adjudication Officer. If the claim is above $8,000, it is filed 
with the Labour Tribunal (LT) which falls under the judiciary and is presided over 
by a Presiding Officer. The practice at all three venues is to encourage settlement 
between the parties, even if some aspect of a hearing has begun. The time for 
resolution of claims can range from 3-4 weeks if settled at conciliation, or 4 months 
or longer if the matter progresses before the MECAB or Labour Tribunal. Neither 
MDWs nor their employers are permitted to have legal representation at any of the 
dispute resolution mechanisms. 
Some claims that are filed with the Labour Department involve not only physical 
assaults on the MDW, but varying forms of psychological coercion. The abuses, 
coupled with the constant threat of termination, limits the MDW’s ability to make 
free and informed decisions about their daily existence under threats of penalties 
such as dismissal, loss of wages or the effect of government policies that contribute 
to forced labour conditions. Despite the documentation of their working and living 
conditions in claims to the Labour Department, the focus remains on monetary issues 
and settlement. MDWs suffer a variety of abuses; reports of physical violence are 
ignored as are many invisible abuses in the form of discrimination based on race and 
gender and inequities of government policy denying equal protection in work safety 
standards, standard work hours and exclusion from the minimum wage protections. 
MDWs also encounter various barriers to seeking a remedy for labour rights 
violations resulting from official policies, their representative recruitment agencies 
or acts of the employer after resistance to demands that fall outside the scope of their 
employment contracts. The lack of investigation and manner of redress may not 
provide an effective remedy, as is obligated. The lack of protection in the form of 
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legal frameworks and effective redress raises the question of Hong Kong’s 
obligations under international law and conventions to which Hong Kong is bound. 
1.2 Conceptual Framework for Study 
The conceptual framework for this research is that MDWs’ employment conditions 
in many instances constitute violations of forced labour prohibitions, contrary to 
international law and convention obligations. If these obligations are afforded the 
reasonable due diligence to ensure protection and effective remedies, there should be 
mechanisms to assess whether violations of forced labour are evident in MDW 
complaints and, if found, recognised as a crime, effectively investigated and 
prosecuted, and reparation in the form of compensation at a minimum to redress the 
violation is made available. In instances where work conditions do not rise to the 
level of crimes and are considered labour disputes, an effective remedy is still 
required and the outcome should be just. 
1.2.1 Legal obligations 
Hong Kong is obligated under several international conventions to provide an 
effective remedy to individuals whose human rights have been violated. These 
include: the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the 
International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); and 
several International Labour Organisation Conventions, particularly the Forced 
Labour Convention No.29 (1930) which remains in effect in Hong Kong, having 
been adopted in July 19973 after the return of Hong Kong to China by the United 
Kingdom. These Conventions have been incorporated into the Basic Law of Hong 
Kong. These instruments require not only that an ‘effective remedy’ is available to 
individuals seeking redress for human right violations, but also provides for proper 
remuneration, rest and reasonable work hours. Since MDWs are legally admitted to 
Hong Kong through official policies and a regulatory scheme that maintains control 
over their employment, the obligation to prevent instances of forced labour is 
                                                
3 International Labour Organisation list of ratified Conventions pertaining to Hong Kong, see also ILO, 
Report to the Director General, GB.270/15 (270 Session, 1997) para. 26-28, see also Hong Kong’s 
Legislative Council Paper No.CB (2) 2617/10-11(01), Information Paper provided by the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China to the Indonesian government at 
‘Committee Meeting on the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers in the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region’ at Solo in the Republic of Indonesia 28 September 2011 
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significant.4 Forced labour is a violation of human rights5 and Hong Kong must 
administer the remedies within established international norms.6 Although Hong 
Kong is a party to numerous international conventions, including International 
Labour Conventions, Hong Kong, does not have specific domestic laws that define 
and penalise forced labour. Additionally, the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties7 establishes that through ‘acceptance’, ‘approval’ or ‘accession’, a party 
consents to be bound by the treaty, and that the text of the treaty is established as 
authentic and definitive. Parties to conventions are also bound to execute their 
obligations in good faith and may not invoke domestic law or the lack thereof as 
justification for failure to perform.8 
1.2.2 Identifying abuses 
As a result of limited employment opportunities and extremely low wages at home, 
Hong Kong has long been a destination country for hundreds of thousands of 
migrant workers from poorer countries in Asia.9 The Philippines and Indonesia alone 
account for nearly two-thirds of the 350,000 MDW workforce. These migrant 
workers, the vast majority of whom are women, find work as domestic workers 
contracted to employers living in Hong Kong. As a result of the circumstances of 
their employment and the policies of the Hong Kong government, MDWs as a group 
are especially vulnerable to physical and sexual violence, economic exploitation, and 
discrimination.10 Many of the abuses begin at the time that they sign their contracts 
with employment agencies that charge illegal fees, creating a debt bondage that has 
been described as a form of modern day slavery.11 
                                                
4 Manfred Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary, 2 edition, N.P. 
Engel Pub (2005) 
5 International Labour Conference (93 Session) ‘A Global Against Forced Labour’ Report I (B) (2005). 
See also, Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, ‘What amounts to 
‘a serious violation of international human rights law’? August 2014, p.5 
6 Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary 
7 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, No.18232 Vienna 23 May 1969 
8 Ibid (Art. 26) (Art. 27) (Art. 31) 
9 The 2016 Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics places the 2015 number of MDWs at 340,380, 
approximately 4.7% of the population (7,305,700). 
10 UNIFEM - CEDAW Panel on Addressing Women Migrant Workers’ Concerns, [2003] July, New 
York, 
11 Office of the Special Representative and Coordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, 
Report of the 3 and 5 Alliance against Trafficking in Persons Conferences on Human Trafficking for 
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Viewed from a distance, Hong Kong is a model for the employment of MDWs12 
compared with other Asian, Middle Eastern and Gulf region countries.13 Hong 
Kong’s policies and practices as they relate to MDW appear to achieve the goals of 
filling a need in their society while providing a streamlined, consistent and 
transparent process for recruitment and placement of MDWs from all around Asia. 
MDWs are required to have an employment contract,14 which is signed by both 
employer and employee, and which outlines the obligations of both parties. The 
contract, which is for an express term of 2 years, outlines the minimum allowable 
wage, identifies the location where the employee is to work, identifies the employer 
with whom the employee is to work, guarantees one rest day of 24 hours per week, 
describes the living accommodation and, typically, outlines the work that the MDW 
would be responsible for. Additionally, the employer is responsible for the 
employee’s passage to and from Hong Kong at the start and end of the contract 
period. The reality, however, is that bad policies on the part of the Hong Kong 
government, coupled with misplaced priorities in the enforcement of applicable laws 
and a strong institutional and cultural bias against MDWs, have created an 
environment of exploitation and abuse. 
The research in support of this thesis, and buttressed by multiple studies conducted 
over a decade, identifies a variety of issues that continue to result in forced labour for 
a substantial number of MDWs working in Hong Kong and violations of basic 
human rights that are routinely ignored. An example that illustrates the issues and 
one of the most criticised laws is the ‘Two Week Rule’ for MDWs whose contracts 
have been terminated. Under this law, MDWs have two weeks to leave Hong Kong 
once their contract has been terminated or the expiration date of their visas, 
whichever is earliest. MDWs pursuing a labour claim after termination may remain 
longer, but must first secure an extension of their visa. However, each extension is 
for 14 days only and costs the MDW $198. If the claim is before the Labour Tribunal 
                                                                                                                                     
Labour Exploitation/Forced and Bonded Labour, Vienna, 7 and 8 November 2005, Vienna, 16 and 17 
November 2006 
12 The term ‘Migrant Domestic Worker’ is preferred to ‘Foreign Domestic Helper’ used by Nicole 
Constable, and is the official term used by the Immigration Department to identify this labour force. 
13 Nicole Constable, ‘Obstacles to Claiming Rights: Migrant Domestic Workers in Asia’s World City, 
Hong Kong’ Chapter 5, ‘Care Migration and Human Rights: Law and Practice’ Edited by Siobhán 
Mullally, Routledge, January 29 2015 
14 ‘Employment Contract (For A Domestic Helper recruited from abroad)’, Form ID 407  
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or the MECAB, the average wait is 4 months to get a hearing date. In the meantime, 
the cost of each extension, and all living expenses must be borne by an already 
financially encumbered MDW. 
The research confirms that this serves as a huge barrier to access to justice. No 
matter how legitimate the claims of the MDW or how egregious the conduct of an 
employer or employment agency, few claims are pursued to a final hearing. Most 
MDWs choose to not pursue legal claims and are resigned to their losses. Those who 
do make a claim for wages owed or wages illegally withheld accept far less than they 
are owed because of the punitive cost of making a claim. Others abandon their 
claims as the costs begin to mount, fearful that their pursuit of a claim might 
prejudice their ability to find future employment. 
1.3 Purpose of the study 
Hong Kong is a receiving country for hundreds of thousands of MDW, many of 
whom are women. They are treated as commodities and susceptible to varying forms 
of abuses. The purpose of the study is to examine the response of the Hong Kong 
government to protect and redress forced labour of MDWs against their existing 
international obligations, which should also be reflected in the domestic law. It will: 
define the concept of an effective remedy; establish Hong Kong’s legal responsibility 
to provide an effective remedy for human rights violations as a party to International 
Conventions and under international law; identify the links between international and 
domestic legal obligations and ensuring the protection and redress of forced labour 
experiences of MDWs; and establish that the experiences of many MDWs constitute 
forced labour, an internationally recognised crime and a serious violation of human 
rights law. 
1.4 Research question 
1. Do the current measures to address labour rights violations of Migrant 
Domestic Workers in Hong Kong provide an effective remedy? 
Secondary questions: 
1. What are the obligations under the Forced Labour Convention? 
2. What is an Effective Remedy? 
3. What are the barriers to remedies for Migrant Workers as a vulnerable 
group? 
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4. Does the use of conciliation (ADR) provide effective access to a remedy? 
5. To what extent does forced labour occur within the research subset of 
workers? 
1.5 Significance of research 
The research conducted and the evidence developed strongly suggest that 
conciliation as a form of ADR is insufficient to provide “access to justice” for the 
Migrant Domestic Workers in Hong Kong; further, it does not meet the requirements 
mandated by International Law to which Hong Kong is obligated. It provides neither 
a remedy for human rights violations of forced labour, nor does it adequately address 
what may be characterized as domestic labour claims (in the majority of cases) to be 
adjudicated by the Labour Department.  
Research also disclosed that there is a high prevalence of forced labour in Hong 
Kong among MDWS who are not afforded an effective remedy. The data collected 
found that approximately 66% of the MDW within the sample group were 
categorised as being in forced labour.  
The research conducted and the findings are therefore significant for the following 
reasons: First, it is original research, in that it attempts to directly link Hong Kong’s 
international and domestic obligations to prevent, investigate and punish forced 
labour to the substantial MDW population of Hong Kong. As of the end of 2015 
there were approximately 340,380 migrant domestic workers in Hong Kong.  This 
number represents about 4.65% of the population (7.3 million).  While there have 
been other studies that have concluded that forced labour exists in Hong Kong, none 
have linked Hong Kong’s obligation to provide a remedy, the barriers to those 
remedies and the effectiveness of that remedy.  
Second, the use of the ILO indicators revealed some difficulties in their application. I 
am aware of only one other study that relied on the ILO’s indicators of forced labour 
as a tool to identify victims and assess the ease of application. The nature of this type 
of research also highlights the encouragement of Halliday and Schmidt; that, 
researchers should embrace the realisation that ‘ambiguity and difficulty were the 
rule rather than the exception in empirical research’ and at times lead to 
 
20 
serendipitous findings that provide insightful realisations that at times help ‘refine a 
research project’ but which can also result in misfortune.15 This research is no 
exception. The initial working hypothesis was that the use of the ILO methodology 
would readily identify MDWs in forced labour, and most MDWs who fell into that 
category as a result of labour rights violations would likely file claims against their 
employers with the Labour Department. A part of the original strategy was to review 
these anticipated claims to assess the labour claims process. However, the 
methodology and analysis of the data revealed that the use of some established ILO 
indicators to assess MDWs who were in forced labour was more complicated in its 
application. The serendipitous finding was that some indicators of forced labour 
were difficult to apply in an initial assessment in identifying forced labour and 
required a deeper evaluation of the specific individual work and living environment. 
While objective assessment criteria were useful, a closer scrutiny of their day-to-day 
work and life environment and their interaction with their respective employers was 
necessary for a definitive assessment conclusion. 
Third, because of the methodology applied and mixed data collection methods such 
as the in-depth screening, and semi-structured interviews and observation, indicators 
of forced labour were identified that would not have been recorded in thinner 
quantitative research. Therefore, the number of MDWs in forced labour may be 
greater than indicated in surveys conducted by organizations like Amnesty 
International and Justice Centre Hong Kong (discussed later). Indicators of forced 
labour may be overlooked in other research since they may not capture or account 
for elements that are not pre-identified on a list of indicators or revealed in 
interviews or through the resolution process. This finding is therefore a significant 
contribution to the relevant literature. 
Fourth, there is empirical confirmation that there is a high prevalence of MDWs who 
were in forced labour but accepted their working and living conditions no matter 
how appalling, and did not see themselves as victims. This finding, a passive 
acceptance of abuse on the part of the victim, raised concerns about the 
                                                
15 Simon Halliday and Patrick Schmidt, Conducting law and society research: reflections on methods 
and practices (Cambridge University Press 2009) 
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psychological impact that the abuse had on decisions made or not made on the part 
of the MDWs. A closer examination suggested that several factors could be 
identified that contributed to a psychological state of helplessness and isolation. One 
of the most glaring is Hong Kong’s ‘live-in’ rule, requiring MDWs to live with their 
employers. By its very nature, this rule turns over almost absolute control of the day-
to-day existence of the MDW to the employer. This gross imbalance in the 
employer-employee relationship diminishes the ability of the MDW to make 
independent decisions that are free of actual or perceived coercion. The secretive 
nature of domestic work outside the eye of the public provides the ideal opportunity 
for untold assaults on MDWs’ person, mind and legal rights. This impact on the 
MDWs and its damaging consequence extends to all aspects of the relationship, 
including any redress process. 
Additionally, most MWDs that were assessed to be in a forced labour situation chose 
not to seek any form of remedy or file official complaints for the variety of abuses 
suffered at the hands of their employers. Most that fell into this category did not see 
themselves in that status.  
Fifth, on a broader and conceptual level, this research contributes to and expands the 
discourse on an under-researched issue and the necessity of adopting a holistic 
approach to ensuring the implementation of human rights principles as part of an 
effective remedy. The research also raises the question of whether the use of ADR 
mechanisms is appropriate given the special vulnerability of groups such as MDWs. 
Forced labour in domestic work is a significant women’s rights issue, since the 
majority of domestic workers are women.16 The research emphasises the similarities 
of the phenomenon across geographical boundaries and implicates government 
policy, awareness and negligence in the implementation of human rights obligations. 
1.6 Organisation of research 
Chapter 2 will establish the legal framework for the prohibition of forced labour and 
the obligations on the Hong Kong government to ensure implementation of those 
obligations. These obligations emanate from the Forced Labour Convention No.29 
                                                
16 Margaret L Satterthwaite, ‘Crossing borders, claiming rights: using human rights law to empower 
women migrant workers’ (2005) 8 Yale Hum Rts & Dev LJ 1, p.4 
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(1930) specifically and more generally the ICCPR the ICESCR and the Palermo 
Protocol. I will examine a recent case for judicial review in the Hong Kong Court of 
First Instance which provides a doctrinal analysis of the obligations of the Hong 
Kong government and examines the definition of forced labour and the criteria for 
identifying victims using the “Palermo Protocol” as an additional instrument to 
elucidate these obligations. The obligations of the Hong Kong government, the 
application of the Forced Labour Convention, the nature of the violation and the 
mechanism for redress will be further examined in the broader examination of an 
effective remedy in chapter 4. 
Chapter 3 will focus on the methodology used in this research, outlining the 
sampling and data collection, validity and methodological framework, challenges in 
executing the methodology and ethical dilemmas. 
Chapter 4 will examine what constitutes an effective remedy as the first of three 
parts of the literature review. It will examine the relationship of the obligation to 
prevent human rights violations with the obligation to provide an effective remedy. 
In examining this literature, the aim is to provide an understanding of an effective 
remedy, the duty to implement obligations domestically, and to articulate the 
necessary component measures in providing an effective remedy with special 
attention to vulnerable groups or individuals. 
Chapter 5 the second part of the Literature review will examine the concept and 
identification of vulnerable groups and individuals who should be provided special 
attention due to their specific vulnerabilities.  
Chapter 6, the third part of the literature review examines the barriers to a remedy 
broadly and consider the merits of ADR, a non-judicial mechanism, as an effective 
remedy to address the issues identified with MDWs. The research found that 
conciliation acted as a barrier to a remedy and is addressed as a finding in chapter 9. 
Chapter 7 will outline the current conditions in Hong Kong affecting MDW. One of 
the issues that will also be considered is the Hong Kong government’s policies and 
priorities as they pertain to the MDWs, and the impact of those choices on that 
vulnerable population as a whole. 
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Chapter 8 will provide the analysis of data collected relative to the prevalence of 
forced labour and conditions of employment, that there is an imbalance in power 
between the employer and employee, the finding that many MDWs do not see 
themselves as victims and had ‘no choice’ but to continue in an abusive employment 
situation, and a comparison with other similar research. 
The concluding Chapter 9 will provide the analysis of data collected that MDWs 
experience variety of barriers to a remedy. These barriers will be presented in four 
sections, social and cultural barriers, institutional barriers and structural barriers and 
conciliation as a barrier. Social and cultural barriers include threats of reprisals, lack 
of awareness on the part of MDWs. Institutional barriers include lack of legal 
frameworks, access to authorities, lack of representation, lack of enforcement, lack 
of government awareness, lack of corroborative evidence, lack of awareness at 
redress, lack of enforcement of judgments, government policy as reprisals, excessive 
delays, fees and cost associated with claiming. Structural barriers will address 
corruption. The final section will address the conciliation process as a barrier to a 
remedy engaging the literature on ADR and non-judicial/informal mechanisms to 
highlight the inappropriate nature of the mechanism for vulnerable individuals. 
Additionally I will outline the conclusions and recommendations of the research. 
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Chapter 2. Legal Framework 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the legal framework of Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region Government (HKSARG) on the prohibition of forced labour. A portion of 
this chapter is also devoted to a landmark case, ZN v Secretary of Justice and Others, 
which was decided by the Hong Kong Court of First Instance (HKCtFI) in 2015.17 
Though styled a civil case, the court was confronted with many of the issues of 
forced labour identified by my research. Broadly, the court’s ruling was a firm 
rebuke of the Hong Kong Government’s policies and lack of response, awareness 
and protection of victims of human trafficking for forced labour. 
As a threshold matter, The People’s Republic of China accepted that Hong Kong was 
bound by the Forced Labour Convention No.29 (1930) in 1997, after gaining 
jurisdiction over Hong Kong. The Forced Labour Convention lays the legal 
foundation for the prohibition of forced labour and identifies the criteria to identify 
victims. The concept of forced labour is broad in scope and emphasises that the 
employee’s right to free choice of employment is ‘inalienable’.18 The underlying 
principle is that the employee must give free and informed consent when deciding to 
accept employment. Therefore, the nature of the work, location, employer, working 
conditions and other relevant information must be made known to the individual so 
that an informed and considered decision can be made in accepting or rejecting the 
job offer. In addition, if an employee initially accepts an offer and then decides to 
terminate the employment, the employee should be able to do so within the terms of 
any contract.  
The research that I conducted made clear that many MDWs in Hong Kong have to 
deal with work conditions that are in violation of these basic precepts, and have to do 
so without appropriate redress mechanisms or a legally sufficient and adequate 
                                                
17 ZN v Secretary of Justice and Others, HCAL15B/2015 
18 ILO, Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
(articles 19, 22 and 35 of the Constitution); International Labour Conference (96 Session) ‘Eradication 
of Forced Labour’ Report III (Part 1B) (2007) p.21 
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response from the Hong Kong government pursuant to its obligation under the 
Convention.  
In Hong Kong case ZN v Secretary of Justice and Others, the central issue for the 
court was to provide an interpretation of Article 4 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights 
Ordinance (BOR) which prohibits slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory 
labour. The judicial review sought to determine whether human trafficking was 
prohibited under the BOR, although Hong Kong is not obligated under the “Protocol 
to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons” 19  and to outline its 
obligations associated with the prohibition of forced labour.  
The three sections below will examine: the background of the Hong Kong case for 
judicial review in section 2.2, the prohibition of forced labour under the recognized 
international and domestic legal framework, and the definition and criteria for 
identifying forced labour in section 2.3 and the international and domestic legal 
obligations for the prohibition of forced labour in section 2.4. The obligations to 
which Hong Kong is bound under domestic law fall within the broader concept of an 
effective remedy. 
2.2 Background – Judicial Review 
The grounds for judicial review in ZN v Secretary of Justice and Others20 arose from 
the application to the HKCtFI alleging the failure of the HKSARG and the relevant 
authorities to protect the applicant from human trafficking for servitude or forced 
labour, after being brought to Hong Kong to work as an MDW between 2007 and 
2010.  
The applicant alleged that the HKSARG and other government authorities failed in 
their duties and obligations to ensure the protection against human trafficking 
guaranteed by Article 4 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383 (BOR), 
which prohibits slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour. The applicant 
alleged that he complained to officers of the Immigration Department, the Hong 
                                                
19 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime: Supplementary Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, adopted 15 
November 2000, G.A. Res. 55/25 
20 ZN v Secretary of Justice and Others, HCAL15B/2015 
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Kong Police and the Labour Department about the conditions under which he was 
required to work; however, the authorities took no action and failed to investigate his 
complaints as a case of human trafficking for servitude or forced labour. He further 
complained that these failures ‘…were systematic and occurred primarily because of 
the absence of any legislative framework to prevent human trafficking or to protect 
victims of human trafficking where they are subject to servitude or forced labour’.21  
The applicant, a Pakistani male in his 30’s had previously worked for the employer 
and the employer’s family in Pakistan. He was first brought to Hong Kong on 1 
May, 2007, accompanied by the employer’s sister. She subsequently retained his 
passport and continued to do so during the period of his employment. The 
employer’s sister was also responsible for addressing all of the legal requirements for 
his work in Hong Kong.  
Findings of fact  
Based on the evidence submitted and other information considered by the HKCtFI, 
the following relevant findings of fact22 were established by the court:   
(1) The applicant was a member of a lower socio-economic “caste” than his 
employer in Pakistan. The implications to this culturally accepted background were 
limited access to education, economic opportunities and general lack of 
sophistication and ignorance of the functions of government and its legal systems, 
particularly in Hong Kong.    
(2) The applicant had been employed by the employer and his family in Pakistan. 
Socio-economic and cultural norms in Pakistan led to the employer asserting 
considerable command and control over the applicant. 
(3) The employer and his family arranged for the applicant to work for them in Hong 
Kong. They sponsored his work permit, and arranged his transportation to Hong 
Kong. The applicant had not previously travelled outside of Pakistan.  
                                                
21 Ibid, para 2 
22 ZN v Secretary of Justice and Others, HCAL15B/2015, para 160 
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(4) The employer promised the applicant that he would have good working 
conditions, and that he would receive a salary of $4,000 per month. The two 
contracts considered by the court in the dispute at issue specified $3,400in salary, 
and a $300 food allowance, and $3,580 in salary and $300 food allowance 
respectively. The court found that while these documents may have been presented 
to the applicant by the employer, the applicant did not understand them, and in some 
instances did not sign them. The applicant was not paid his wages for nearly a 4 year 
period.  
(5) The applicant was accompanied to Hong Kong in January 2007, by a member of 
the employer’s family who held all of the travel and identification documents of the 
applicant. Further these documents were in the employers custody during the 
duration of the applicants stay in Hong Kong. 
(6) During his stay in Hong Kong, the applicant was under the total control and 
influence of his employer. The employer decided all aspects of the applicant’s work 
and living conditions. The applicant had no knowledge of his rights or protections 
under the law, and was certainly unaware of obligations on the part of his employer 
created by the applicable laws or administrative regulations. The court found that the 
employer’s dominance and control existed at all levels, psychological, physical and 
economic, creating a state of dependency.   
 (7) Though employed as a foreign domestic helper, he was required to work in the 
employer’s trading company (which the applicant agreed to do). The applicant was 
required to live on the property of the business, sleeping on the carpeted floor of one 
of the offices. He was required to work long hours, seven days a week. He was given 
two meals a day, and his movements were limited to the property of the trading 
company, save to run any office related errands. The applicant was allowed breaks, 
but the court was not able to identify the frequency or the length of these breaks.  
(9) The applicant was suffered both physical and emotional abuse at the hands of the 
employer. Although the applicant did not suffer any serious injuries, the court found 
the abuse pervasive.   
 (10) In late 2010, the applicant asked the employer to give him an advance on his 
unpaid wages to assist his family in Pakistan. The employer deceived the applicant 
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into returning to Pakistan, and then terminated his contract and associated 
sponsorship in Hong Kong. The end result was an inability for the applicant to claim 
the wages that were owned to him and a de–facto prohibition from entering Hong 
Kong to pursue a legal claim.  
(11) Subsequently, when the applicant attempted to claim his unpaid wages, the 
employer and members of his family and business associates, both in Hong Kong 
and in Pakistan, threatened the applicant and his family.  
(12) The applicant returned to Hong Kong in April 2012 to claim his unpaid wages 
from and to report the mistreatment that he had suffered from the employer. He 
presented himself to the Immigration Department upon his arrival, admitting his 
illegal entry, and requesting the right to make a claim on his unpaid wages and the 
right to file a complaint against the employer for mistreatment received over the 
course of his employment.  
(13) Between April 2012 and September 2013, the applicant was interviewed on 
multiple occasions by the Immigration Department , the Labour Department and 
police department.  
 (14) Upon his return to Hong Kong, the employer filed charges of theft against the 
applicant. These charges went to trial and the accused was acquitted of any 
wrongdoing. The clear belief was that these charges were retaliatory and initiated to 
discourage the applicant from pursuing his case.  
Relying on the ILO’s indicators for identifying forced labour, jurisprudence of the 
ILO and its Committee of Experts , available Hong Kong domestic law and the 
European Court of Human Rights, specifically Siliadin v France , Rantsev v Cyprus 
and Russia   CN & V v France  and  C.N. v The United Kingdom  to define the 
nature and extent of Hong Kong’s legal obligations under the Forced Labour 
Convention No.29 (1930) which has been incorporated into the Basic Law of Hong 
Kong (Article 4 BOR). International and regional human rights courts have 
considered ILO instruments and jurisprudence when interpreting and applying 
regional human rights treaties.  These courts engage in binding adjudication 
available to individuals within the state party’s jurisdiction, ‘complement and 
reinforce protective effects of ILO conventions and forms the foundation on which 
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domestic courts rely for referencing the application of international human rights 
issues’.  In addressing the gaps in Convention obligations and the actual application 
of those obligations, courts have attempted to clarify a state’s obligations. The 
repeated caution is that the provisions of a Convention should not be the sole 
framework for interpreting Convention rights.  However, it “…must be read as a 
whole, and interpreted in such a way as to promote internal consistency and harmony 
between its provisions.”   
The HKCtFI incorporated the concepts of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT) in its reasoning. The VCLT sets the binding standards and 
principles on the interpretation of international treaties and makes clear that these 
standards and principles must be done in good faith and in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning given to the terms of the Convention, its context and aligned with 
its object and purpose for which the Convention was drafted.   The context for the 
interpretation of the purpose and objective of the Convention includes the text and 
the preamble and annexes. Parties to conventions are bound to execute their 
obligations in good faith may not invoke its domestic law or lack thereof as 
justification for failure to perform.  The prohibition of forced labour and its 
accompanying obligations are binding on its parties and therefore as an international 
convention must be interpreted and executed in accordance with the VCLT. 
2.3 The prohibition of forced labour 
This section examines the legal framework which includes the definition and the 
criteria for identifying forced labour. The prohibition of forced labour dates back to 
the International Labour Organisation Forced Labour Convention, No.29 (1930) and 
Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, No.105 (1957). These Conventions apply to 
Hong Kong through ratification by the British Government on 3 June 1931 and on 3 
June 1957 respectively.23 The legal commitments were extended to Hong Kong by 
the government of the People’s Republic of China (‘China’) on 1 July 1997,24 and 
                                                
23 ILO Ratification by Convention, http://www.ilo.org, accessed 22 April, 2015 
24 The Basic Law of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of The People’s Republic of China, 
Article 39; Peggy Lee, Carole Petersen, ‘Forced Labour and Debt Bondage in Hong Kong: A Study of 
Indonesian and Filipina Migrant Domestic Workers’ [2006] Centre for Comparative and Public Law 
Faculty of Law, The University of Hong Kong 
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remain in effect. Additionally The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) was extended to Hong Kong by the United Kingdom’s ratification in 
1976.25 The Sino-British Joint Declaration in 198426 provided that the treaty would 
continue to apply to Hong Kong and was incorporated into Hong Kong’s domestic 
law in 1991, through the enactment of the Bill of Rights Ordinance (BOR) (Cap. 
383).27 The BOR, Article 39 of the Basic Law (Hong Kong’s constitution since July 
1997) provides that the provisions of the ICCPR, as applied to Hong Kong, ‘shall 
remain in force and shall be implemented through the laws of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region’.28 The text related to the prohibition on all forms of 
slavery and forced labour as outlined in Article 8 of the ICCPR (based on Article 4 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)) has been directly 
incorporated in Article 4, section 8, of the Hong Kong BOR. The Hong Kong Court 
of Final Appeal has held that this has the effect of incorporating the ICCPR into the 
Basic Law, giving it constitutional force.29 
2.3.1 Legal Framework 
In setting out the legal framework of human trafficking for forced labour, the 
HKCtFI adopted a global view of the mechanisms implemented to combat this 
phenomenon. It made note that the Abolition of Slavery Act was implemented in 
1833 in the United Kingdom and in 1844 in Hong Kong with the first ever Slavery 
Ordinance. These early instruments were followed by two significant ILO 
Conventions, the Forced Labour Convention of (1930) and the Abolition of Forced 
Labour Convention of 1957. The League of Nations approved the Slavery 
Convention in 1926 and charged signatories to supress all forms of slavery, a 
condition or status where one person assumes the right of ownership over another. In 
1956 the United Nations Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery and 
                                                
25 Lee and Petersen, Forced Labour and Debt Bondage in Hong Kong: A Study of Indonesian and 
Filipina Migrant Domestic Workers, p.17 
26 Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong (signed in 
Beijing on 19 Dec. 1984 and entered into force on 27 May 1985 on the exchange of instruments of 
ratification. 
27 Ghai, Hong Kong’s new constitutional order: the resumption of Chinese sovereignty and the Basic 
Law, p.406 
28 Ibid at 138, see also ZN v Secretary of Justice and Others, HCAL15B/2015, para 186 
29 HKSAR v Ng	Kung	Sin [2002] 2 HKC 117 (CFA). 
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Practices related to Slavery recognized the prohibition of debt bondage and serfdom. 
In 1948, the adoption of the UDHR recognized that “all human beings are born free 
and equal in dignity and rights” (Article 1) and that “…no person shall be held in 
slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms” 
(Article 4). In 1966, the ICCPR (Article 8) and the ICESCR (Article 6 and 7) 
prohibited slavery and related practices and provided for the right to work and enjoy 
just and favourable conditions of work respectively.  
The HKCtFI relied on the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons (the Palermo Protocol) for the definition of human trafficking. The Protocol 
supplements the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organised Crime and 
Article 3 provides that: 
 “(a) ‘Trafficking in persons’ shall mean the recruitment, transportation, 
transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of 
force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the 
abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving 
of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control 
over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall 
include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other 
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices 
similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs;  
(b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended 
exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant 
where any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) have been used;  
(c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child 
for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered ‘trafficking in persons’ 
even if this does not involve any of the means set forth in sub-paragraph (a) 
of this article.”  
Enshrined within Article 3 are three constituent elements of human trafficking. 
Firstly, the act is the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of 
persons. Secondly, the means is the manner by which the act is achieved and 
includes the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, 
of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving 
or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having 
control over another person. Thirdly, the purpose for which the act is done, which is 
exploitation, it includes the exploitation for the prostitution of others or other forms 
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of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or similar practices, 
servitude or the removal of organs. In regard to the trafficking of children, there are 
two elements; the act of trafficking as referred to above, and for the purposes of 
exploitation as defined.  
The protocol also imposes obligations to adopt legislative and other measures 
necessary to establish criminal offences in Article 5, an obligation to provide 
assistance to victims in Article 6 and an obligation to establish comprehensive 
policies, programs and other measures to combat and protect victims of human 
trafficking. Although the People’s Republic of China and Macau is a signatory to the 
Palermo Protocol, a reservation has been entered by China in relation to the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR). Thus the Protocol does not apply to 
the HKSAR.30  
2.3.1.1 Hong Kong Basic Law - Article 4 BOR 
Article 4 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights states: 
 
“No slavery or servitude 
  
(1) No one shall be held in slavery; slavery and the slave-trade in all their 
forms shall be prohibited.  
 
(2) No one shall be held in servitude. 
 
(3) (a) No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.  
(b) For the purpose of this paragraph the term “forced or compulsory labour” 
shall not include-  
(i) any work or service normally required of a person who is under detention 
in consequence of a lawful order of a court, or of a person during conditional 
release from such detention;  
(ii) any service of a military character and, where conscientious objection is 
recognized, any national service required by law of conscientious objectors;  
(iii) any service exacted in cases of emergency or calamity threatening the 
life or well-being of the community;  
(iv) any work or service which forms part of normal civil obligations.”  
In Articles 8(3) of the ICCPR and 4(3) of the BOR relating to forced labour, both are 
                                                
30 ZN v Secretary of Justice and Others, HCAL15B/2015, para 176 
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subject to derogation, but only in cases of public emergency where the life of the 
nation is threatened and only to the extent required by the exigencies of the 
situation.31 
The realisation that forced or compulsory labour for public purposes would 
sometimes be necessary, Article 4(3) BOR provides for and follows the exceptions 
laid out in Article 8(3) ICCPR. The exceptions provide for work required by 
compulsory military service, provided it is of a purely military character; normal 
civic obligations; conviction in a court of law; cases of emergency; and minor 
communal services performed by members of a community and in the direct interest 
of the community.32 Other than the exceptions specified, the right not to be subjected 
to slavery, servitude or forced labour is absolute.33 
2.3.2 Definition and criteria 
The definition of forced labour specified in the Article 2(1) Convention No.29 
defines forced labour as:	
‘…all work or service which is exacted from any person under 
the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not 
offered himself voluntarily’.34 
The ILO’s definition of forced labour comprises two basic elements: the work or 
service is exacted under the menace of a penalty and it is undertaken involuntarily. 
The HKCtFI looked to C.N. V v France35 for clarity on defining forced labour. In 
that case, the court relied on extracts from “The cost of coercion: global report under 
the follow-up to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work”, adopted by the International Labour Conference in 1999:  
Menace of any penalty 
 “24. The work of the ILO supervisory bodies has served to clarify both of 
these elements. The penalty does not need to be in the form of penal 
                                                
31 Ibid para 183 
32 ILO, ‘Forced labour and trafficking: a casebook of court decisions: a training manual for judges, 
prosecutors and legal practitioners’ [2009] Geneva, p.10 
33 ZN v Secretary of Justice and Others, HCAL15B/2015, para183 
34 International Labour Organisation Forced Labour Convention No.29 (1930), Geneva, 14 ILC session 
(28 Jun 1930), Article 2 para. 1 
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sanctions, but may also take the form of a loss of rights and privileges. 
Moreover, the menace of a penalty can take many different forms. Arguably, 
its most extreme form involves physical violence or restraint, or even death 
threats addressed to the victim or relatives. There can also be subtler forms 
of menace, sometimes of a psychological nature. Situations examined by the 
ILO have included threats to denounce victims to the police or immigration 
authorities when their employment status is illegal, or denunciation to village 
elders in the case of girls forced to prostitute themselves in distant cities. 
Other penalties can be of a financial nature, including economic penalties 
linked to debts. Employers sometimes also require workers to hand over their 
identity papers, and may use the threat of confiscation of these documents in 
order to exact forced labour.”36  
The Committee of Experts37 (ILO supervisory body) has concluded that the menace 
of penalty which is the means of coercion, should be construed broadly and does not 
always have to be penal sanctions. Additionally, menace of penalty may include 
subtler forms of a psychological nature, or a loss of rights and privileges such as 
transfers, access to new employment and housing. The Committee has identified the 
scope of rights or privileges to include entitlement benefits based on previous work 
or contributions, such as social security. The concept obviously includes more 
extreme acts such as physical violence, restraint or death threats.38 
The Human Rights Committee has acknowledged the definitions of relevant ILO 
instruments to be useful in elucidating the meaning of the terms forced or 
compulsory labour in Article 8 of the ICCPR. The Committee concluded, the term 
forced or compulsory labour covered a range of conduct extending from labour 
imposed on an individual in particularly coercive, exploitative or egregious 
conditions, through to lesser forms where a sanction is threatened if the labour 
directed is not performed.39 
Examples of menace of penalty that are commonly identified and relevant in the 
MDW context include threats to falsely report victims to the police for committing a 
                                                
36 Ibid, para 52 
37 ILO, Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 
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38 Ibid see also Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights, Guide on Article 4 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights: Prohibition of Slavery and Forced Labour (2014), para. 25 
39 UN Human Rights Committee, Bernadette Faure v Australia, Communication No.1036/2001, UN 
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crime; notifying immigration authorities when the workers are in an illegal 
employment status; and financial penalties, including economic penalties linked to 
debts, the non-payment of wages, or the loss of wages accompanied by threats of 
dismissal if workers refuse to perform beyond the scope of their contract.40 The 
difficulty of leaving one’s employer is a characteristic of forced labour when leaving 
entails a penalty or other anticipated risk to the worker.41 Employers may often seize 
identity documents or use the threat of confiscation as a means to exact forced 
labour. The deliberate retention of wages is recognised as a form of coercion as the 
worker has to stay because outstanding wages will be lost if they leave, hence there 
is a penalty for leaving.  
The HKCtFI also looked to C.N. v United Kingdom42 where the ECtHR defined 
forced or compulsory labour in accordance with what had been said in Siliadin v 
France43 and based on the definition of forced labour in the ILO’s Forced Labour 
Convention. 
“The Court itself noted that the term brought to mind the idea of “physical or 
mental constraint”. In Siliadin the Court found this element to be present 
where the applicant was an adolescent girl, unlawfully present in a foreign 
land and living in fear of arrest by the police. In the present case, in light of 
the definition adopted by the Court and the ILO, and taking into 
consideration the reports by the POPPY Project and the consultant 
psychiatrist, the applicant submitted that the police’s conclusion that the lack 
of payment for the applicant’s work was no more than an absence of “honour 
among thieves” betrayed a fundamental disregard of the ILO’s key indicators 
of forced labour and a troubling ignorance of the vulnerabilities of illegal 
immigrants.”44  
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In C.N. v The United Kingdom the ECtHR Court placed emphasis on the use of the 
ILO’s developed indictors45 of forced labour in identifying instances of forced labour 
and the:	
‘…overt and more subtle forms of coercion, to force compliance. 
A thorough investigation into complaints of such conduct 
therefore requires an understanding of the many subtle ways an 
individual can fall under the control of another’.46 
The issue of coercion and its forms was addressed directly in Unites States v 
Kozminski.47 Although this case is a domestic case, I find it relevant since it provides 
examples of more subtle forms of coercion that are described by many MDWs. The 
case involved the ‘involuntary servitude’ of two mentally handicapped men who, in 
their 60s, possessed the maturity and mental development of an 8-10-year-old. The 
Court held that coercion also encompassed any form that actually succeeds in 
reducing the victim to a condition of servitude resembling that of slavery.48 They 
concluded that coercion could include psychological, economic, social coercion or 
weakness resulting from lack of food, sleep or medical care. In examining other 
similar cases, the Court noted that a variety of coercive measures were employed to 
include, isolation from friends, family, shelter, clothing, jobs, denial of pay, debt 
greater that a worker’s income, disorientation by unfamiliar environment, barraging 
workers with orders and controlling every detail of their lives.49 In this particular 
case, the victims were subjected to disorientation with frequent verbal abuse and 
complete authoritarian domination, denial of medical care, substandard food, 
                                                
45 The IlO has developed a list of indicators, the most extensive list that includes forced labour and 
trafficking lists 77 indicators of involuntariness and coercion. The list used in this research and listed 
above used a list of the 11 most common indicators. In C.N. v The United Kingdom (App. No.4239/08) 
ECtHR 13 November 2012 the Court referred to a list of six indicators used by an assisting NGO and 
included ‘1. Threats or actual physical harm to the worker. 2. Restriction of movement and 
confinement to the work place or to a limited area. 3. Debt bondage: where the worker works to pay 
off a debt or loan, and is not paid for his or her services. The employer may provide food and 
accommodation at such inflated prices that the worker cannot escape the debt. 4. Withholding of wages 
or excessive wage reductions, that violate previously made agreements. 5. Retention of passports and 
identity documents, so that the worker cannot leave, or prove his/her identity and status. 6. Threat of 
denunciation to the authorities, where the worker is in an irregular immigration status’ 
46 C.N. v The United Kingdom (App. No.4239/08) ECtHR 13 November 2012 para 80 
47 United States v Kozminski US (Supreme Court) 487 US 931 (1988), This case was identified in the 
ILO, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking. Casebook of Court Decisions p.5 as a useful case on the 
concept of coercion and the issue of an individual’s perception of constraint. While a domestic case, it 
is relevant to the issue. 
48 Ibid para 962 
49 Ibid para 956-957 
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substandard living conditions, working long hours (3 a.m. to 8:30 p.m.) with no days 
off, exhaustion without free time to seek other work, denial of wages and isolation to 
reduce contact from others that might render assistance.50 
Involuntariness 
“25. As regards “voluntary offer”, the ILO supervisory bodies have touched 
on a range of aspects including: the form and subject matter of consent; the 
role of external constraints or indirect coercion; and the possibility of 
revoking freely-given consent. Here too, there can be many subtle forms of 
coercion. Many victims enter forced labour situations initially out of their 
own choice, albeit through fraud and deception, only to discover later that 
they are not free to withdraw their labour, owing to legal, physical or 
psychological coercion. Initial consent may be considered irrelevant when 
deception or fraud has been used to obtain it.”51  
Also: 
 ‘The criterion of not having offered oneself voluntarily is distinct from that 
of the menace of any penalty. Where consent to work or service was already 
given ‘under the menace of a penalty’, the two criteria overlap: there is no 
‘voluntary offer’ under threat’.52 
A worker’s freedom to offer themself voluntarily may also be influenced by external 
constraints or indirect coercion from an act of the authorities such as a statutory 
instrument, or from an employer’s practice, such as retention of identity 
documents.53 In instances where migrant workers were induced by deceit, false 
promises and retention of identity documents or forced to remain at the disposal of 
the employer, a violation of the Forced Labour Convention occurs.54 The forced 
labour situation is characterised by an unequal relationship between the employer 
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and employee.55 The employee possesses no bargaining power in re-negotiating the 
terms and conditions of employment without facing some form of punishment.56 
In instances where workers are required to work beyond their normal working hours, 
they should be able to refuse such work, but in reality their vulnerable position 
makes such a choice almost impossible since their continued employment and wages 
depend on conforming to the exploitative request.57 However, in instances where 
work or service is imposed through exploitation of the worker’s vulnerable position, 
under ‘menace of penalty’ such as dismissal or refusal of payment, the work ceases 
to be simply an issue of poor working conditions and becomes forced labour.58 
In identifying victims of forced labour, the HKCtFI accepted the ILO indicators of 
forced labour. The indicators59 include the following:  
“a) Threats or actual physical harm to the worker;  
b) Restriction of movement and confinement, to the workplace or to a limited 
area;  
c) Debt bondage, where the worker works to pay off a debt or loan, and is not 
paid for his or her services. The employer may provide food and 
accommodation;  
d) Withholding of wages or excessive wage reduction;  
e) Retention of passport and identity documents;  
f) Threat of denunciation to the authorities;” 
The ILO provides that a person qualifies as having been trafficked if their labour 
migration involves either: (1) two strong indicators of exploitation from the 
checklist, or (2) one strong indicator and one medium or weak indicator, or (3) three 
medium indicators, or (4) two medium indicators and one weak indicator. Where 
there are two or more indicators, the employment qualifies as forced labour.60 
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2.4 Obligations under the Convention 
The Hong Kong Bill of Rights has no definition of slavery, servitude or forced or 
compulsory labour, therefore, the HKCtFI relied on relevant international 
instruments, case law and domestic legislation to interpret the concepts of human 
trafficking.61 In analysing the relevant instruments, the Court reasoned that although 
HKSAR was not a party to the Palermo Protocol and the BOR did not specifically 
mention human trafficking, human trafficking was covered under the BOR. The 
prohibition under Article 4 of the BOR of forced labour can be regarded as both the 
implementation of the ICCPR in Hong Kong and an aspect of the implementation of 
the provisions of the ILO Forced Labour Convention.62  
In Siliadin v France, the ECtHR adopted the definition of the 1930 Forced Labour 
Convention and held that Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) which is similar to Article 4 of the BOR63 imposed a positive obligation to 
protect children and vulnerable individuals in the form of effective deterrence against 
breaches of personal integrity.64 The ECtHR also held that there was a strong 
positive obligation to prevent breaches related to torture, inhumane and degrading 
treatment and that an equivalent obligation arose under Article 4 of the ECHR.65 The 
court specifically held that because there was no criminal offence under French law 
at the time related to slavery, servitude or force or compulsory labour, the current 
legislation did not provide the victim practical and effective protection and 
constituted a breach of Article 2 ECHR. 
The case of CN v France involved two sisters brought to France from Burundi by 
relatives. The elder of the sisters was found to be in forced labour and the state was 
found to be in breach of its positive obligation of Article 4 ECHR.  The court in this 
case followed Siliadin and identified the following factors associated with forced 
labour amounting to servitude: (a) the victim has a fear of deportation; (b) the victim 
has no hope of finding paid work outside the workplace; (c) the victim has no days 
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off; (d) the victim is not permitted leisure activities; (e) the victim is vulnerable and 
isolated; (f) the victim has no means of living other than at the home of the 
employer; (g) the victim’s passport has been confiscated; (h) the victim’s 
immigration status has not been regularised; (i) the victim is not permitted to leave 
the workplace other than for chores and has no freedom of movement or free time.66  
In Rantsev v Russia, the ECtHR found Cyprus in breach of Article 4 ECHR in that 
the failed to afford effective protection against trafficking and that the police had 
failed to properly investigate. The Court held that: 
“There can be no doubt that trafficking threatens the human dignity and 
fundamental freedoms of its victims and cannot be considered compatible 
with a democratic society and the values expounded in the Convention. In 
view of its obligation to interpret the Convention in light of present-day 
conditions, the Court considers it unnecessary to identify whether the 
treatment about which the applicant complains constitutes “slavery”, 
“servitude” or “forced and compulsory labour”. Instead, the Court 
concludes that trafficking itself, within the meaning of art.3(a) of the Palermo 
Protocol and art.4(a) of the Anti-Trafficking Convention, falls within the 
scope of art.4 of the Convention.”67  
In the case of C.N. v United Kingdom, the victim was brought to the United 
Kingdom from Uganda on a false passport and visa by a relative. The victim was 
confined to premises owned by the relative and her passport was seized. She was 
warned not to speak to anyone or risk being arrested. Employment was arranged for 
the victim as a carer and security guard, but any wages earned were retained by the 
relative. The victim eventually escaped and complained to the police who found her 
claim to be not credible.  
The ECtHR held that the United Kingdom was in breach of Article 4 ECHR because 
they failed to properly investigate the victim’s claim, a procedural obligation under 
the Article 4 when there is a credible suspicion the the victim was in domestic 
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servitude. The court further held that the treatment of the victim fell within the scope 
of Article 4 of the ECHR but the state had not taken steps to criminalise the 
prohibited conduct under domestic law at the time. 
The parties to the subject case in the HKCtFI were in agreement that the Strasbourg 
decisions at a minimum suggest that there were four obligations below, relative to 
human trafficking and forced labour.68 
(1) To take positive measures to protect, and not merely to refrain from 
directly infringing, the right of individuals not to be subject to slavery, 
servitude and forced labour.  
 (2) Penalisation and effective prosecuting under criminal law of any act 
which is aimed at maintaining a person in such a situation. With respect to 
human trafficking, it also requires that a legal and administrative framework 
to prohibit and punish human trafficking should be put in place.  
(3) There may be a duty in specific cases, depending on the factual 
circumstances, to take proportionate operational measures to protect 
individuals who are victims or potential victims of human trafficking.  
(4) There may be a procedural obligation in specific cases, depending on the 
factual circumstances (i.e. where it is demonstrated that the authorities were 
aware or ought to have been aware of circumstances giving rise to a credible 
suspicion that an identified individual had been, or was at real and immediate 
risk of being trafficked), to investigate cases of human trafficking in a way 
that may lead to the identification and punishment of persons responsible for 
human trafficking.  
2.4.1 Protection Under Article 4 BOR 
The HKCtFI relying on Rantsev69 noted70 that Article 4 of the BOR as well as Article 
4 of the ECHR does not explicitly include a prohibition of human trafficking. 
However, in Rantsev, the ECtHR established that by its very nature, the aim of 
human trafficking is the exploitation of individuals and therefore prohibited and does 
not necessitate the determination of whether it constituted slavery, servitude or 
forced or compulsory labour. The ECtHR further held that trafficking threatened the 
human dignity and fundamental freedoms of individuals and is incompatible with a 
democratic society. It reasoned that the interpretation of covenant obligations under 
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the ECHR must be done in light of present day conditions and it was unnecessary to 
subsume trafficking into any of the categories of slavery, servitude or forced or 
compulsory labour. 
To determine the positive obligations under the BOR, the HKCtFI71 noted that both 
Rantsev and C.N. v France followed the reasoning in Siliadin. The ECtHR in 
Siliadin confirmed that Article 4 ECHR entailed a specific positive obligation to 
penalise and prosecute effectively any act aimed at maintaining a person in a 
situation of slavery, servitude or forced or compulsory labour. To comply with this 
obligation, it is required that a legislative and administrative framework be put in 
place to prohibit and punish trafficking. To effectively combat trafficking, there is a 
need for a comprehensive approach to combat trafficking which includes measures to 
prevent trafficking and to protect victims, in addition to measures to punish 
traffickers. The duty to penalise and prosecute trafficking is only one aspect of the 
general undertaking to combat trafficking.  
The extent of the positive obligations under Article 4 must be considered within this 
broader context. Additionally, Article 4 ECHR entails a procedural obligation to 
investigate situations of potential trafficking. The requirement to investigate does not 
depend on a complaint from the victim or next-of-kin: once the matter has come to 
the attention of the authorities they must act of their own motion. For an 
investigation to be effective, it must be independent from those implicated in the 
events. It must also be capable of leading to the identification and punishment of 
individuals responsible, an obligation not of result but of means. A requirement of 
promptness and reasonable expedition is implicit in all cases but where the 
possibility of removing the individual from the harmful situation is available, the 
investigation must be undertaken as a matter of urgency. The victim or the next-of-
kin must be involved in the procedure to the extent necessary to safeguard their 
legitimate interests.  
The HKCtFI72 concluded that there is a positive obligation under Article 4 of the 
BOR to enact measures to ensure the prohibition of forced labour, to include 
criminalising and penalising any offender of forced or compulsory labour or 
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trafficking for that purpose. There must be appropriate measures in place to 
investigate such cases which constitute a criminal act as intended by the prohibition 
under Article 4 of the BOR. There is no criminal offence against forced or 
compulsory labour and the current reliance on other provisions of law falls short in 
addressing the prohibited conduct. The criminalisation of forced labour serves two 
important objectives, first it addresses the prohibited act with a specific offence 
provision and penalty and delineates the elements of the prohibited conduct. 
Secondly, it is beneficial to society as a whole as it provides notice to law 
enforcement and the general public of the conduct that is prohibited.  
The HKCtFI further concluded that the applicant was denied his rights under Article 
4 BOR, in that his case was not recognized by the relevant authorities as a victim of 
trafficking for forced labour and denied the appropriate investigation and care that 
should be afforded to victims of this crime.  
Obligations under the Forced Labour Convention require that ‘… a state undertakes 
to suppress the use of forced or compulsory labour in all its forms’.73 This 
undertaking implies both a positive and negative obligation, in that the state must 
take positive action to “abolish, forbid and counter all forms of forced labour”74 not 
to allow any form of forced labour to be imposed by private parties and must 
establish legal safeguards to prevent coercion to perform work.75 The state must also 
refrain from using forced labour as defined in the Convention for ‘its own benefit or 
the benefit of its various divisions (regions, public services, etc.)’.76 This latter 
negative obligation requires that any legislation that allows forced or compulsory 
labour should be repealed.77 
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‘The illegal exaction of forced or compulsory labour shall be 
punishable as a penal offence and …it shall be an obligation to 
any [party] to ensure that penalties imposed by law are 
adequate and strictly enforced’.78  
The application of convention obligations is also intended to be flexible in nature. To 
express this flexibility and the ability to address future harms, a convention is to be 
treated as a living instrument that must be interpreted in accordance with modern day 
conditions and requires a ‘…firmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental 
values of democratic societies’.79  
The HCtFI case highlights the ILO’s findings that there is a direct link between law 
enforcement and victim protection. Weak enforcement can be attributed to 
inadequate protection mechanisms, a lack of awareness on the part of the judiciary to 
identify forced labour violations in matters before them, and woefully inadequate 
training of law enforcement agencies and officers to recognise violations and finally, 
corruption is a major impediment in many instances. 80  As a result of these 
inadequacies, ‘there have been very few prosecutions for forced labour offences 
anywhere in the world’. 81  The lack of clear legislation, scarce resources for 
prosecutions, limited awareness both publicly and throughout state organisations and 
institutions, creates a cycle of violations and impunity on the part of perpetrators.82	
Most recently, Article 4(1) of the Protocol to the Forced Labour Convention requires 
members ‘…to ensure that all victims of forced or compulsory labour, irrespective of 
their presence or legal status in the national territory, have access to appropriate and 
effective remedies, such as compensation’.83 Other recognised remedies include 
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access to justice and rehabilitation to all victims without regard to legal status.84 
Remedies should be provided for in the territory where the forced labour occurred.85 
Conclusion 
The reasoning and decision in this case has for the first time established precedent in 
Hong Kong that should serve to clarify the HKSARG obligations to effectively 
address conditions of human trafficking for forced labour and by extension, it is not 
necessary that HKSARG recognise the “Palermo Protocol” since the constituent 
elements and purpose are the same. The reasoning also establishes that obligations 
under Article 4 BOR are reflective of other Conventions to which HKSARG is 
bound. These Conventions include the ICCPR (Article 8) based on Article 4 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the ICESCR (Article 6 and 7) that 
prohibits slavery and related practices and provided for the right to work and enjoy 
just and favourable conditions of work respectively and most importantly the Forced 
Labour Convention (1930).  
The obligations to protect victims and in particular MDWs from human trafficking 
and forced labour entail that the HKSARG must:  
(1) Take positive measures by adopting legislative and administrative 
measures to protect, and not merely to refrain from directly infringing, the 
right of individuals not to be subject to slavery, servitude and forced labour.  
 (2) Penalise prosecute and punish violators under criminal law of any act 
which is aimed at maintaining a person in such a situation.  
(3) Investigate cases as part of their a procedural obligation where the 
authorities were aware or ought to have been aware of circumstances giving 
rise to a credible suspicion that an identified individual had been, or was at 
real and immediate risk of being trafficked. The investigation must be 
conducted in a way that may lead to the identification and punishment of 
persons responsible.  
(4) Take proportionate operational measures depending on the factual 
circumstances, to protect individuals who are victims or potential victims.  
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The HKCtFI proceeded along a narrow path constrained to determining HKSARG’s 
obligations based on the definition of human trafficking for forced labour and 
whether human trafficking was prohibited under Article 4 BOR. However, the 
obligations of the HKSARG may be more extensive if a wider view of obligations 
under international law (ICCPR) is examined. Forced labour is considered a serious 
violation of international human rights law. The term ‘serious violation’ has no 
authoritative definition and is not explicitly outlined in any legal international legal 
framework.86 It is also not very clear what factors are considered in classifying a 
violation as ‘serious.87 Bearing the uncertainty of the definition in mind, several 
competent international authorities88 have interpreted the notion of serious violations 
broadly and have concurred in saying that ‘Deplorable conditions of work and 
life/forced labour/sexual slavery/slave labour’ are serious violations of international 
human rights law.89 The Council of Europe classified, ‘the prohibition of forced 
labour and slavery (Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights) among 
others as serious human rights violations. ‘In this respect, states have an obligation 
under the Convention, supported by the Court’s case-law, to enact criminal law 
provisions to criminalise forced labour’. 90  
This classification of “serious violation” and the fact that forced labour is considered 
a crime both internationally and domestically, the obligations of HKSARG 
necessitate a series of actions to sufficiently address the crime. These obligations and 
actions are covered in more detail in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 3. Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the methodology, instruments, challenges and ethical dilemmas 
in the collection of data and factors that influenced the methodology development. 
The data collected is not intended to be representative of the entire migrant domestic 
worker population in Hong Kong. Additionally, because of the selection of the NGO 
site to conduct the research, the prevalence of forced labour victims would be 
expected to be higher than those identified by randomised samples within the general 
population. 
The examination of the research question was completed in two stages. In stage one, 
the sample group was assessed to determine if any of the MDWs were in a forced 
labour status. To determine forced labour in this first stage, I relied on the ILO’s 
definition of forced labour based on the Forced Labour Convention No.29 (1930) 
and on an established, tested and validated list of indicators and qualifying criteria. 
In stage two of the research, I accompanied the MDWs assessed to be in a forced 
labour status who chose to make labour claims to the Labour Department and 
observed the relevant steps of the resolution processes. In this stage, my observation 
of the resolution process examined whether the government officials and 
departments conducted any assessment or recognised MDWs to be forced labourers 
and selected a resolution process that was appropriate to the nature and gravity of 
their working and living conditions. Additionally, the examination focused on 
whether MDWs understood the resolution process, were capable of presenting their 
cases effectively, would benefit from representation, viewed the process as fair and 
what was the MDWs expectation of the outcome of the process. 
During the research one individual was clearly identified as being a victim of human 
trafficking. The research is focused on the response to labour rights violations that 
rise to the level of forced labour and, although human trafficking and forced labour 
are very closely linked, the particulars of this case were recorded but was not 
included as the participant had not been employed in Hong Kong.   
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The fieldwork was conducted at the Mission for Migrant Workers (MFMW) over a 
seven-month period between June and December 2015. The decision to conduct the 
research through the NGO’s facility was based on three factors: first, the fear that the 
ability to access participant documents and other information would be difficult at 
other venues, particularly the Labour Department, and may involve privacy issues; 
second, I had no resources to provide support to MDWs and the NGO site provided a 
safe environment to interview participants; and third, the topic of migrant worker 
abuse in Hong Kong is politically unpalatable and free and transparent access to 
information is difficult. 
In total, 80 MDWs were interviewed, with 53 identified as being in forced labour; 17 
agreed to follow up interviews and provided detailed information about their 
working and living conditions. However, of the 53 people assessed to be in forced 
labour employment status, only 12 made complaints to the Labour Department. An 
additional seven participants were interviewed through referrals, bringing the total 
number of participants to 87. The inclusion of these additional participants will be 
addressed below under ‘sampling’. 
I was granted access to potential participants beginning from 10 June to 24 August 
2015. The flow of MDWs arriving for assistance was slower than expected and by 16 
July only 23 participants had been interviewed, an average of 3 interviews per week. 
To address the lower than anticipated number of participants, I negotiated with 
MFMW for additional access to the MDWs and also contacted other NGOs for their 
assistance. In the end, MFMW extended access to include Sundays and between 19 
July and 24 August, I interviewed an additional 57 participants, averaging 8 
interviews on Sundays when the majority of MDWs have their weekly rest day. The 
number of interviews during the week remained constant. The demographic 
breakdown of the 80 participants interviewed included, 76 Filipino MDWs, two 
Indonesians and two from Madagascar. I eventually accompanied a total of 17 
participants to redress forums through a combination of conciliation, Minor Claims 
Adjudication Board or the Labour Tribunal. In addition to the 87 participants, I 
conducted interviews with nine key informants and submitted written questions to 
five HK Government agencies. 
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The four sections below will examine, methods of data collection to include 
sampling and data sources in 7.2, the methodology framework in section 7.3, 
challenges during research in 7.4 and ethical dilemmas in 7.5. 
3.2 Data collection 
This section explains how the sample frame was selected, the 4 methods of data 
collection and instruments used and the method of gaining consent. Data was 
collected from screening MDWs seeking assistance for labour rights complaints that 
included living and working conditions, breaches of the employment contract and 
concerns of final wages and entitlements after premature termination. Data was also 
collected from semi-structured interviews, accompaniment of MDWs to interviews 
and redress hearings and other key informant sources from NGOs and government 
organisations and departments. 
3.2.1 Sampling of MDWs 
MDWs were selected to provide data on their living and working conditions that 
would allow me to assess whether they were in forced labour and to further 
understand what factors were considered if they decided to stay with their employers. 
The sample frame was determined by referral from NGO staff who asked their 
clients if they would participate in the research. This referral process was acceptable 
for two reasons. First, from an ethical standpoint, clients arriving at the NGO for 
assistance were at times seeking assistance for traumatic experiences, therefore I 
refrained from inserting the research into a process intended to provide care and 
assistance to the clients. Second, while it may be viewed as undesirable to not have 
total control over the sample selection, I would argue that this trade-off is an 
example of decisions that may need to be made in this type of research dealing with 
access to a vulnerable population and the “Gatekeeper” NGO’s ability to effectively 
tend to their clients. Again, Halliday and Schmidt make the point that researchers 
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should embrace the realisation that ‘ambiguity and difficulty were the rule rather 
than the exception in empirical research’.91 
Clients that agreed to participate were referred for inclusion in the research study. To 
narrow the sample size and identify participants that would enable the observation of 
the redress process, criterion sampling was chosen as the most appropriate method to 
gather the data needed on MDWs filing complaints with the Labour Department. 
This method was based on the ILO guideline that two or more indicators 
(involuntariness and menace of penalty with one being strong) might indicate the 
presence of forced labour; therefore, participants exhibiting two or more indicators 
that met the ILO’s criteria of forced labour were selected as potential participants for 
accompaniment to the redress processes. To provide an in-depth understanding of the 
MDW’s working and living conditions, participants were asked to participate in a 
second in-depth interview for use in case studies. This in-depth interview used an 
established ILO questionnaire92 designed to capture the required information as an 
interview guide. Seventeen of the 53 participants when asked, agreed to participate 
further in the semi-structured interviews. Of the 53 participants in forced labour, 
only 12 decided to pursue a remedy. The overall question to be answered is whether 
MDWs have access to an effective remedy, and since the remedy gap exists in 
relation to human rights violations of forced labour, it was necessary to first establish 
the presence of forced labour before examining the available redress mechanisms. 
Similar research that has been conducted in the past used snowball sampling where 
the overall sample group was identified through referral from earlier participants. It 
was determined that this method may not have been an appropriate means to gather 
the required data as there would be no way to follow claims in real time from when 
the violations were revealed to the NGO through resolution either by agreement with 
the employer or through one of the available redress processes. 
To address the low numbers seeking a remedy, an additional 7 participants were 
added to examine the redress process in this second phase. Of the 7 additional 
                                                
91 Simon Halliday and Patrick Schmidt, Conducting law and society research: reflections on methods 
and practices (Cambridge University Press 2009) 
92 ILO, Hard to See, Harder to Count: Survey Guidelines to Estimate Forced Labour of Adults and 
Children (Genève, Bureau international du Travail 2011) 
 
51 
participants, four were referred by MFMW and earlier participants from the initial 
cohort of 80 referred three participants to me. 
3.2.2 Sampling of key informants 
Key informant interviews were conducted to gather general data on the conditions on 
the employment of MDWs, perceptions on the effectiveness or lack of effectiveness 
of existing laws and policies. Written questions were submitted to government 
agencies and departments to gather data on the government’s position on addressing 
complaints of MDWs, awareness and response to concerns from NGOs and civil 
society organisations about the treatment of MDWs. 
3.2.3 Data Sources 
This section addresses the methods of data collection that includes screening of 
MDWs, securing written consent, conducting semi-structured interviews, 
accompaniment, and other data collection sources. 
3.2.3.1 Screening of MDWs 
Once I made contact with a MDW, I explained that the reasons for the research was 
to determine if their working and living conditions were more than just poor 
employee/employer relationships or could be classified as forced labour, and whether 
the current Labour Department resolution processes were adequate to resolve their 
complaints. I then asked if they were willing to participate in the research and 
received verbal consent that they were. None of the MDWs were aware of what 
forced labour was, and usually asked me to explain. I referred to a three-page 
information sheet that explained the 11 indicators of forced labour and informed 
them that I first wanted to ask some questions and then explain what forced labour 
was. Most of the MDWs appeared eager to answer questions seemingly seeking 
education that clarified their own predicament, if complaining about their work 
conditions. I administered a screening form designed to capture the 11 most 
commonly experienced indicators of forced labour (Appendix 1) outlined in the 
ILO’s booklet on forced labour.93 The 11 indicators were treated as high-level 
                                                
93 International labour Office, ILO Indicators of Forced Labour, Special Action Programme to Combat 
Forced Labour (Geneva 2012) 
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operational indicators with sub-categories of what I called behavioural indicators. 
Both operational and behavioural indicators represent the physical, psychological 
and economic methods of involuntariness and menace of penalty (coercion) 
associated with forced labour (see Chapter 2). To be classified as being in forced 
labour under the ILO guidelines, a participant needed to exhibit at least one 
behavioural indicator of involuntariness and one indicator of menace of penalty with 
one of the indicators assessed as being strong.94 
Depending on the comfort level of the participant, they were either asked whether 
they experienced any of the 11 operational indicators or associated behavioural 
indicators, or through free dialogue the behavioural indicators were self-identifying 
and follow up questions were asked. At the conclusion of the screening, participants 
were asked whether they intended to file a claim with the Labour Department based 
on their complaint to the service provider and not on the screening conducted that 
may have identified then as being in a forced labour situation. If they were not 
intending to file a claim, additional information was sought to understand why that 
was. The screening form also collected minimal demographic data such as name, 
age, education, nationality and years of experience. The screening of participants 
took approximately 45 minutes to an hour if forced labour was assessed. If there was 
no assessment of forced labour, the interview lasted approximately 20 minutes. 
The concept of involuntariness relates to the fact that victims may at times make the 
decision to enter employment situations that constitute forced labour, and sometimes 
through fraud or deception only to realise later that they lack the freedom to leave 
their employment due to legal, physical or psychological coercion.95 The initial 
consent would be considered irrelevant when deception or fraud had been used to 
mask the true nature and conditions of the employment.96 The freedom to leave 
forced labour is also often influenced by external constraints or indirect coercion 
from an act, statutory instrument or policy of the authorities, or from an employer or 
                                                
94 The International Labour Organisation has developed indicators of forced labour that have been 
qualified as strong or medium indicators through consensus of experts in the field based on the severity 
or degree of abuse. 
95 International Labour Conference (93 Session) ‘A Global Alliance Against Forced Labour’ Report I 
(B) 2005, p.5-6 
96 Ibid 
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third party’s practice, such as retention of identity documents.97 In almost all cases, 
the employee is unable to negotiate the terms and conditions of employment without 
facing some form of punishment,98 removing their ability to negotiate and leaving 
them with little choice but to continue in their employment as their wages depended 
on conforming to the exploitative request.99 If a worker is not free to withdraw their 
consent without fear of a penalty, it may be categorised as forced labour.100 
Similarly, the worker may also be left with little choice but to perform work that is 
hard, hazardous, dangerous, illegal,101 or performed in degrading living conditions 
with limitations on their freedom or excessive dependency imposed on them by the 
employer after they arrive at the destination country.102 When any of the decisions to 
perform work that is not encompassed within their labour contract and their 
subsequent decision is influenced by fear of punishment, or loss of benefits whether 
actual or perceived, the work/labour becomes forced labour. 103 
The assessment of the element of menace of penalty should be construed broadly, as 
it might include a range of penalties from subtle forms of a psychological coercion to 
more extreme forms physical violence, restraint or death threats. 104  The ILO 
Committee of Experts has identified the scope of rights or privileges to include 
entitlement benefits based on previous work as one such right or privilege,105 and 
threats of dismissal if workers refuse to perform work beyond the scope of their 
contract.106 Employers may often seize identity documents or use the threat of 
                                                
97 Ibid 
98 International Labour Conference (93 Session) ‘A Global Alliance Against Forced Labour’ Report I 
(B) (2005)  
99 International Labour Conference (96 Session) ‘Eradication of Forced Labour’ Report III (Part 1B) 
(2007) p.72 
100 ILO, Promoting Jobs, Protecting People, Q & A’s on Business and Forced Labour 
101 International Labour Conference, (93 Session) ‘A Global Alliance Against Forced Labour’, Report I 
(B) 2005 
102 Lee and Petersen, ‘Forced Labour and Debt Bondage in Hong Kong: A Study of Indonesian and 
Filipina Migrant Domestic Workers’ 
103 Ibid 
104 ILO, Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
(articles 19, 22 and 35 of the Constitution), International Labour Conference (96 Session) ‘Eradication 
of Forced Labour’ Report III (Part 1B) (2007)  
105 Ibid, also Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights, Guide on Article 4 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights: Prohibition of Slavery and Forced Labour, para. 25 
106 International Labour Conference, General Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations (85 Session) Report III (Geneva 1998), paras. 106, 123 
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confiscation as a way to impose their will on the MDW.107 However, a worker who 
may not be able to leave a job because of a lack of alternative income opportunities 
may not be in a situation of forced labour unless it is coupled with other identifiable 
elements of coercion.108 
3.2.3.2 Semi-Structured Interview 
Participants who had met the criteria of forced labour and were contemplating filing 
claims were asked to participate in a semi-structured interview. This used a 26-
question questionnaire adapted from the ILO.109 The questionnaire (Appendix 3) was 
adapted to the Hong Kong context and to domestic work and served two purposes: 
first to capture more detailed information about the participant’s recruitment, 
working and living conditions, debt and methods of coercion associated with their 
employment; and second, as a guide to the interview based on structured questions 
but allowing for follow up and clarifying questions. 
Participants who verbally agreed to participate further were provided with an 
information sheet to inform them about the specifics of the research with the intent 
of eventually securing written consent to accompany them to any redress hearings. 
The information sheet was read to participants or read together (Appendix 2). I also 
provided a three-page attachment to the information sheet describing the 11 
operational indicators and behavioural indicators describing forced labour situations. 
Once the information sheet was completed, I asked participants if they understood 
the information provided and whether they had any further questions. An effort was 
made to ensure no additional harm110 was caused to participants and they were 
offered the opportunity to take the information sheet with them if they could do so 
without drawing unwanted scrutiny from their employers. In some instances, 
participants did take the information with them and others declined out of concern 
                                                
107 Ibid 
108 International Labour Conference (93 Session) ‘A Global Alliance Against Forced Labour’ Report I 
(B) (2005)  
109 ILO, Hard to See, Harder to Count: Survey Guidelines to Estimate Forced Labour of Adults and 
Children 
110 Karen Jacobsen and Loren B Landau, ‘The dual imperative in refugee research: some 
methodological and ethical considerations in social science research on forced migration’ (2003) 27 
Disasters 185; Catriona Mackenzie, Christopher McDowell and Eileen Pittaway, ‘Beyond ‘do no 
harm’: The challenge of constructing ethical relationships in refugee research’ (2007) 20 Journal of 
Refugee studies 299 
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over their employer’s reaction. While the literature focuses on methodologies in 
gathering data and the exposure of research participants, in this instance the 
provision of information to better educate participants could have exacerbated their 
already precarious employer-employee relationships. 
Once the information sheet was completed, I asked participants to consent in writing, 
agreeing to participating in the in-depth semi-structured interview, having the 
interview recorded, using quotes or their responses and experiences in case studies. 
The written consent (Appendix 2) also provided agreement for the use of 
pseudonyms to protect their identity and allowing me to accompany them to any 
forum that might assist or adjudicate their claims. I informed all participants that 
whether they agreed to or declined to participate in the research, their decision would 
have no impact on the quality of service offered by the NGO staff. I assured 
participants that care would be taken in maintaining their confidentiality and no clues 
to their identity would appear in the research or any future publication. Any 
quotations would be entirely anonymous, and done under the agreed pseudonyms. I 
provided participants with my contact information and informed them that if they 
had any questions, concerns, or no longer wanted to participate after leaving the 
interview they should contact me within 3 months to express the desire to withdraw 
and they would not be included. 
3.2.3.3 Accompaniment 
I accompanied participants to police interviews, scheduled hearings and 
appointments filing claims with the Labour Department, to conciliation meetings, 
MECAB and Labour Tribunal hearings in varying combinations. Of the 53 initial 
participants in forced labour, 12 were accompanied to conciliation, MECAB and the 
Labour Tribunal. Some Participants went to a combination of conciliation and 
MECAB or conciliation and the Labour Tribunal. One participant was involved in 
two claims against two different employers. In one case, a combination of 
conciliation and MECAB and the other was a combination of conciliation MECAB 
and the Labour Tribunal. Of the seven additional participants, five were 
accompanied to MECAB, the Labour Tribunal or conciliation hearings. These 5 were 
provided with information sheets and signed consent forms allowing accompaniment 
to the hearing and use of their experiences as part of any case study. These five 
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participants were assessed separately from the main cohort, and were mainly relied 
on for assessment and observation of the redress process. The remaining three 
additional participants were interviewed, but time constraints did not allow their 
accompaniment to the redress forum. 
Observations of hearings focused on whether Conciliation Officers, Adjudicating 
Officers or Presiding Officers recognised or made any attempt to address the 
circumstances of the MDW’s employment consistent with forced labour, and to 
document the conclusions of the tribunal officers, comments of the participant and 
employer if possible. At the end of each meeting, a debriefing was conducted to 
document as best as possible the participant’s perception of the claims process. Of 
the 17 participants accompanied to redress forums, information was gathered from 8 
about their perceptions of the process. 
3.2.3.4 Accompaniment questionnaire 
This questionnaire was developed to capture the participant’s perception of the 
redress process. The main questions captured if the participant felt the process was 
fair, what outcome did they desire, did they understand the process and what was the 
motivation for the claim. 
3.2.3.5 Key Observations 
The use of the mixed methods for data collection proved useful in that it allowed a 
more thorough analysis and identification of forced labour indicators than in other 
research such as the Amnesty International and Justice Hong Kong research 
discussed in Chapter 8. 
Other research that relied on structured surveys only are unable to capture 
information in court proceedings that revealed deception concerning a MDWs actual 
employer, discerning why cameras (which have a legitimate purpose) were in the 
premises and what the MDW perceived was the purpose of their presence, 
determining if a change in location of employment at an employer’s second 
residence is a medium indicator of forced labour or if the prohibited location is at an 
office or restaurant which changes the nature of the job and makes it a strong 
indicator of (involuntariness) forced labour.  
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A clear example is in the Justice Centre Hong Kong research discussed in Chapter 8, 
“Hazardous work” where the MDW is forced by the employer to undertake 
dangerous tasks or work, the forced labour indicator is qualified as a medium 
indicator. However, when MDWs are asked to clean the exterior of windows on a 
high-rise building with no safety equipment or railing and risk the possibility of 
death, this should be a strong indicator of involuntariness under the dimension “work 
and life under duress”. These missed or overlooked indicators would suggest that the 
prevalence of forced labour in other research may be higher than reported in more 
thinly focused quantitative research. 
3.2.3.6 Other data sources 
The selection of key informants was through a mixture of referral from existing 
contacts and selection of NGOs who provide services to MDWs. The interviewees 
agreed to be audio recorded, except for the High Court Judge. Additionally, it was 
agreed that the identity of key informants would remain anonymous. Government 
agencies and departments were also provided with questions to clarify policy 
regarding the administration of the MDW programme and remedies available for 
violations. Below is a list of NGO key informants, consular staff, government 
sources, the judiciary and a brief description of the information they provided or 
were asked to provide. 
Key Informants 
• Employment Agency Manager who provided general information on the 
recruitment process, licensing of agencies, overcharging of recruitment fees 
by agencies and premature terminations. 
• Consulate Labour Attaché who provided information on the accreditation of 
recruitment agencies, overcharging of recruitment fees, migration of MDWs 
to Hong Kong and assistance provided to MDWs complaints. 
• Four staff members (Director, Deputy Director, Deputy Manager and Social 
Worker) from various NGOs provided information on the types of complaints 
of MDWs, the effectiveness of redress of complaints by the Labour 
Department and government policy that affects the ability of MDWs to avoid 
or escape abusive employment conditions. 
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• Governmental employment discrimination case worker who provided 
information on the policy of handling discrimination resulting from breaches 
of the employment contract. 
• United Nations Agency Representative on Migration provided information on 
migration of MDWs to Hong Kong, the effectiveness of existing redress 
mechanisms, the implications of using a redress process that does not 
specifically address forced labour and the lack of awareness of the 
government, judges, NGOs and those in the legal profession that negatively 
impacts the type of assistance and redress offered. 
Government Sources 
Five government organisations and departments were asked to participate in 
interviews, however all but a High Court Judge declined to do in-person interviews 
and some agreed to respond to written questions submitted to them. Phone 
interviews were not conducted as the language barrier would have been too great. 
Written questions were sent via e-mail to the following agencies and departments: 
• Commissioner of Police through an agent responded to the request for an 
interview to discuss the treatment of MDWs and contact with the police 
stating that the Hong Kong Police is not the responsible department to handle 
the general labour rights complaints of migrant workers, and that I may wish 
to contact the Labour Department. 
• Secretary of Justice responded that issues relating to migrant domestic 
workers in Hong Kong are under the purview of Security Bureau of the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region Government and they were not in a 
position to comment on the subject and was therefore unable to arrange for 
the interview. 
• Director of Public Prosecution (DPP) provided answers to some of the 
seven questions submitted. The questions sought to understand the function 
of the DPP as it relates to how cases of forced labour were referred to 
whether Hong Kong’s institutions were equipped to recognise and combat 
forced labour; whether the experiences of some migrant domestic workers 
rise to the classification of forced labour; whether there was a process within 
the Public Prosecution Office that monitored or coordinated with other 
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agencies to identify cases of forced labour; whether conciliation is an 
effective means of redressing labour rights complaints of migrant domestic 
workers; and issues over numbers of prosecutions and legal instruments. 
• Commissioner of Labour agreed to have questions submitted in writing, 
however after a year of monthly follow-ups, the representative who had 
assumed responsibility for responses had not provided answers to the 
submitted questions.  
• Director Immigration Department provided a generic response that 
explains the two-week rule. The Immigration Department is responsible for 
managing the MDW scheme. The questions posed to this Department were 
similar to those posed to the Labour Department. 
Judiciary 
• One High Court Judge who was cognisant of the issues concerning MDWs 
provided information on the lack of legislation for protection and 
enforcement, and what current methods were relied on to remedy some 
violations where MDWs are severely abused. 
3.3 Methodology 
This section examines the methodological framework used and the development and 
validation of the ILO instruments used to identify forced labour. From this 
framework, the indicators of forced labour were developed, along with the 
questionnaire outlined in the guidelines Hard to see, harder to count, and was used 
as the guide for the semi-structured interview discussed earlier. This section further 
discusses the adaptation of the indicators to Hong Kong and to domestic work, and 
discusses how the indicators used were finally compiled. 
3.3.1 Methodological framework 
The framework for this research was based on the ILO’s guidelines outlined in Hard 
to see, harder to count111 The guidelines were written on the basis of theoretical 
work through pilot studies to estimate forced child and adult labour in ten countries 
                                                
111 ILO, Hard to See, Harder to Count: Survey Guidelines to Estimate Forced Labour of Adults and 
Children 
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between 2008 and 2010. Five of the surveys focused only on forced child labour, and 
three related to only forced adult labour. The remaining two addressed both. The 
guidelines provide comprehensive information and tools to undertake national 
surveys on forced labour of adults and children by presenting an operational 
definition of what constitutes forced labour and indicators with which to identify it, 
and to propose a minimum set of questions necessary to assess forced labour. 
Although the guidelines specifically address the design and implementation of 
quantitative surveys on forced labour and particularly relate to indicators and 
questionnaire design, it can also be employed equally for qualitative research using 
the same theoretical framework improving consistency across different but 
complementary approaches. 
The methodology of using established indicators of forced labour and the 
questionnaire developed was tested and validated by the ILO between 2008 and 2010 
through quantitative surveys of forced labour and human trafficking undertaken in 
ten participating countries.112 The results of four of the pilot surveys (those with 
national coverage) have since been used in the context of the generation of new ILO 
global estimates of forced labour in 2012. The use of these primary data has 
contributed to the increased robustness of the resulting estimate of 20.9 million 
victims of forced labour globally. 
The indicators of involuntariness are grouped under the three ‘dimensions’: unfree 
recruitment, work and life under duress, and impossibility of leaving the employer. 
These indicators correspond to the three phases during which coercion may be 
applied by employers to workers: to force them to take the job, and to force them to 
work or live under conditions with which they do not agree. The combination of 
indicators of involuntariness and coercion (penalty or menace of a penalty) can then 
be used to qualify a situation as one of forced labour.113 
                                                
112 Testing and validation was conducted in Armenia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Georgia, Guatemala, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Mali, Republic of Moldova, Nepal and Niger. 
113 ILO, Hard to See, Harder to Count: Survey Guidelines to Estimate Forced Labour of Adults and 
Children 
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3.3.2 Adaptation to Hong Kong 
The indicators of forced labour and the questionnaire used in this methodology was 
adapted from the ILO’s survey guidelines Hard to see, harder to count and the 
Operational Indicators of Trafficking in Human Beings114 indicators of trafficking of 
adults for labour exploitation. The questionnaire was modified to include several 
questions relevant to Hong Kong and the application of indicators to domestic work. 
The MDW contract115 outlines three options for the start of employment: on arrival 
in Hong Kong, an agreed date or the date the Director approves the visa. MDWs are 
often told by employment agencies to arrive on specific dates but they are not picked 
up or taken to the employer’s residence for days or sometimes weeks. The MDW 
will sometimes be required to work in the employment agency for no wages and then 
only be paid from the date the MDW arrives at the employer’s home. To address this 
issue, the question when did the contract begin was added. 
To better assess involuntariness and deception in employment, several questions 
were added, which included, if you had to change anything about your employment, 
what would it be? Participants verbalised issues or tasks that were outside the scope 
of their contracts or they had not volunteered to do. Once a list of issues was 
verbalised, follow up questions were asked, such as; do you feel that you can 
negotiate the terms of your employment? Participants at times said no and at times 
yes. Those indicating they could not negotiate expressed the coercive mechanisms in 
their employment. In many instances, participants revealed that they were afraid: of 
being terminated; that the employer would get angry; of assault; of higher 
recruitment fees if they did not finish their contract as they would have to repatriate 
after short work periods while still in debt; of further exorbitant or illegal recruitment 
fees; and of investigation by the Immigration Department for ‘job hopping’, resulting 
in jeopardising future employment. If participants answered yes to being able to 
negotiate the terms of employment and provided a list of coercive measures, then the 
following question was asked; if you can negotiate the terms of your employment, 
why don’t you discuss the issues that you have raised with your employer? At times 
                                                
114 ILO, Operational Indicators of Trafficking in Human Beings, March 2009 
115 Immigration Department of Hong Kong, Employment Contract (For A Domestic Helper recruited 
from abroad), Form ID 407, para 2 
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participants indicated that they did not want to cause trouble or upset their 
employers, or they might be asked to pack their things (termination), but in some 
instances they did not answer and they could be seen processing the discrepancy. 
3.3.3 Indicators adapted to domestic work 
Some ILO indicators such as restriction of movement, debt bondage and excessive 
working hours needed to be adapted to Hong Kong conditions. 
The use of surveillance cameras is considered a behavioural indicator under 
‘Restriction of Movement’ and is intended to control the movements of employees 
within the workplace (industrial or commercial). When applied to domestic work, the 
use of surveillance cameras can have legitimate and oppressive functions. Cameras 
can at times be used to maintain constant visuals of the worker’s movements and rest 
breaks, and can also be reviewed at a later time contributing to the denial of rest 
breaks. The use of this method of surveillance can also be used to invade the privacy 
of MDWs in their sleeping areas as a form of sexual harassment through voyeurism. 
However, this indicator was not assessed as positive until further investigation of the 
participant’s perspective on why the cameras were there, since surveillance cameras 
have a legitimate application in the home. If participants provided information that 
surveillance cameras were used to monitor their movements or that it invaded their 
privacy such as in sleeping areas, this factor was assessed as a positive indicator of 
restriction of movement or excessive work hours in the form of denial of rest or 
abusive living conditions. Objective assessment criteria have to be supplemented 
with a through follow up to ensure accuracy in the assessment. 
Questions intended to assess debt bondage in the form of illegal recruitment or 
excessive fees were dependent on where the participant was recruited. If the 
recruitment fee was illegal, excessive recruitment fee as a form of debt bondage was 
assessed as a strong indicator of involuntariness (unfree recruitment). Although this 
indicator is found at the recruitment stage and many of the indicators that influenced 
the assessment of forced labour were found during the current employment (work 
and life under duress), it was recorded since it is one of the limitations in decision-
making regarding abusive employment conditions. The indicator of debt bondage 
was not used to assess instances of forced labour for two reasons: one, it was an 
indicator under the dimension ‘unfree recruitment’ and would be more time intensive 
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to determine recruitment circumstances; and two, it was my belief that a more direct 
link could be made between the employer and worker by focusing on the dimension 
of ‘work and life under duress’. 
Hong Kong does not currently have standard work hours for MDWs. The ILO has 
indicated that, as a rule of thumb, the determination of whether or not overtime or 
excessive work hours constitutes a forced labour offence is whether employees have 
to work more hours than is allowed under national law under some form of threat 
(e.g. of dismissal) or in order to earn at least the minimum wage.116 A 2012 study of 
work hours conducted by the Labour Department of Hong Kong117 revealed that the 
national average work week was 48 hours, with the highest number being performed 
by estate management and security personnel at 69 hours. If the amount of work 
hours performed was above the highest for local workers, it was classified as 
excessive and a strong indicator of involuntariness. In respect to ‘Excessive work 
hours’ the denial of the contractual 24 hours of continuous rest was calculated 
separately from weekly working hours. MDWs are required to live with their 
employers and they (the employers) impose a curfew on MDWs, controlling when 
they can leave and have to return on their day off. Because of the residential 
dimension of this work, a curfew may be considered a reasonable restriction and an 
issue of safety. 
3.3.4 Methodology development 
The screening form outlining the eleven ILO operational indicators of forced labour 
and associated behavioural indicators was used to conduct a semi-structured 
interview with participants to establish the presence of forced labour. The ILO 
booklet was produced to assist law enforcement officials, NGOs and others in 
identifying people who might be in forced labour and need assistance. They are 
based on the definition of forced labour in the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 
29). The list of indicators and associated behavioural indicators were not qualified 
strong or medium, and thus was not able to quickly qualify a behavioural indicator. 
                                                
116 International labour Office, ILO Indicators of Forced Labour, Special Action Programme to 
Combat Forced Labour, Geneva 2012 
117 Labour Department, ‘Report of the Policy Study On Standard Working Hours’ Hong Kong 2012. 
p.120-123 
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To simplify the identification and qualification of behavioural indicators, the list was 
cross-referenced with two other ILO lists of indicators to ensure consistency. 
The first list that was cross-referenced was derived from the ILO’s Hard to see, 
harder to count which provided a list of 77 indicators of forced labour, divided into 
three principal dimensions of forced labour representing the stages of employment: 
unfree recruitment (20 indicators), work and life under duress (33 indicators) and 
impossibility of leaving (24 indicators). Within each principal dimension, indicators 
of involuntariness and coercion (which I have called behavioural indicators) are 
qualified as strong or medium. In order to be assessed as being in forced labour, an 
individual had to exhibit at least two indicators, one indicator of involuntariness and 
one indicator of coercion in one of the three dimensions with at least one indicator 
assessed as strong.118 
Unfree/Deceptive recruitment includes forced and deceptive recruitment. Forced 
recruitment is when workers are forced to work against their will during the 
recruitment process using forms of coercion. A family’s poverty and a need for an 
income do not satisfy the element coercion unless the coercive methods are applied 
by a third party. Deceptive recruitment occurs when a person is recruited using false 
promises about the work to be undertaken. Where deception is used, voluntariness is 
voided as there is no free and informed consent; had the worker known the true 
conditions regarding all aspects of the job, they would not have decided to take the 
job. 
Work and life under duress covers exploitation and coercive working and living 
conditions at the destination imposed on a worker by the use of force, penalty or 
menace of penalty. Work under duress includes an excessive volume of work or 
tasks that are beyond what can reasonably be expected within the framework of 
national labour law. Life under duress refers to situations where degrading living 
conditions, limitations on freedom or excessive dependency are imposed on a worker 
by the employer. 
                                                
118 ILO, Hard to See, Harder to Count: Survey Guidelines to Estimate Forced Labour of Adults and 
Children 
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Impossibility of leaving entails a penalty or risk to the worker making it difficult to 
terminate the employment. The deliberate retention of wages is recognised as a form 
of coercion as outstanding wages will be lost if the worker leaves. A worker who 
finds it difficult to leave a job because of poverty or lack of alternative income is not 
in a situation of forced labour, unless elements of coercion or involuntariness are 
also present. 119 
3.3.5 Development of indicators 
The 77 indicators of forced labour were derived from the indicators of trafficking for 
labour and sexual exploitation produced by the ILO in collaboration with the 
European Commission in 2009. 120  In this collaborative effort, the Delphi 
methodology121 was used to build consensus among experts on the basic elements of 
human trafficking to harmonise data collection across the European Union.122 Six 
dimensions were identified as part of this effort, deceptive recruitment, coercive 
recruitment, recruitment by abuse of vulnerability, exploitative working conditions, 
coercion, and abuse of vulnerability at destination resulting in a total of 67 indicators 
across all six dimensions.123 Indicators vary in importance as to whether or not a 
person is in forced labour or has been trafficked.124 Experts, through consensus, 
classified each indicator as strong, medium or weak according to the severity or 
degree of abuse.125 The list of 67 indicators was the second list cross-referenced with 
the 11 indicators used. 
To simplify the assessment of participants, I decided to use the shorter list of 11 
indicators that dealt primarily with the dimension of work and life under duress, as I 
felt that I would most likely encounter MDWs in this dimension. The cross-
referencing exercise proved to be useful as the 11 indicators did not fit perfectly with 
the other lists of indicators; for example, ‘Intimidation and Threats’ did not list a 
                                                
119 International Labour Conference (93 Session) ‘A Global Alliance Against Forced Labour’ Report I 
(B) (2005)  
120 ILO, Operational indicators of trafficking in human beings (Geneva, ILO, 2009) 
121 For Delphi methodology, see Harold A. Linstone and Murray Turo (eds): The Delphi method: 
Techniques and applications 
122 ILO, Hard to See, Harder to Count: Survey Guidelines to Estimate Forced Labour of Adults and 
Children 
123 Ibid 
124 Ibid 
125 Ibid 
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comprehensive set of behavioural indicators. The list of 77 indicators did not list 
‘threats of violence against the victim’ but it was listed in the list of 67 indicators. 
Thus, additional behavioural indicators were added under ‘operational indicators’ to 
make assessment easier.	
Attention was also paid to the Unites States v Kozminski,126 where a number of 
behavioural indicators mostly consistent with the ILO indicators were outlined. This 
was expected to be useful in identifying some behaviours that were not listed in any 
of the list of indicators but could be identified during an interview. Examples of 
these unlisted behaviours included, insulting and demeaning language, constant 
barraging of workers with orders, and constant shouting at workers. These 
behaviours were viewed as a means of psychological coercion and were included 
under the operational indicator ‘Intimidation and Threats’. 
The qualifying of behavioural indicators was also distinct from the operational 
indicator under which they fall and each are qualified differently from other 
indicators within the same set. For example, under the operational indicator 
‘Intimidation and Threats’, threat of dismissal is qualified as a medium behavioural 
indicator of coercion while depravation of food is a strong indicator. So, under each 
operational indicator, there are behavioural indicators that range in severity of abuse 
from medium to strong. Some indicators such as retention of identity documents or 
isolation are easily qualified as strong as there isn’t many others associated 
behavioural indicators. 
This instrument was used as a guide in documenting the working and living 
conditions, any incurred debt that was excessive or illegal, any forms of deception, 
reasons for remaining in the abusive employment, and methods of coercion used to 
ensure performance. During this in-depth interview, audio recordings were 
conducted. In retrospect, I would not have used the screening form, but relied 
primarily on the in-depth questionnaire modified to reflect the indicators more 
readily and qualified as strong and medium, making available more rich information 
on which conclusions could be drawn. The screening could be useful if further 
                                                
126 United States v Kozminski US (Supreme Court) 487 US 931 (1988) 
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simplified to assist front line NGOs, law enforcement, customs or immigration 
officials to quickly identify victims of forced labour. Additionally, the complexity 
involved in identifying victims of forced labour requires training of all people and 
organisations tasked with preventing, investigating, punishing and providing 
remedies to victims. A lack of widespread training may limit capacity to specialised 
groups that may not be as effective if front line law enforcement and NGOs are more 
likely to encounter victims. 
3.4 Challenges encountered during the research 
Challenges were encountered in four main areas: in the execution of the outlined 
methodology; in applying some of the ILO indicators; in identifying forced labour; 
and ethical dilemmas and researcher bias. This section will examine the normal 
challenges associated with research, the adjustments that were necessary to collect 
the required data and the unintended or unexpected dilemmas that arose. 
3.4.1 Challenges in methodology 
Changes in methodology had to be made in relation to accessing participants’ case 
files to review responses from employers or the Labour Department. The original 
intent and part of the data collection was to have access to the participants’ case files 
that was secured as part of the written consent. I was sensitive to the staff at the 
NGO and conditions in the office and I felt that reviewing case files was not 
desirable and so no case files were accessed as planned. All documents reviewed 
came directly from the participants. The intent to establish a daily count of migrant 
domestic workers seeking assistance through the office log book and to identify 
those who were filing labour claims as a percentage of those who were not, did not 
materialise. There were very few MDWs seeking assistance during the week, and 
most of the 80 interviews were completed on Sundays when many of the MDWs in 
Hong Kong had their day off. Because of the high volume of MDWs needing 
assistance on Sundays, a private area to conduct interviews was not available. 
Considering the location and size of the office and the need for immediate access, 
there was not much of an alternative to conducting the interviews under the 
limitations present. It was quickly discovered that the screening took about 45 
minutes to an hour, the same amount of time as the questionnaire as a full 
understanding of the conditions of employment was necessary to attach the presence 
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of forced labour and both covered the same information. The questionnaire did 
provide a detailed understanding of coercive methods used, and a detailed 
description of the living and working conditions of employment was revealed. With 
regard to one of the questions adapted to Hong Kong on when the employment 
started, it was discovered that this issue conflicts with a 2014 court ruling that sets 
the start date of employment from the day the MDW starts working for the employer. 
This discovery voided any attachment of involuntariness at the recruitment stage 
regarding involuntary work with no pay. 
It was also difficult to maintain contact with participants after the interview because 
of the two-week rule mandating that MDWs repatriate within two weeks of 
termination of their contract. Many participants were occupied with looking for new 
work or attending interviews within this tight timeframe and therefore inaccessible. 
Communication was also problematic since some MDWs made use of employer-
provided mobile phones, and others seeking to minimise expenses did not ‘top-up’ 
their mobiles, causing texts and messages to be delayed. I was also unable to 
successfully schedule appointments with participants as they were focused on 
securing their future employment. I had to remain flexible and would meet 
participants at coffee shops on their route to employment interviews. 
Accompanying participants was more time intensive than anticipated, and not all 
participants were accompanied to their hearings. To execute this part of the research, 
it was necessary to keep track of scheduled dates for submitting claim forms and 
conciliation meeting, MECAB and Labour Tribunal dates and times. While filling 
out claim forms at the Labour Department, MDWs appeared visibly intimidated by 
Department staff. My assessment was that the MDWs were frequently treated as 
though they were a nuisance, and Labour Department Staff were not very helpful. In 
some instances Staff attempted to assist in providing limited information regarding 
paperwork but it was clear that there might have been some prohibition about 
involvement or providing assistance in filing and submission of paperwork.  To be 
able to file a claim, the NGO staff would assist in calculating the amount of any 
outstanding wages, vacation, severance, travel allowance, airfare, rest days worked 
and at times any underpayment of wages. MDWs, armed with the itemized 
calculation of outstanding entitlements would be taken to the Labour Department 
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where the claim form would be filled out using the calculated amounts. The claim 
form proved challenging at times as it was written in English and some MDWs had 
trouble understanding it. Additionally, there was a section on the claim form where 
MDWs were required to provide a brief description on their working conditions, 
reason for termination and justification for the claimed amount. This initial filing 
would be reviewed by Labour Department Staff for completeness and at times Staff 
directed MDWs to remove claim items if they felt it was not justified. This initial 
claim form would remain as the basis of the claim through Conciliation, MECAB or 
Labour Tribunal. If a claim was filed directly with MECAB or the Labour Tribunal, 
the process was the same except that a more detailed statement of the working 
conditions and justification of the claim was provided as a separate and attached 
document. 
Hearing dates were sometimes postponed or cancelled as a result of the absence of 
the employer, or continued to provide the opportunity to gather additional 
information or witnesses and time for decision makers to consider evidence before 
rendering a decision. Prior to the commencement of any meeting or hearing, MDWs 
were required to arrive early and notify the Labour Department Staff that they were 
present. Failure to notify the Staff of their presence would result in the dismissal of 
their claim if they failed to appear. Usually MDWs were extremely anxious as the 
waiting areas for meetings or hearings provided no ability to be separated from their 
sometimes belligerent employers. At times the anxiety was a result of just being in 
the same proximity of the employer.  
Hearings took an extremely long time, typically lasting four hours or more. The 
length of time spent on translations contributed significantly to the lengthy process. 
The MDWs may have an interpreter that translated from their native tongue of 
“Tagalog” to English. The employer may have an interpreter to translate from 
English to “Cantonese”. The adjudicator would use English as the common 
language. A MDW unfamiliar with the process might find it extremely difficult to 
understand everything that is being translated since at any one time, the Adjudicator 
may be speaking in English and at the same time the Tagalog and Cantonese 
interpreters would be speaking to their clients. 
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 Interviews after hearings were at times not considered prudent, as participants were 
emotionally distraught during and after many hearings. The taking of notes during 
hearings was at times discouraged by those adjudicating the process, and audio 
recordings of the hearings was prohibited in all forums. No employers were 
interviewed as part of this research. 
3.4.2 Challenges in applying indicators of forced labour 
Experience revealed that the ILO indicators did not fit neatly when applied to 
domestic work and highlights the fact that the indicators and the ILO guidelines are a 
‘…starting point, and subject to refinement in the light of further experience in their 
application in different national contexts’.127 The three indicators discussed below 
highlight some of the difficulty in applying indicators and the necessity of adapting 
indicators not only to the local context but the type of work being performed. 
3.4.2.1 Hazardous work without adequate protection 
This indicator is qualified as medium indicator of exploitation by the ILO. In Hong 
Kong, there have been several documented incidents of MDW deaths in high-rise 
apartments. In 2012, nine MDWs in Singapore fell to their deaths while cleaning 
windows.128 In 2014, a MDW from Indonesia fell from the 27th floor of a building in 
Hong Kong while cleaning windows.129 During this research participants P3 and P4 
both worked for the same employer and described having to clean the exterior of the 
windows on the 4 floor of their building. They were asked to climb onto a narrow 
ledge, with no railing to hold on to, to clean the windows. This was not a singular 
event, but a part of their required and expected work. Considering the dangerous 
nature of this ‘routine’ activity, it was assessed as a strong indicator of exploitation. 
                                                
127 ILO, Hard to See, Harder to Count: Survey Guidelines to Estimate Forced Labour of Adults and 
Children p.9 
128 The Independent, ‘Singapore Tightens Rules On Window Cleaning After Nine Maids Fall To Their 
Death’, June 4 2012 (no author’s name provided) 
129 Clifford Lo, ‘Maid Falls to Her Death From 27 Floor Flat While Cleaning Windows’, South China 
Morning Post, January 24 2014 
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3.4.2.2 Deprivation of food 
This indicator was qualified as strong for coercion (menace of penalty) under 
‘Intimidation and Threats’. Some participants who described receiving very small 
portions of food also described receiving a very limited budget to do the household 
grocery shopping. Under these circumstances it was difficult to discern the intent of 
the employer. It was unclear whether the limited food budget was due to limited 
financial resources or a purposeful act on the part of the employer directed at the 
MDW. Some of the documented complaints included being asked to eat leftovers 
after the family had had their meals or being given food that was stale or spoiled. 
The assessment of these indicators could not take into account the intent of the 
employer, although it was very obvious from an objective consideration of the facts. 
3.4.2.3 Deception 
Deception indicators were categorised as strong if deception was applied at the 
recruitment stage and related to the nature of the work. A qualification of medium 
was assigned if there was deception in working conditions, in the content or legality 
of the employment contracts, housing or living conditions, or legal documentation 
such as work visas, job location, employer or wages. The ILO’s lists of indicators 
did not identify any indicators for deception when considering ‘work and life under 
duress’ 130  or deception at destination. The assessment of deception under the 
dimension ‘work and life under duress’ was a bit unclear. When MDWs were 
illegally deployed to commercial places such as retail stores and restaurants, the 
employer’s action or practice was not assessed as deception as to location or 
conditions, but it was considered as deception in the nature of the job and qualified 
as a strong indicator of involuntariness. An example of deception under the 
dimension ‘work and life under duress’ is explained by one participant below. 
P33131 had been working for her employer for one year before she was told that she 
had to sign a document that would change her employment address. She was 
considered to be in forced labour because she was working 17 hours per day 
                                                
130 ILO, Hard to See, Harder to Count: Survey Guidelines to Estimate Forced Labour of Adults and 
Children 
131 Participant number 33, in chronological order of interview. 
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(excessive work hours, strong involuntariness), the employer had seized her passport 
(retention of documents, strong coercion), and she was allotted 10 hours rest per 
week. P33 had paid the equivalent amount of approximately $14,000 to a Hong 
Kong recruitment agency but she paid the fee in the Philippines of 80,000 pesos. P33 
was taken to the Immigration Department where she was told to sign what she was 
told was a change of address form. In fact, the employer transferred P33 to his 
mother’s employ (deception, work and life under duress). P33 worked for three 
months with the original employer’s mother. During the three months, she was 
frequently beaten with clothes hangers, assaulted with blows to her head, and her ear 
forcefully twisted (physical assault, strong coercion). P33 said that she did not report 
the assaults to the police at first because she simply wanted to finish her contract. 
After 3 months, the employer abruptly terminated her and, feeling aggrieved, P33 
called the police and made a full statement of the abuses. P33 reported that the police 
told her ‘it is OK because the employer had paid me’. The call to the police upset the 
employment agency staff that was notified by the employer. The agency refused to 
assist P33 in finding temporary shelter until she could repatriate. 
3.4.3 Ethical dilemmas 
With respect to this category of challenges, three ethical issues arose that had to be 
dealt with. In the first instance, a participant secretly recorded a conciliation meeting 
that I was not allowed to attend. In the two other instances, I felt compelled to 
intervene in the claims process as I felt that I would make a significant difference to 
the outcome. These dilemmas will be discussed in further detail below, but according 
to MacKenzie et al.132 dilemmas are not unexpected and intervention may be 
ethically required. They argue that where a human being is in need and the 
researcher can offer assistance, failing to do so for the sake of objectivity is 
unethical.133 Jacobsen and Landau134 contend that the intervention into the lives of 
research participants can influence their behaviour and responses, compromising the 
research findings. My intervention in the two latter instances did not, in my opinion, 
                                                
132 Mackenzie, McDowell and Pittaway, ‘Beyond ‘do no harm’: The challenge of constructing ethical 
relationships in refugee research’, p.316 
133 Ibid 
134 Jacobsen and Landau, ‘The dual imperative in refugee research: some methodological and ethical 
considerations in social science research on forced migration’, p.192 
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affect the findings since the focus of the research was to examine if the redress 
process was appropriate and whether government personnel recognise the presence 
of forced labour in the working conditions of the participant. I found that, not only 
did my intervention have a positive effect, it also provided some evidence that 
representation, not necessarily in the form of legal counsel but also people 
knowledgeable about the rights of MDWs, could be helpful. I have had a great deal 
of experience assisting MDWs in the past and was familiar with the Labour 
Ordinance in Hong Kong and some of the challenges faced by MDWs in asserting 
their rights. 
In the first participant’s conciliation meeting, the employer failed to appear and I was 
not allowed to accompany the participant into the meeting with the Conciliation 
Officer. At the end of the meeting the participant revealed that she had recorded the 
meeting on her mobile phone without the knowledge of the Conciliation Officer. 
While the recording was unsolicited, I ultimately decided that the recording might 
provide useful insight into a closed-door meeting between the Conciliation Officer 
and participant. After this issue arose, each participant was asked not to record any 
aspect of hearings that they participated in. Care was taken thereafter to ensure that 
this type of surreptitious recording did not happen again. This recording was useful 
in documenting the coercive efforts by the Conciliation Officer to get the participant 
to withdraw her claim. The employer had falsely accused the participant of theft and 
assault, and the Conciliation Officer convinced the participant that if she pursued her 
claim, the employer would pursue the cases of assault and theft against her. I have 
attended numerous conciliation meetings in the past and this type of behaviour on the 
part of the Conciliation Officer had never been exhibited. This suggests that if an 
advocate accompanies MDWs to the applicable meetings and hearings, the field 
becomes a bit more level. 
The second ethical dilemma was more direct and concerned my ability to maintain a 
neutral observer’s posture during conciliation. In this second claim, the participant 
was asked to explain her claim against the employer and was visibly intimidated 
after a lengthy explanation from the Conciliation Officer that the meeting was ‘a 
framework for settlement of the dispute’. While much of the items of the claim were 
contractual obligations, one point of contention was airfare to the participant’s ‘place 
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of origin’. The employer had provided an air ticket for the participant to travel to the 
Philippines and was willing to pay all final entitlements, but she refused to accept the 
ticket and the time of use had expired. When asked to explain why she (the 
participant) did not use the ticket and had allowed it to expire, she became 
emotionally incapacitated and could only explain that she had the right to remain in 
Hong Kong for up to 14 days after termination. The Conciliation Officer left the 
room returning approximately ten minutes later with a copy of the immigration 
policy explaining that there was no right to remain in Hong Kong, although staying 
for 14 days was allowed. At this point, the participant turned to me and asked, ‘sir 
what will I do?’	
I then explained to the Conciliation Officer that the issue of the 14-day stay was not 
the relevant issue. The issue at hand was that although the employer was willing to 
pay all final entitlements, he was unwilling to provide the appropriate air ticket. The 
contract obligates the employer to provide airfare to the employee’s place of origin, 
and since the air-ticket was only to Manila and the participant would have to secure 
an additional flight from Manila to her home, the ticket provided was insufficient. 
The Officer explained the obligation to the employer who eventually agreed to 
provide the appropriate airfare. 
The third instance concerned a participant that had filed a claim with the Labour 
Tribunal against her employer. The participant submitted her statements135 to the 
Tribunal, and was distraught once she received a copy of the employer’s response. 
The employer provided a copy of a termination letter that he claimed was given to 
the participant at the time of termination. He further claimed that this letter was 
being discussed with the participant when she became angry and left the residence 
and later accused him of assault. The letter was essentially claiming that the 
participant was being summarily dismissed for disobedience and poor performance 
after being warned on several earlier occasions. This account of events supplied by 
the employer, if believed, could deny any final entitlements to the participant. After I 
was provided a copy of the employer’s response and a copy of the ‘termination 
                                                
135 Once the participant files the claim and statements, the employer is provided a copy of the claim 
and is required to respond to it. 
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letter’, the participant expressed concern that she would not be believed over the 
employer and posed the question, ‘what am I going to do?’ 
I recognised the despair in the participant’s voice and body language and offered my 
assessment. Recalling the circumstances of the participant’s case, I pointed out that 
the ‘termination letter’ supplied to the Labour Tribunal was addressed to her (the 
participant) at the NGO’s address. If the letter was provided on the day of 
termination, there should be no mention of the NGO’s address since that address was 
not provided to the employer until two weeks after the date on which the contract 
came to an end. This would suggest that the letter was written some time on or after 
the NGO’s address was provided to the employer and could not have been written on 
the date of termination. I further informed the participant that this discrepancy should 
be highlighted in any response to the Tribunal. 
These dilemmas reinforce the need for representation; not necessarily a lawyer, but 
someone familiar with the law and process and capable of overcoming the imbalance 
in power both between the employer and MDW and the third-party Conciliation 
Officer or decision maker and the MDW. 
3.4.4 Researcher bias and perspective 
In all three instances above, beyond the request for assistance, I must recognise my 
own bias based on my life experiences and as an advocate for MDWs. Having 
worked with the MDW population in Hong Kong for some time prior to this 
research, I was keenly aware that for each claim in the Labour Department, there was 
a family in the Philippines or Indonesia that was relying on every single dollar of the 
claim. This lesson came in 2012 when I had the opportunity to visit a recently 
returned MDW in their home country. As I was entertained in her home with her 
husband and daughter, she reflected on her time in Hong Kong. Pointing to the 
unfinished repairs to her home and the spots of daylight in the roof, she explained 
that her experience had left her feeling cheated. Having been underpaid for four 
years and being owed in excess of $100,000, at settlement only $48,000 was 
recovered. This experience and life lesson gave me a clear understanding of what 
was at stake for those pursuing a claim. The possibility of negotiating for and losing 
money that had already been earned was viewed as an unjust outcome. Even when 
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MDWs said that ‘it’s ok’, I interpreted it to mean that they were tired of the process 
and saw it as not worthwhile. 
Additionally, my prior work in law enforcement and many years as a detective 
conducting interviews and interrogations created two issues. First, there was a sense 
of frustration with the lack of recognition and enforcement of forced labour 
prohibitions which reinforced my views of the unpredictable outcomes faced by 
MDWs. Secondly, during interviews I at times viewed accounts of deception in 
recruitment with scepticism. In one instance, after being told by a MDW that he had 
been hired as a gardener at the employer’s residence, but then found himself living in 
squalid conditions in a remote location and had bought his own boots and gloves, I 
questioned if he was really a victim of forced labour. This questioning made the need 
to get a law enforcement perspective on the treatment of MDWs even more 
significant although at the time it was apparent that I would not be able to achieve 
that goal. However, my perception is that the problems encountered by MDWs are 
viewed as self-created and they are willing participants in their predicament. I did 
not view my participant in this way and did classify him as being in forced labour 
since he no longer wanted to be engaged in work he was doing (involuntariness), and 
it was illegal based on the conditions of his employment contract as he was isolated 
as a result of the instructions from the employer not to engage with others at the 
work site and threatened with deductions of wages (coercion) and he was unpaid for 
the work he had provided and would lose it if he returned home (menace of penalty). 
Toma136 acknowledges that it is impossible for researchers to be truly objective, 
although many believe that objectivity should be the standard. He suggests that 
researchers should ‘accept involvement and bias as inevitable and work toward 
finding meaning through closer ties with subjects’. A research relationship cannot be 
built on detached observations by researchers intentionally uninvolved. The 
researcher and the subject, object are interactively linked, with the values of the 
researcher inevitably influencing the research.137 According to Toma, researchers 
                                                
136 J Douglas Toma, ‘How getting close to your subjects makes qualitative data better’ (2000) 39 
Theory into practice 177 
137 Egon G Guba and Yvonna S Lincoln, ‘Competing paradigms in qualitative research’ (1994) 2 
Handbook of qualitative research 105 p.110 
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work in two worlds. In one aspect, they can be objective in their relationships with 
participants and the subject being studied and in the other, their personal values 
influence their investigation138 based on their own values and perspective. While the 
presence of the researcher potentially influences the behaviour and responses of 
participants and occurs in all field research especially related to marginalised, poor 
and powerless groups, the presence may lead to problems in methodology and even 
cross over into ethical issues.139 
 
                                                
138 Toma, ‘How getting close to your subjects makes qualitative data better’ p.178 
139 Jacobsen and Landau, ‘The dual imperative in refugee research: some methodological and ethical 
considerations in social science research on forced migration’, p.192 
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Chapter 4. Duty to Implement an Effective Remedy 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines an individual’s right to an effective remedy and builds on the 
issues identified and developed in Chapter 2, including the identification of forced 
labour as a crime. This chapter will focus on defining the obligation in implementing 
measures necessary for ensuring an effective remedy to address violations of human 
rights. 
The term ‘effective remedy’ refers to ‘the range of measures that may be taken in 
response to an actual or threatened violation of human rights’.140 International law 
recognises individual human rights and requires all states to take affirmative steps to 
ensure that all individuals within their jurisdiction have the ability to enjoy those 
basic freedoms accepted by the international community. 141  Reading together 
Articles 2(1), (2) and (3) of the ICCPR, jurisprudence and relevant literature on the 
provision of effective remedies in the event of breach, we can identify eight specific 
measures that are critical in providing an effective remedy. 142 Human rights bodies 
have held that states are in breach of their obligations if they do not exercise due 
diligence in preventing violations, or fail to punish violators as required by the 
Convention.143 The lack of due diligence in adopting the required legislative and 
other measures to ensure human rights gives rise to a variety of abuses exacted on 
individuals and creates barriers to seeking remedies for violations of guaranteed 
rights. 
Over time, many principles have been developed and refined through jurisprudence 
and international human rights bodies.144 In articulating the principles and legal 
standards of an effective remedy in Article 2 and in particular Article 2(3) of the 
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ICCPR, I have been guided by the jurisprudence of the United Nations human rights 
treaty bodies, the decisions reached by the Inter-American Court, the European Court 
of Human Rights and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and 
by General Assembly Resolution 60/147 of 16 December 2005 which has been 
adopted by the Commission on Human Rights,145 the Human Rights Committee, and 
the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural rights. I have also relied on several 
secondary sources146 from writers who have examined the obligations that states 
incur as parties to international conventions to take affirmative steps to address 
crimes such as forced labour. 
This chapter will also serve as the link between the issues of the prohibition of forced 
labour addressed in Chapter 2 and the duty to provide effective remedies through the 
complement of the eight measures identified to negate or mitigate barriers to 
remedies that will be detailed in Chapter 6. 
In the three sections below, I will examine the duties that arise as part of the 
obligation to implement human rights and examine the domestic implementation of 
covenant obligations (Section 4.2). I will also articulate the eight component 
measures of an effective remedy (section 4.3). Throughout each section, I will 
examine the comments and direction of supervisory human rights bodies for 
guidance on how the right to a remedy should be interpreted and applied, and the 
jurisprudence of international and regional human rights courts and other treaties. 
While addressing the eight components I will rely on jurisprudence that addresses 
the specific component which in some instances will not relate to crimes, but will 
give meaning to the component being addressed. Lastly I will introduce the theory 
that there should be special attention provided to vulnerable groups and individuals 
as part of a remedy (section 4.4). 
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Lastly, the terms state, party and government are used interchangeably at times when 
referring to Hong Kong. Given its unique political history, Hong Kong is technically 
not a state and is officially identified as the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region and a part of the People’s Republic of China. However, by virtue of the fact 
that the United Kingdom extended several relevant international conventions to 
Hong Kong prior to handing it over to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, Hong Kong is 
bound to many international conventions that impose specific binding obligations. 
4.2 Duty to implement human rights 
Article 2 of the ICCPR imposes obligations to respect and ensure the implementation 
of human rights, the protection of individuals and the right to remedies if the state 
fails to protect those rights through commission of any acts attributable to the state or 
by omission in failing to exercise due diligence to protect harm from individuals. 
Article 2(1) outlines the obligations of the parties to the Convention in respecting 
and ensuring guaranteed rights has immediate effect for all state parties.147 Paragraph 
2 ‘…provides the overarching framework within which the rights specified in the 
Covenant are to be promoted and protected’.148 Article 2(3) requires that, in addition 
to effective protection of Covenant rights, states must ensure that individuals also 
have access to effective remedies to enforce those rights149 and provide reparation to 
individuals whose Covenant rights have been violated.150 The three sections below 
will examine the obligation to respect and ensure human rights, the obligation to 
protect individuals and fulfil those obligations by taking positive steps and to provide 
remedies when protection fails. 
4.2.1 International obligations 
The obligation to respect and ensure the implementation of human rights emanates 
from treaties to which a state has bound itself. Those treaty obligations also require a 
member state to pass the appropriate legislation in conformity with the relevant 
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treaty or convention, creating the necessary legal framework to enforce those laws.151 
In executing these treaty obligations, the adoption of a victim-oriented perspective is 
critical in protecting victims and effectively prosecuting those who violate those 
laws. 152  Generally, the crimes which are subject of international treaties and 
conventions, such as forced labour, are not subject to statutes of limitations.153 
Article 2(1) states in pertinent part that: 
‘Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect 
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to 
its jurisdiction the rights recognised in the present Covenant, 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status’. 
The obligation of a state to respect and ensure the rights of all individuals on its 
territory has been characterised as both ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ in nature.154 With 
respect to what are termed negative obligations, a state must refrain from interfering 
with or curtailing the enjoyment of the type of rights outlined in the Covenant.155 
States must also ensure that no element of the state violates those rights; this includes 
the legislative and executive bodies and those agents of the state such as civil 
servants, law enforcement bodies such as the police, and the military.156 Positive 
obligations refer to the responsibility to give effect domestically to civil and political 
rights and economic, social and cultural rights.157 Parties to the Covenant are also 
required to recognise that the rights guaranteed are intended to protect individuals 
and	
‘…will only be fully discharged if individuals are protected by 
the State, not just against violations of Covenant rights by its 
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agents, but also against acts committed by private people or 
entities’.158 
Article 2(1) also provides clear language prohibiting discrimination against 
individuals within the state’s jurisdiction, whether nationals or non-nationals.159 The 
protection is ‘without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status’.160 This obligation applies equally without discrimination between citizens 
and aliens.161 
The Human Rights Committee has noted that the ICCPR does not define the term 
‘discrimination’, nor does it indicate what constitutes discrimination.162 However, it 
concluded that the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (CERD) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) provided suitable guidance and at the 
same time demonstrating the compatible nature of Conventions and determined that: 
‘…discrimination’ as used in the Covenant should be understood 
to imply any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference 
which is based on any ground such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status, and which has the 
purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise by all people, on an equal footing, of all 
rights and freedoms’.163 
In discussing the non-discrimination provisions of the ICESCR, the Committee 
advised that:	
‘Guarantees of equality and non-discrimination should be 
interpreted, to the greatest extent possible, in ways which 
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facilitate the full protection of economic, social and cultural 
rights’.164 
The Committee has found ‘that discrimination against some groups is pervasive and 
persistent and deeply entrenched in social behaviour and organisation, often 
involving unchallenged or indirect discrimination’.165 Discrimination can be exacted 
through ‘…legal rules, policies, practices or predominant cultural attitudes in either 
the public or private sector which create relative disadvantages for some groups, and 
privileges for other groups’.166 
4.2.2 Domestic Implementation 
Article 2(2) states:	
‘Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other 
measures, each state Party to the present Covenant undertakes 
to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional 
processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to 
adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to 
give effect to the rights recognised in the present Covenant’. 
Parties to the Convention are required to take positive steps to protect individuals 
through the adoption of judicial, administrative and legislative measures appropriate 
to reflect Covenant obligations.167 The state may be held liable for its shortcomings 
in protecting individuals, for example if the state adopts a law that made violations 
possible or fails to take action that would have prevented the violation from 
occurring.168 
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The Human Rights Committee has made it clear that the responsibility for giving 
domestic effect to Covenant obligations is through adoption of judicial, 
administrative and legislative and educative measures169 as the:	
‘…Covenant cannot be viewed as a substitute for domestic 
criminal or civil law’. 170  Educative measures are a critical 
component in raising awareness about Convention obligations 
and rights among public officials, state agents and population at 
large’.171 
The failure to ensure Covenant rights as required by Article 2 may give rise to 
violations by parties to the Covenant for:	
‘…permitting or failing to take appropriate measures or to 
exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, investigate or redress 
the harm caused by such acts by private people or entities’.172 
A party may not invoke the provisions of domestic law or lack thereof as 
justification for failure to perform a treaty,173 nor can there be an argument that a 
violation was carried out by a non-executive branch of government as a means of 
evading responsibility.174 This understanding is made clear in Article 27 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Lastly, where there are incompatibilities 
between domestic laws and Covenant obligations, the domestic law or practice must 
be changed to meet the standards of the Convention.175	
4.2.3 The right to a remedy 
Article 2(3) states:	
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: 
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as 
herein recognised are violated shall have an effective remedy, 
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notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by 
persons acting in an official capacity; 
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have 
his right thereto determined by competent judicial, 
administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other 
competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, 
and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; 
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such 
remedies when granted. 
The duty to provide an effective remedy has been outlined in several human rights 
instruments176 and places the obligation squarely on the state to ensure accessible 
and effective remedies.177 
States have the discretion to determine how they discharge their Covenant 
obligations domestically,178 and the ICESCR Committee has provided clarification 
on this issue. The Committee’s adoption of General Comment No.9 provided crucial 
clarification and came as a result of the remarks of the Canadian Head of Delegation 
at the review at the Committee’s 19 session (November 1998).179 The contention was 
over the issue of ‘justiciability’ of Covenant rights. The Canadian delegation 
believed that it was up to the state (Canada) to decide whether to make rights under 
the ICESCR justiciable and argued that legal remedies were optional. Committee 
members disagreed with the Delegate’s statement, and drafted General Comment 
No.9 to clarify the issue. The Committee laid down two basic principles of 
compliance based on the overriding duty to provide effective remedies in domestic 
law.180 The first is that the means chosen must be adequate to give effect to the rights 
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in the Covenant.181 In many cases, this includes judicial enforcement, particularly 
when it comes to protecting the most vulnerable.182 The Committee cautioned that: 
‘The adoption of a rigid classification of economic, social and 
cultural rights which puts them, by definition, beyond the reach 
of the courts would thus be arbitrary and incompatible with the 
principle that the two sets of human rights are indivisible and 
interdependent. It would also drastically curtail the capacity of 
the courts to protect the rights of the most vulnerable and 
disadvantaged groups in society’.183  
Secondly, ‘protection for social and economic rights should be comparable to, and 
integrated with, the protection provided for civil and political rights’.184 
‘…protection for social and economic rights should be 
comparable to, and integrated with, the protection provided for 
civil and political rights. Where the means used to give effect to 
the ICESCR ‘differ significantly’ from those used in relation to 
other human rights treaties, ‘there should be a compelling 
justification for this, taking account of the fact that the 
formulations used in the Covenant are, to a considerable extent, 
comparable to those used in treaties dealing with civil and 
political rights’.185 
The Committee (ICESCR) was careful to leave room for variation from state to state 
as to how rights are protected within domestic legal systems, giving states the 
flexibility to choose the precise method by which Covenant rights are given effect in 
national law.186 However, the Committee was firm in articulating that this flexibility 
in implementing the covenant into domestic law did not permit states to simply 
decide not to provide any effective remedies at all for violations of Covenant 
rights.187 
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Courts and tribunals must interpret and apply domestic law in a manner that is 
consistent with a state’s international human rights obligations. This basic principle 
of the rule of law is not ‘optional’ or a matter for the discretion of parties.188 
Whatever constitutional provisions are adopted, these must be applied consistently 
with international human rights law.189	
‘Thus, when a domestic decision maker is faced with a choice 
between an interpretation of domestic law that would place the 
state in breach of the Covenant and one that would enable the 
state to comply with the Covenant, international law requires the 
choice of the latter’.190 
The Inter-American Court clearly stated that to give effect to human rights 
obligations, a party to the Convention needs ‘…to ensure the principles of human 
rights throughout its entire ‘legal, political and institutional system’.191 All the 
structures, through which public power is exercised, must be capable of providing 
judicial measures ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human rights.192 The mere 
existence of a legal system designed to make it possible to comply with this 
obligation is insufficient, the government is also required to conduct itself so as to 
effectively ensure the free and full exercise of human rights.193 An important aspect 
of this is the obligation to take proactive steps to prevent violations from occurring, 
investigate and prosecute effectively when they do not and punish those found guilty 
of committing criminal acts and to provide effective remedies to restore the right 
violated and provide compensation for damages resulting from the violation.194	
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The Court further made clear in its advisory opinion195 that the lack of an effective 
remedy to vindicate rights under the Convention is itself a violation by the obligated 
party. 196 Merely incorporating the obligation into the Constitution or law or that it be 
formally recognised is insufficient ‘… rather it must be truly effective in establishing 
whether there has been a violation of human rights and in providing redress’.197 
If the existing conditions in a country or particular case do not provide a real 
possibility of rights vindication, an effective remedy is not achieved. 198  The 
limitations in realising an effective remedy could be attributable to ineffective 
practices, when judicial power lacks independence to render impartial decisions or 
enforce its judgments, where there is unnecessary delay in rendering decisions or 
when victims are denied a judicial remedy.199	
In X and Y v the Netherlands, a gap in criminal law provision and government policy 
failed to protect and provide access to a remedy to a minor from a criminal act.200 
Identifying a gap in protection, the Court made it clear that effective deterrence of 
criminal acts was indispensable and could only be achieved by criminal law 
provisions and is the means by which similar matters would be regulated.201 
Similarly, in Opuz v Turkey, the court identified a gap in the law that	
‘…prevented the prosecuting authorities from pursuing the 
criminal investigations because the criminal acts in question had 
not resulted in sickness or unfitness for work for ten days or 
more’.202 
The Court further considered this ‘sickness or unfitness’ requirement under the 
existing legal framework constituted a breach of the state’s positive obligation.203 
Additionally, the withdrawal of complaints of harm was irrelevant, as the state 
should have pursued prosecution of the violator as a matter of ‘public interest 
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regardless of the victims’ withdrawal of complaints’.204 The Government had argued 
that it did not pursue investigation out of respect for the private life of the victims. 
The Court concluded:	
‘…that, in some instances, the national authorities’ interference 
with the private or family life of the individuals might be 
necessary in order to protect the health and rights of others or to 
prevent commission of criminal act’.205 
The African Charter206 does not specifically provide for the right to an effective 
remedy.207 However, in Jawara v The Gambia, the African Commission set out the 
three elements of a remedy: availability, effectiveness and sufficiency.208 
‘A remedy is considered available if the petitioner can pursue it 
without impediment; effective if it offers a prospect of success; 
and sufficient if it is capable of redressing the complaint’.209 
These three aspects of a remedy although distinct and separate, should be considered, 
as constitutive of a remedy that is ‘effective’ for human rights violations.210 
4.3 Components of effective remedies 
UN General Assembly Resolution 60/147211 outlines basic principles related to 
effective remedies consistent with those outlined in the ICCPR 212  and the 
ICESCR.213 While these principles are not binding on states, they outline the extent 
and scope of the right to a remedy, measures to be taken in securing that remedy, and 
standards for measuring effectiveness. Using these guidelines, effective remedies can 
be separated into two categories,214 both of which are essential in securing effective 
                                                
204 Ibid para 145 
205 Ibid para 144 
206 Organisation of African Unity (OAU), African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘Banjul 
Charter’), 27 June 1981, CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) 
207 Godrey M Musila, ‘The Right to an Effective Remedy under the African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights’ (2006) 6 Afr Hum Rts LJ 442, p.447 
208 Jawara v The Gambia (2000) AHRLR 107 (ACHPR 2000), para 32, see also Ibid p.446 
209 Ibid para 32 
210 Ibid 
211 UNGA Res 60/147 (16 December 2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/147 
212 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation on 
States Parties to the Covenant 
213 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) General Comment No.9: The 
domestic application of the Covenant 
214 Shelton, Remedies in international human rights law, p.7 
 
90 
protection of all human rights. The first is procedural in nature and deals with the 
right to bring human rights violations before the competent authorities.215 Second, 
there is a substantive redress category that focuses on the relief to which the victim is 
entitled after a successful claim.216 The aim of the substantive component is to 
‘restore as far as possible the state of the victim prior to the violation occurring:217 
‘Irrespective of who may ultimately be the bearer of responsibility for the 
violation’,218 the victim should have equal and effective access to justice.219 
A victim of a crime is defined as person(s) who have suffered harm, including 
physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial 
impairment of their fundamental rights through acts or omissions which are in 
violation of domestic criminal laws and also includes those crimes that are 
internationally recognised norms relating to human rights that are not recognized 
nationally.220 
The existing literature221 identifies a number of complimentary component measures 
that adequately fulfil the state’s obligations in providing an effective remedy. These 
measures are to be delivered through the application of domestic laws that reflect 
Covenant obligations. An effective remedy may be a singular component measure in 
the range of options or multiple measures to effectively restore the victim to the state 
prior to the violation occurring.222 The list of component measures below is not 
intended to be representative of all measures, nor is it limited to those outlined; 
rather it represents basic components that would be expected as remedies to gross 
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violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international 
humanitarian law that constitute crimes.223  
The components of a remedy 224  include access to competent authorities; an 
obligation on the state to thoroughly and effectively investigate; an obligation to 
prosecute, where the investigation yields evidence of a crime; a right of the victim to 
access to relevant information; a victim’s right to reparation; an obligation on the 
part of the state to stop ongoing violations; and the ability on the part of the victim to 
enforce any judgments rendered by the adjudicating body. 
4.3.1 Procedural components of a remedy 
This measure of redress is intended to ensure victims of violations are afforded 
access to judicial, administrative and legislative bodies. Several conditions emerge as 
important factors in ensuring meaningful access.225 Judicial mechanisms are critical, 
especially when they protect the most vulnerable 226  or when the behaviour 
complained of constitutes a crime. 227  In the section below, several important 
elements of judicial and administrative proceedings will be highlighted. These 
elements include the appropriateness of judicial remedies for serious violations and 
crimes. Access to competent authorities is more than a physical appearance in court; 
representation in proceedings are important especially for disadvantaged participants 
and procedures must be based on the law. 
4.3.1.1 Access to competent authorities 
There is a general agreement concerning access to judicial and administrative 
measures, however there is very little discourse on the importance of legal 
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representation, or the meaning of access to the competent authorities. This latter 
issue was addressed in the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) decision in 
Airey v Ireland involving a victim of domestic violence who was unable to afford the 
cost of legal representation necessary to pursue separation proceedings before the 
High Court.228 Although Airey claimed that she was not provided an effective 
remedy under domestic law as guarantee by Article 13 of the ECHR, the Court did 
not rule on the issue as it was found that she was denied effective access and thus a 
decision on an effective remedy was not necessary.229 The Court did note that by 
denial of access to the high court, she was denied a domestic remedy.230 
In the complaint to the Commission, Mrs. Airey raised several issues, including 
‘…that, because of the prohibitive cost of proceedings, she could not obtain a 
judicial separation’231 which violated: 
- Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention, by reason of the fact that her 
right of access to a court was effectively denied; 
- Article 8 (art. 8), by reason of the failure of the state to ensure that there is 
an accessible legal procedure to determine rights and obligations that have 
been created by legislation regulating family matters; 
- Article 13 (art. 13), in that she was deprived of an effective remedy before a 
national authority for the violations complained of; 
- Article 14 in conjunction with Article 6 para. 1 (art. 14+6-1), in that judicial 
separation is more easily available to those who can afford to pay than to 
those without financial resources. 
The Court found that Mrs. Airey did not enjoy an effective right of access to the 
High Court for the purpose of petitioning for a decree of judicial separation contrary 
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to Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1)232 which ‘secures to everyone the right to have any 
claim relating to his civil rights and obligations brought before a court or tribunal’.233 
The Irish government contended that there was nothing to gain from a judicial 
separation and that Airey could have entered into a separation deed with her husband 
or could have applied for a barring order or for maintenance under the 1976 Act. 
The Court held that the law required remedies to the violation that had been alleged, 
and rejected the government’s claim that the applicant had nothing to gain from a 
judicial separation. It further concluded that judicial separation is a remedy provided 
for by law and should be available to anyone who satisfies the conditions prescribed. 
It is for the individual to select which legal remedy to pursue. 
The government234 also contended that Airey did enjoy access to the High Court 
since she was free to go before that Court without the assistance of a lawyer. The 
Court held that the law is ‘…intended to guarantee, not rights that are theoretical or 
illusory, but rights that are practical and effective’.235 This is particularly so with the 
right of access to the courts and the right to a fair trial. The Court explained that the 
applicant would be at a disadvantage if a lawyer represented her husband and she 
was not represented. In considering the complexity of the case, the Court concluded 
that the possibility of appearing in person before the High Court without 
representation, notwithstanding any assistance that the judge may provide, does not 
provide an effective right of access and, hence, that it also does not constitute a 
domestic remedy. 
The government maintained236 that there was no positive obstacle emanating from 
the state and there was no deliberate attempt by the state to impede access; the 
alleged lack of access stemmed not from any act on the part of the authorities, but 
solely from Mrs. Airey’s personal circumstances, a matter for which the state cannot 
be held responsible. The Court did not agree with this conclusion. In the first place, 
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hindrance to access can be an impediment resulting from the state’s inaction. It is the 
duty of the state on some occasions to take positive action and not simply remain 
passive. The law is designed to safeguard the individual in a real and practical way 
and, in some cases, even a lack of legal representation may meet the requirements of 
effective access but it is dependent on the particular circumstances of the case and 
complexity of the procedure. 
The Court offered some direction on this issue, suggesting that in order to ensure 
effective access, the state may be required to provide legal aid or to simplify 
procedures so that litigants may easily navigate the system; however, the state was 
free to determine the means by which access is assured. 
The Court noted that Convention obligations ‘are intended to guarantee not rights 
that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective’. 237 In 
essence, Airey should also have had access to legal counsel in order to meaningfully 
and effectively present and resolve her complaint and, if needed, be provided legal 
resources (legal aid) as a duty of the state. 
4.3.1.2 Priority of judicial remedies 
To fulfil the obligations of the state that everyone has the right to effective redress 
measures by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental 
rights granted by the constitution or by law,238 a number of specific actions have 
been outlined setting the standard of effective access. Access to the convening body, 
whether judicial, administrative or other, must be prompt, effective 239  and 
independent with the power to determine whether a violation has been committed 
and to offer a mechanism of redress appropriate to the nature and gravity of the 
violation.240 
In respect to judicial measures, there appears to be consistent agreement that judicial 
measures of redress be used for gross violations of human rights and serious 
violations of international humanitarian law obligated under Article 2(3) of the 
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ICCPR, as disciplinary or administrative sanctions are insufficient for these 
violations.241 In Caracazo v Venezuela, the Inter American Court concluded that ‘any 
person who considers himself or herself to be a victim of human rights violations has 
the right to resort to the system of justice to attain compliance with the duty of the 
State, for his or her benefit and that of society as a whole’.242 There is:	
‘…an obligation to provide effective judicial remedies to victims 
of human rights violations…, remedies that must be 
substantiated in accordance with the rules of due process of law 
…, all in keeping with the general obligation of such States to 
guarantee the free and full exercise of the rights recognised by 
the Convention to all people subject to their jurisdictions’.243 
The significance of access to the court was also outlined in Rantsev v Cyprus and 
Russia where the court elaborated on the purpose of judicial proceedings stating:	
‘…that its judgments serve not only to decide those cases 
brought before it but, more generally, to elucidate, safeguard 
and develop the rules instituted by the Convention, thereby 
contributing to the observance by the States of the engagements 
undertaken by them as Contracting Parties’,244 
and	
‘Although the primary purpose of the Convention system is to 
provide individual relief, its mission is also to determine issues 
on public-policy grounds in the common interest, thereby raising 
the general standards of protection of human rights and 
extending human rights jurisprudence throughout the community 
of the Convention States’245  
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights is consistent with the Inter 
American Court and Article 2(3) of the ICCPR in that a judicial measure of redress is 
reiterated in the Principles and Guidelines on the Rights to a Fair Trial and Legal 
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Assistance in Africa.246 The Committee on CEDAW has opined that, for redress 
measures to be effective, they should include penal sanctions, civil methods of 
redress, and preventive and protective measures.247 The committee notes that judicial 
measures are effective only if the judicial power is independent, and can render 
impartial decisions, carry out its judgments, ensure justice without unnecessary 
delay, and the victim is assured access to a judicial redress measure.248 
The Committee on ICESCR has determined that ‘the right to an effective redress 
need not be interpreted as always requiring a judicial measure’. 249  Where 
administrative redress measures are used as the primary mechanism for providing a 
remedy, they must be legally binding and available for judicial review to ensure that 
the decision rendered is consistent with Covenant obligations and due process and 
the rule of law.250 In many cases an Administrative measure will be adequate but 
‘such administrative measures should be accessible, affordable, timely and 
effective’.251 However, when a Covenant right cannot be made fully effective 
without some role for the judiciary, judicial measures are necessary.252 
The European Court has adopted the position that ‘the application of Article 13 
(effective remedy) under European Convention on Human Rights in a given case 
will depend on the manner in which the Contracting state concerned has chosen to 
discharge its obligation under Article 1’.253 A single redress measure may not 
entirely satisfy the requirements, but the aggregate of component measures provided 
for under domestic law may do so.254 States are also obligated to take measures to 
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minimise the inconvenience to victims and should ensure their safety before, during 
and after judicial, administrative or other proceedings.255 
4.3.1.3 Obligation to effectively investigate 
The Committee on the ICCPR noted that administrative mechanisms are necessary to 
fulfil the obligation to investigate allegations of violations promptly, thoroughly and 
effectively through independent and impartial bodies.256 This establishes that the 
obligation has two criteria; that there must be an investigation and that it must be 
effective. States must therefore ensure that the necessary supporting administrative 
offices are instituted to give effect to their obligations under the Convention.257 The 
right to an effective remedy cannot be realised if the state does not take the steps to 
seriously investigate human right violations.258 Not all human rights instruments 
have explicit obligation to investigate violations, but human right bodies have 
unanimously held that the right to a prompt, effective, impartial and independent 
investigation for all violations of covenant rights is critical to the right of a 
remedy.259 
The obligation to investigate is necessarily dependent on the enactment of a 
legislative framework. In C.N. v United Kingdom,260 the victim had reported to the 
police that she had been subjected to conditions that violated Article 4 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (Slavery and Forced Labour). At 
the time of the alleged violation between 2002 and 2006, the United Kingdom had no 
specific statutes relating to servitude, forced or compulsory labour. The police relied 
on the Asylum and Immigration Act of 2004 in conducting their investigation but did 
not find her allegations to be credible, finding no evidence to substantiate her claim 
that she was trafficked into the United Kingdom. In filing with the Court, the victim 
claimed that the investigation was deficient because of the lack of legislation 
criminalising domestic servitude had hampered the ability of the investigating body 
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to make a true determination. In its ruling, the Court concluded that there was a 
failure to adequately investigate, hampered by the lack of adequate legislation to 
provide practical and effective protection. The UK was obligated under the Forced 
Labour Convention No.29 to penalise forced labour and adequately enforce 
penalties. It was further found that the authorities should have been aware of the 
presence of these types of violations, given that similar types of cases had previously 
been brought to the attention of the authorities. Additionally, the Court found that the 
obligation to investigate is not reliant on a complaint of the victim; where there is a 
credible suspicion of a violation or the matter comes to the attention of the 
authorities, they are obligated to investigate and to take operational measures to 
remove the victim from the harm as a matter of urgency. 
An additional aspect of the obligation to investigate is maintaining central focus on 
the victim and integrating them into the process. Victims have the right to take an 
active part in the investigation, and the right to know all facts surrounding the 
violation is crucial to ensuring effective redress.261 This obligation is derived from 
the state’s duty to protect all individuals within its jurisdiction from acts committed 
by private people who prevent the enjoyment of human rights.262 
4.3.1.4 Obligation to prosecute 
State parties must ensure that those responsible for Covenant rights violations are 
prosecuted before an unbiased authority with jurisdiction. A failure to bring to justice 
perpetrators of violations could in of itself be a breach of the Covenant.263 These 
obligations are heightened when the violations are recognised as criminal under 
national or international law. 264  The obligation to prosecute and to punish is 
intrinsically related to the right of justice and a duty of the state to address impunity 
that promotes recidivism. 265 
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The Human Rights Committee has considered criminal sanctions the primary 
obligation of States in respect to gross human right violations and serious human 
rights violations.266 In Bleier v Uruguay, the HRC urged the Uruguayan government 
to pursue the prosecution of individuals responsible for human rights violations.267 
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights has also found that certain acts that 
interfere with the enjoyment of individual rights will require punishment by criminal 
law.268 The Court held the duty to punish is embedded in the wider obligation of 
protection, as states must take appropriate measures to protect those within their 
jurisdiction.269 
The obligation to prosecute provides the opportunity for the courts through their 
judgments ‘not only to decide those cases brought before it but, ...to elucidate, 
safeguard and develop the rules’270 of the convention which contributes to the 
observance of state obligations.	
4.3.1.5 Access to relevant information 
States are obligated to develop and effectively disseminate relevant information to 
educate the general public, government personnel and victims of human rights 
violations of their rights.271 Information should also include available services for the 
rehabilitation of victims and should include all legal, medical, psychological, social 
and administrative resources to assist victims.272 
4.3.2 Substantive Components of a Remedy  
Substantive redress measures are intended to restore the victim to their condition 
prior to the harm and include reparations, cessation of the violations and the 
enforcement of judicial and administrative judgments. 
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4.3.2.1 Right to reparation 
The right to reparation has long been recognised as part of positive international law. 
273 The underlying principle was clearly articulated by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice in ‘Factory at Chorzow’.274 The Court observed that ‘… it is a 
principle of international law, and even a general conception of law, that any breach 
of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation’,275 ‘…reparation is the 
indispensable complement of a failure to apply a convention, and there is no 
necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself’.276 
The objective of this principle of reparation ‘…is that reparation must, as far as 
possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation 
which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed’.277 
Although this case involved disputes between states, the principle has since been 
extended to include individuals who have suffered harms.278	
The Human Rights Committee, in General Comment 31, reinforced this obligation 
stating that, without reparation, the obligation to provide effective redress that is 
central to the efficacy of Article 2(3) of the ICCPR is not discharged.279 States are 
obliged to provide adequate, effective and prompt reparations proportional to the 
gravity of the violation and harm suffered.280 The Basic Guidelines281 have outlined 
appropriate forms of reparations included below to encompass: 
Restitution, 282 whenever possible, should restore the victim to their original position. 
It can include restoration of liberty, identity, citizenship, employment and return of 
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property. States should review their laws, policies and practices to make restitution 
an available option in criminal cases and other criminal sanctions. 
Rehabilitation283 includes medical and psychological care and legal and social 
services. 
Compensation284 should be provided for any assessable damage resulting from a 
violation. Violations can include: 
a) Physical or mental harm. 
b) Lost opportunities, including employment, education and social 
benefits. 
c) Material damage and loss of earnings, including loss of earning 
potential. 
d) Moral damage to include humiliation, defamation, attacks on 
reputation and self-esteem. 
e) Costs of legal advice, expert assistance, medicine and medical 
services, psychological and social services. 
Other forms of reparation can include measures of satisfaction, such as public 
apologies, public memorials, guarantees of non-repetition and changes in relevant 
laws and practices. In relation to non-state actors, ‘in cases where a person, a legal 
person, or other entity is found liable for reparation to a victim, such party should 
make reparation to the victim or compensate the state if the state has already made 
reparation to the victim’.285 To ensure that victims are properly compensated, states 
should establish, strengthen or expand national funds for this purpose.286 
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4.3.2.2 Cessation of an ongoing violation 
Cessation of violations is an essential element of the right to an effective remedy. 
The Committee287 has held that ‘In general, the purposes of the Covenant would be 
defeated without an obligation integral to article 2 to take measures to prevent a 
recurrence of a violation of the Covenant’.288 Accordingly, measures, beyond a 
victim-specific remedy may be necessary to avoid recurrence of the type of 
violations in question.289 Such measures may require changes in the state party’s 
laws or practices’.290 ‘Under international law, it has been disputed if guarantees of 
non-repetition are a reparation measure or another consequence of state 
responsibility’.291 However, under international human rights law, non-repetition is 
critical in bringing relief to victims.292	
‘Guarantees of non-repetition, together with rehabilitation 
measures, are the most far-reaching forms of reparation that 
can be awarded to redress a human rights violation, with 
measures such as institutional reform, vetting, training of police 
personnel, and development programmes’.293 
This may also include practices and policies intended to protect certain categories of 
at risk people.294 
4.3.2.3 Enforcement of judgments 
Enforcement of redress measures is the responsibility of the police and executive 
authorities and can only be deemed effective when it is implemented.295 The African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has asserted that ‘…an effective remedy 
is a crucial component of a right, as it provides victims with the procedure by which 
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they can assert their rights and seek reparation for the violation’.296 While defining 
how the success of the Commission should be measured, it was determined that 
effectiveness should be measured by the practical outcome of cases to include how 
violations are addressed, ‘…what States should do to provide justice to the victims, 
what measures should be taken to prevent recurrence, and most importantly, the 
extent to which States comply with the rulings’.297 
‘A remedy can only be deemed effective when it is implemented, 
if need be, by the exercise of force’.298 
In essence, without the ability to enforce judgments of courts and the decisions of 
administrative bodies, commissions and tribunals effective redress may not be 
achieved. 
4.4 Special attention to the vulnerable 
The central aims of an effective remedy are to ensure that individuals have access to 
mechanisms to vindicate their rights299 and are provided reparation when Covenant 
rights have been violated.300 In many cases, this includes judicial enforcement, 
particularly when it comes to protecting the most vulnerable; 301  whatever 
mechanisms are employed, they must be sufficient to give effect to the rights in the 
Covenant.302 
To ensure the protection of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, the United Nations 
human rights system has adopted a variety of instruments to specifically address 
groups that have been designated as vulnerable.303 These include, the International 
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Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities,304 the International Covenant 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,305 the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,306 the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child,307 and the International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.308 Article 27 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights309 also provides for the rights of 
minorities. 310  Additionally, the United Nations Human Rights Council and, 
previously, the Human Rights Commission, established a series of thematic 
mandates to address issues of vulnerability.311 These mandates	
‘…include the appointment of special rapporteurs and 
independent experts on the topics of the sale of children, child 
prostitution, and child pornography; violence against women; 
contemporary forms of slavery, torture and other cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading punishment; trafficking in people; 
contemporary forms of racism and racial discrimination; human 
rights and extreme poverty; minority issues; and the human 
rights of migrants’.312 
The recognition of the special attention necessary to ensure the protection of 
vulnerable and disadvantaged groups has been an ongoing concern of the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR).313 The Icelandic 
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Human Rights Centre has identified 13 groups that are considered vulnerable 314 and 
may experience structural discrimination, social exclusion, stigmatisation, and 
deprivation of protections and entitlements on an ongoing basis and may be subject 
to human rights violations by the state, by others in the society, or from institutions, 
structural barriers, social dynamics and economic forces. 315 For these reasons, 
vulnerable groups require special protection for the equal and effective access to 
remedies. 316 Despite the continuous references to vulnerable, disadvantaged and 
marginalised individuals and groups, the CESCR has not provided a definition or 
criteria for identifying these groups.317 
Conclusion 
The right to an effective remedy highlights the obligations discerned by HCtFI 
(Chapter2). The above examination provides a broader framework for determining 
the HKSARG obligations to prevent human rights violations experienced by MDWs 
in Hong Kong. It also highlights the lack of due diligence exercised by the HKSARG 
in protecting and preventing the imposition of forced labour by private individuals 
and the lack of effective remedies available to victims of forced labour seeking 
vindication of rights. 
The lack of an effective remedy available to human trafficking for forced labour 
under Article 4 of the Hong Kong BOR highlights several points raised above. First, 
merely incorporating the obligation into the Constitution or law or that it be formally 
recognised as is Article 4 BOR, is insufficient ‘… rather it must be truly effective in 
establishing whether there has been a violation of human rights and in providing 
redress’.318 The lack of due diligence in adopting the required legislative and other 
measures to ensure human rights gives rise to a variety of abuses exacted on 
individuals and creates barriers to seeking remedies for violations of guaranteed 
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rights. It is clear that effective deterrence of criminal acts could only be achieved by 
criminal law provisions and it is by this means by which similar matters would be 
regulated.319 The lack of awareness of government organizations demonstrated that 
the HKSARG failed in their obligations, ‘…to ensure the principles of human rights 
throughout its entire ‘legal, political and institutional system’.320 All the structures, 
through which public power is exercised, must be capable of providing judicial 
measures ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human rights.321 
Additionally, the ICESCR Committee’s adoption of General Comment No.9 
recommended that the means chosen to address violations of rights must be adequate 
to give effect to the rights in the Covenant.322 In many cases, this includes judicial 
enforcement, particularly when it comes to protecting the most vulnerable. 323 
Therefore any legislation intended to prevent, protect, investigate, punish as a 
remedy to forced labour must take account of the special vulnerability of MDWs.  
The following chapter will examine the concept of vulnerability relying on the 
reports of the CESCR, case law of the ECtHR, the committee on CEDAW and the 
link to barriers in accessing remedies in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 5. Vulnerable Groups  
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the links between the obligation to provide an effective 
remedy discussed in Chapter 4, the concept of vulnerability of disadvantaged or 
marginalised groups and the necessity to pay special attention to the underlying 
elements that make a particular individual or groups vulnerable and the response of 
government institutions in addressing the needs of vulnerable individuals and 
groups.  
I will examine the concept of vulnerability and what makes migrant workers in 
particular a vulnerable group. To address the concept and identification of vulnerable 
groups, I will rely on the reports of the CESCR, emerging case law of the ECtHR 
which is at the forefront in setting the parameters of what constitutes vulnerable 
groups, the committee on CEDAW and the Council of Europe Parliamentary 
Assembly that specifically addresses migrant domestic workers. I will also rely on 
Martha Fineman’s theory of vulnerability which I believe links directly to the goals 
of human rights instruments, and in particular state responsibility in ensuring equity 
and non-discrimination. 
There are some overlapping elements between migrant workers and other designated 
vulnerable groups, however migrant workers appear to experience a wider array of 
overlapping vulnerability elements that may follow them into mechanisms for 
redress of rights violations. The barriers to accessing remedies will be discussed in 
Chapter 6. 
In the section below, I will examine the concept of vulnerability and the emerging 
jurisprudence on the identification of vulnerable groups, and the protections that 
should be afforded to such groups under heading equalising vulnerability.  
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 5.2 Concept of vulnerability 
Although the concept of vulnerability is not new, there is no consensus on its 
definition. 324  Recent scholarly writings and case law have contributed to the 
articulation of parameters in the identification of these special groups. The 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR is at the forefront of shaping the understanding of this 
concept, and prolific writers such as Martha Fineman have provided a theoretical 
framework on the discourse that provides a dual lens on viewing vulnerability. 
5.2.1 Recognition of vulnerability 
Vulnerable and disadvantaged groups have frequently been victims of violations of 
civil and political rights which extends to economic, social, and cultural rights’.325 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has repeatedly stressed326 
that the ICESCR is the appropriate vehicle for the protection of the most vulnerable 
and disadvantaged in society.327 
These concerns are rooted in the realisation that in most societies, specific groups or 
individuals may be systematically denied a variety of their rights.328 These groups 
are likely to be disproportionately affected by discrimination, social exclusion, and 
stigmatisation. In many cases, these violations are carried out by a state actor, and 
consummated via state institutions. 
The CESCR has outlined a set of reporting guidelines to better evaluate the 
effectiveness of the implementation of Covenant rights. The guidelines, adopted in 
2008, require reporting on ‘disadvantaged and marginalised individuals and 
groups’.329 In the reporting to the CESCR, migrant workers have been specifically 
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referred to in the context of the disadvantaged and marginalised when seeking 
information on measures to protect and ensure the rights to education and adequate 
food.330 In this context, the terms disadvantaged and marginalised are used in the 
same manner as the term vulnerable, which was used in the 1991 guidelines.331 The 
CESCR has also recognised that the ability of impoverished individuals and groups 
to gain access to, take part in and contribute to cultural life on equal terms is 
seriously restricted.332 Poverty plays a significant role in the lack of awareness of 
individual rights and contributes to a sense of powerlessness as a consequence of 
their situation, therefore efforts must be taken to adopt measures to ensure adequate 
protection and the full exercise of the rights of people living in poverty as a matter of 
urgency.333 The CESCR has defined poverty broadly as the lack of basic capabilities 
to live-in dignity and encompasses broader features such as hunger, poor education, 
discrimination, vulnerability and social exclusion.334 
‘In the light of the International Bill of Rights, poverty may be 
defined as a human condition characterised by sustained or 
chronic deprivation of the resources, capabilities, choices, 
security and power necessary for the enjoyment of an adequate 
standard of living and other civil, cultural, economic, political 
and social rights’.335 
In some instances, poverty arises when people have no access to resources because 
of who they are, what they believe or where they live. The Committee recognised 
that, as a means of eliminating discrimination, poverty must also be addressed. 
Discrimination may cause poverty, just as poverty may cause discrimination. 
Particular attention must be afforded vulnerable groups, as inequality may be 
entrenched in institutions and deeply rooted in social values that shape relationships 
within households and communities.	
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To address the vulnerable and unequal position of people with disabilities, the 
CESCR in Comment No.5 stated that it was an obligation on parties to the Covenant 
to remove structural disadvantages and give appropriate preferential treatment to 
people with disabilities to enable them to achieve the objectives of full participation 
and equality within society.336 This obligation would require additional resources be 
made available to ensure the guarantee of rights to people with disabilities and may 
require specifically tailored measures to fulfil the obligation. This principle would in 
all probability be applied to other vulnerable individuals and groups.337 General 
comment No.20 on discrimination similarly stipulates that measures must be taken to 
attenuate or suppress conditions that perpetuate discrimination and, in some cases, 
there is an obligation to adopt special measures to achieve such a purpose.338	
The ILO has stated that migrant workers both individually and as a group are 
vulnerable to human rights abuses due to inequalities determined by gender, race, 
ethnicity, national origin and social status. 339  According to the ILO, migrant 
domestic work is one of the least protected under national laws and lacks effective 
monitoring under labour laws. For migrant domestic workers who live and work in 
the household of the employer, the situation is critical, particularly for those in 
irregular or undocumented migration status. They can face language and cultural 
barriers in accessing information on their rights and the socio-cultural characteristics 
of their host country. They may be isolated from other employees and service 
providers, have limited access to communications, including phones or the internet, 
limiting communication with their families, and are restricted in their freedom of 
movement. They may also suffer from non-payment or withholding of wages, 
extremely long working hours, contract substitutions, passport retentions, violations 
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of human dignity and fundamental freedoms, degrading treatment and violence, 
forced labour and trafficking for labour exploitation in the worst cases.	
The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 
addressed the vulnerability of migrant workers directly, indicating that their 
vulnerability is both cause and consequence of their experiences of sex and 
gender.340 Female migrant workers are women who migrate independently, who 
migrate to join their spouses or members of their families who are also workers and 
undocumented, and may fall into the above categories.341 
In assessing policy needs to combat discrimination of women migrant workers, 
policy makers should adopt a perspective based on gender inequality, traditional 
female roles, a gender labour market, widespread gender-based violence, the 
worldwide feminisation of poverty, and labour migration.342 Violations occur in 
countries of origin, transit and destination. Female migrant workers may experience 
intersecting forms of discrimination, suffering not only gender-based discrimination, 
but also that based on racism, ethnicity, cultural particularities, nationality, language, 
religion or other status.343 
Access to justice may also be limited due to the unresponsiveness of officials and at 
times through collusion between officials and perpetrators.344 Workers may lose their 
work permits once reports of abuse or discrimination are reported to the authorities 
and they cannot remain in the country for trial. In addition to these formal barriers, 
practical barriers may frustrate access to remedies; there may be language barriers, 
lack of awareness of rights, a lack of mobility due to confinement at the employer’s 
residence, lack of access to communication, isolation and lack of access to social 
groups.345 Additionally, workers may suffer violence and abuse for long periods 
before the situation is exposed.	
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5.2.2 Identification of vulnerability 
Peroni and Timmer trace the way in which the ECtHR has characterised the concept 
of vulnerable groups and its implications on human rights case law. 346  The 
identification as a ‘vulnerable group’ allows courts to provide special attention to 
address inequalities in an effective and practical way. 347  As it relates to the 
identification of vulnerable groups, the court has examined the social, historical and 
institutional forces that create and perpetuates the vulnerability; whether specific 
actions have affected a particular group or a specific segment of society; and whether 
historical prejudice and stigmatisation have contributed to the harm.348  Where 
evidence of historical prejudice and stigmatisation exists, Peroni and Timmer 
characterise this as ‘misrecognition’, where some individuals or groups actors are 
branded as inferior and excluded from a full membership in the wider society. 349	
According to Fraser350, one becomes a full member of society only by recognising 
and being recognised by another member of society. Recognition by others is 
essential to the development and sense of belonging as a member of society. The 
denial of ‘…recognition or to be “misrecognised” is to suffer both a distortion of 
one’s relation to one’s self and an injury to one’s identity’.351 Belonging to a group 
that is devalued by the dominant culture, suffering repeated encounters with the 
stigmatising gaze of the culturally dominant, disesteemed groups internalise negative 
self-images which prevent them from developing a healthy cultural identity. Another 
identifiable harm recognised by the court is ‘maldistribution’ which constitutes an 
impediment to equal participation in social life and a form of social subordination 
and injustice in which some actors lack the necessary resources to interact with 
others as peers.352 
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In determining the protection to be afforded to vulnerable groups, the ECtHR’s case 
law is identifying and developing the necessary criteria for classification of 
vulnerable individuals or groups. Peroni and Timmer state that the concept of 
vulnerable groups was introduced in 2001 in the case of Chapman v the United 
Kingdom353 involving the lifestyle of the Roma community. They contend that the 
articulation of elements constituting vulnerability in this case has shaped the court’s 
construction of the term, in that, ‘belonging to a group whose vulnerability is 
constructed by broader, societal, political and institutional circumstances’, which 
creates power imbalances and an institutional framework that fails to account for the 
specific needs of a minority class.354 
The vulnerability of groups has also been defined by historical prejudices directed 
toward the group resulting in social exclusion (misrecognition).355 In D.H. and 
Others v the Czech Republic356 Oršuš and others v Croatia357 and Horváth and Kiss 
v Hungary358 the Court relied on historical prejudices in school segregation against 
these groups (Roma) citing the group’s ‘turbulent history and constant uprooting’.359 
The court also relied on a recommendation by the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe that, as a group, the Roma were continually being: 
‘…subjected to discrimination, marginalisation and segregation 
…in every field of public and personal life, including access to 
public places, education, employment, health services… [and 
that this type of discrimination] …usually affects the weakest 
social groups’.360 
In addition to prejudice and stigmatisation, another variable in determining 
vulnerability is social disadvantage and material depravation (maldistribution).361 In 
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Yardanova v Bulgaria362 which involved the forced eviction of a decades-old Roma 
settlement from state land, the Court noted the government’s argument that had they 
considered the Roma community’s unique status and taken steps to provide housing, 
it could be viewed as discrimination against the majority population. 363  The 
misalignment of the argument did not escape the court that reminded the state that; 
‘…the applicants are part of an underprivileged community 
whose problems are specific and must be addressed 
accordingly… The argument fails to recognise the applicants’ 
situation as an outcast community and one of the socially 
disadvantaged groups’.364 
‘Such social groups, regardless of the ethnic origin of their 
members, may need assistance in order to be able effectively to 
enjoy the same rights as the majority population. As the Court 
has stated in the context of Article 14 of the Convention, that 
provision not only does not prohibit a member state from 
treating groups differently in order to correct ‘factual 
inequalities’ between them but, moreover, in certain 
circumstances a failure to attempt to correct inequality through 
different treatment may in itself give rise to a breach…’365 
In M.S.S. v Belgium,366 an asylum seeker was returned by Belgium to Greece and 
held in conditions so bad that the Court concluded that it constituted inhumane and 
degrading treatment in violation of the ECHR.367 In identifying the asylum seeker as 
vulnerable, the court stated in part: 
‘In the present case, the Court must take into account that the 
applicant, being an asylum- seeker, was particularly vulnerable 
because of everything he had been through during his migration 
and the traumatic experiences he was likely to have endured 
previously’.368 
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This statement suggests that the court not only identified the victim as vulnerable 
based on his status as an asylum seeker, but also considered his past individual 
experience.369 
The victim was wholly dependent on the state for support and therefore:	
‘…State responsibility could arise for “inhuman and degrading 
treatment” where an applicant, in circumstances… [finds] 
…herself faced with official indifference when in a situation of 
serious deprivation or want incompatible with human 
dignity’.370 
This dependency reasoning is consistent with other cases concerning prisoners and 
detainees.371 The Court further took notice of the specific conditions existing372 at the 
detention facility in their decision essentially establishing the exacerbation of 
vulnerability through government policy and conduct.373 
5.2.3 Equalising vulnerability 
Fineman proposes an understanding of vulnerability that diverges from the 
traditional understanding of harm to individuals and groups where equality is 
narrowly defined as ‘sameness of treatment’, an anti-discrimination agenda that is 
remedied in the courts.374 The current understanding of vulnerability is built on the 
narrow confines of the discrimination model concerning the autonomous and 
independent subject and an inattentive state that disregards underlying social 
inequalities.375 The anti-discrimination perspective built on sameness coupled with 
the autonomous subject creates two issues: first the autonomous subject is viewed as 
one with individual choice and responsible for their own successes and failures; 
second, the state in respecting this autonomy adopts a passivity that ignores the 
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underling inequalities of circumstances and presumes an equivalence of position, and 
possibilities.376 
The traditional anti-discrimination and equality approach is based on sex, race and 
ethnicity.377 It is divisive and spawns a backlash on the part of those who perceive 
they are not within groups favoured by this approach to equal protection and claims 
of reverse discrimination378 as the protections do not cover everyone.379 For true 
equality to exist, Fineman proposes that the argument should be reframed in terms of 
advantages and privileges conferred on segments of the population through the 
respective state’s polices and its institutions.380 
Vulnerability is often associated with victimhood, depravation and dependency 
intended to protect populations such as those infected with HIV-AIDS, people living 
in poverty or confined in prisons or other state institutions, children and the 
elderly.381 
Fineman postulates that vulnerability is a naturally occurring human condition that 
afflicts all in society, is inevitable and, if viewed universally, has the potential to 
provide a more robust framework for equal protection. We are vulnerable as a result 
of our mere existence, faced constantly with the possibility of harm ranging from the 
mild to severe either by accident or intentionally. Vulnerability is beyond our 
control, we can mitigate it but we cannot escape it. 
Taking into consideration the constant possibility of harm, ‘…vulnerability mandates 
that politics, ethics, and law be fashioned around a complete, comprehensive vision 
of the human experience if they are to meet the needs of real-life subjects…’382 To 
ensure that the issue of concern is addressed, the focus by the state should be on 
ensuring that its polices and institutions are structured in such a manner to ensure no 
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group is gaining impermissible advantages at the expense of other groups.383 This 
shift in perspective not only brings scrutiny to individual actions, but also to 
institutions ensuring that assets are not being provided unequally, even if 
unintentionally. 
Peroni and Timmer suggest that there is a tension between Fineman’s theory and the 
legal literature on vulnerability. The court uses vulnerability to define particular 
groups in need of protection but Fineman’s approach is universal vulnerability.384 To 
make sense of the paradox, they rely on a ECtHR judge who, when asked about the 
court’s reasoning, replied ‘[a]ll applicants are vulnerable, but some are more 
vulnerable than others’.385 
This paradox that Peroni and Timmer debated can be seen in Yardanova v 
Bulgaria 386  and Fineman’s concern over reverse discrimination. The court 
recognised that the government’s argument that housing assistance to the Roma 
could be viewed as discrimination against the majority population was without merit. 
The government was not only required to provide measures tailored to bring relief to 
the Roma, but was also responsible for attempting to correct existing inequalities and 
recognising their status as a socially disadvantaged group. However, there may never 
have been a paradox in Fineman’s theory and the Court’s reasoning. Human rights 
courts have consistently done two things through their judgments; bring relief to 
victims and hold states accountable for their actions. The accountability of states for 
harms resulting from commission or omission in state responsibility often requires 
changes in law, policy or resources to ensure full compliance with state obligation. 
While Peroni and Timmer finally embrace, and rightly so, the concept of universal 
vulnerability, Fineman’s theory may not have been to define vulnerability, but rather 
to re-define the argument on equality. The back-footed approach in identifying and 
justifying vulnerable groups creates gaps in which reverse discrimination claims can 
occur. If the concept of universal vulnerability is accepted, then everyone is equally 
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vulnerable and the argument of equality shifts to why some are benefiting 
disproportionately from a skewed manner in which institutions create, reinforce and 
sustain privileges and disadvantages. 
Fineman387 argues that this new regime to refocus on institutional and structural 
advantages and disadvantages would require changes in political culture. The 
responsibility in structuring this imperative would fall on the legislature and 
executive branches for primary manifestation and ultimate monitoring by the courts 
to ensure fulfilment of responsibility in assessing individual equality claims. State 
institutions collectively are important in lessening, ameliorating and compensating 
for vulnerability. Together, they provide assets which can be viewed as advantages, 
coping mechanisms, or resources that allows us to withstand misfortunes, disaster 
and violence. 
According to her, these assets include physical assets that provide financial means, 
property and other material goods, and human assets focused on individual 
capabilities developed to allow us to make the best of a given situation, for example 
health and educational institutions and employment systems.388 These assets allow 
the development of the human being to participate in the market facilitating the 
accumulation of material resources that enhance the ability to withstand 
vulnerabilities. Lastly, social assets are networks of relationships that provide 
support and include family and other cultural groups and associations.389 Social 
assets are also accumulated through political parties and trade unions as a means of 
strengthening resilience. Institutions that are responsible for conferring assets are 
brought into legal existence through regulation and the mechanisms of the state. 
Since the state is responsible for conferring these assets through their institutions, 
there should be greater vigilance in ensuring equitable distribution and they should 
be held accountable for individual and institutional vulnerability. 
Within the asset conferring institutions, Fineman believes that individuals are placed 
and treated differently with some enjoying more privileges than others who are 
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relegated to disadvantaged positions. Privileges and disadvantages overlap and 
accumulate across asset conferring systems devastating some while benefiting 
others. She makes the point that, in some instances, assets conferred in one system 
may mitigate disadvantages in other systems; for example, education may mitigate 
poverty, particularly when linked to strong social networks. Vulnerability does not 
occur because of the intersection of multiple identifiers such as race, class or sexual 
orientation, but rather as a result of the intersecting of systems of power and 
privileges that creates webs of advantages and disadvantages.390 The resources 
provided by institutions are the assets that create the capacity to the full enjoyment of 
rights despite naturally occurring vulnerabilities.391 It is therefore critical that these 
institutions operate in a non-discriminatory manner that does not favour or 
disadvantage individuals or groups. The institutions should be structured in such a 
manner that they that are capable of responding equally and, if they do not, they must 
justify the inequality or act appropriately to remedy the disadvantages.392 
Conclusion 
Government institutions possess considerable leverage in ensuring the protection of 
vulnerable individuals and groups and ensuring equity and equality in treatment. 
MDWs like other groups in most societies may be systematically denied a variety of 
their rights393 and disproportionately affected by discrimination, social exclusion, 
and stigmatisation. The supervisory body of ICESCR has recognised that those 
disadvantaged by poverty lack the ability to gain access to, take part in and 
contribute to cultural life on equal terms with others in society.394 Poverty 
contributes to a lack of awareness of individual rights and contributes to a sense of 
powerlessness as a consequence of their situation, therefore efforts must be taken to 
adopt measures to ensure adequate protection and the full exercise of the rights of 
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people living in poverty as a matter of urgency.395 It is an obligation on parties to the 
Covenant to remove structural disadvantages and give appropriate preferential 
treatment to vulnerable groups and individuals to enable them to achieve the 
objectives of full participation and equality within society.396 
MDWs are viewed as inferior and excluded from full membership in society. 397 This 
view can be recognized in the ZN v Secretary of Justice and Others where the 
implications of the applicant’s membership as an inferior caste member was noted 
along with the imbalance in power between the applicant and the employer, the low 
economic status and unfamiliarity with the system and structures in Hong Kong, the 
psychological and economic constraints exerted by the employer, the state of 
dependency, restriction of movement and isolation that limited the ability to a normal 
life398 and full enjoyment of rights. 
Considering the vulnerable position of MDWs, a comprehensive vision of the 
MDW’s experience must be taken into account to protect and ensure they are not 
being taken advantaged of by those more powerful members of society or adversely 
affected by government policy in accumulating the necessary assets to lift 
themselves and their families out of poverty. To ensure that MDWs are receiving 
their fair share of the assets owed to them and are not being disadvantaged while the 
employers benefit off of the disadvantage, the government institutions must ensure 
that the apparatus that regulates the MDW scheme and tasked with ensuring the 
prevention, protection, and remedy of labour rights violations are responding 
appropriately to remedy any disadvantage. 
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Chapter 6. Barriers to Remedies 
6.1 Introduction 
This Chapter examines the link between vulnerable groups and individuals, and 
barriers399 to remedies, which include the use of formal and informal mechanisms 
such as conciliation. Barriers to remedies generally and disproportionally affect the 
vulnerable who are most at risk of abuse, are the least able to protect themselves 
against harm and are more likely to be ignored by policy makers.400 
Barriers to remedies may manifest in ways such as unaffordable costs associated 
with legal representation, administrative and other costs or fees for filing claims, or 
be directly linked to the lack of financial resources.401  Studies that focus on 
unrepresented litigants have found that, in some courts, the majority of litigants who 
were without legal representation and identified themselves as racial or ethnic 
minorities were women and poor.402 This factor has a ripple effect that reaches into 
every aspect of the formal and informal justice processes. 
Galanter403 proposes that barriers to accessing remedies are related to the fact that an 
injured party may not perceive the injury as attributable to a decision of another 
individual, they may be ignorant about their rights or suffer intimidation, and cost 
barriers may prevent a party from making a claim, pursuing a dispute or obtaining 
legal help. Similarly, Murphy404 identifies cost, lack of access to legal aid, lack of 
representation, delay, complexity of proceedings and paperwork, lack of awareness 
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of rights and process for low- and moderate-income litigants as barriers to accessing 
remedies. Rhode405 also identifies legal representation, system inefficiency, cost of 
representation and malpractice as impediments to access to justice. She reiterates that 
the poor experience more legal difficulties and their cases take on a special urgency 
since individuals living on the economic margins are less likely to ‘lump it’ when 
they are impeded from accessing remedies.406 
There are many overlapping elements in a variety of available literature on barriers 
to remedies, however, they do not seem to capture the varied and overlapping 
elements associated with the vulnerability of migrant workers. The wide array of 
overlapping elements of barriers to remedies described below has been found to 
adequately reflect the migrant workers condition. The list of barriers has been 
compiled from several studies, reports and literature related to access to justice for 
vulnerable, poor or disadvantaged groups.407 
There is wide agreement that the disadvantaged are less likely to have the education, 
skills, and self-confidence to handle legal problems effectively without assistance.408 
According to Carmona, the lack of access to information and the lack of recognition 
or awareness of guaranteed rights impedes access to remedies for the most 
marginalised in society and other barriers occur due to institutional and structural 
deficiencies in the design and operation of justice and resolution mechanisms; these 
include lack of legal frameworks, inadequate capacity and awareness of police, 
courts and prosecutors, corruption, lack of enforcement of judicial rulings and 
others.409 Access to justice requires a substantially greater effort in money and time 
for disadvantaged groups and the lack of quality education, reduced access to 
information and limited political influence translates into lower levels of knowledge 
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of rights and the legal system.410 In summary, access to remedies requires a 
comprehensive and holistic approach that must incorporate broader structural, social, 
cultural and institutional factors to ensure equity so that one segment of society is not 
benefiting from privileges at the disadvantage of others.411 
Many jurisdictions have made use of informal alternative mechanisms for resolving 
disputes and have either mandated it as a first step to resolution or as an optional 
mechanism available for those willing to use it. These alternative mechanisms were 
developed as an alternative to the formal court system and include mediation, 
conciliation, arbitration and collaborative resolutions of disputes.412 The central 
question on the use of informal and formal mechanisms regarding vulnerable groups 
is, which mechanism offers the best procedural and substantive protections? 
In the following Sections, I will examine three categories of barriers to remedies; 
social and cultural, institutional and structural. I will also bear in mind the discourse 
on alternative mechanisms of dispute resolution as the preferred method of resolving 
labour rights violations is conciliation, an informal resolution process where there is 
a lack of procedural and substantive protections for vulnerable individuals and 
groups. The structural framework for this section was adapted from Beqiraj and 
McNamara’s Access to Justice study.413 
6.2 Social and cultural barriers 
Beqiraj and McNamara believe that social and cultural barriers are reflected from 
wider society and characteristic of the particular jurisdiction, including economic 
factors, income, inequality gaps, ethnicity, nationality, religion, literacy and 
education. Poverty, illiteracy and discrimination are widely identified as obstacles to 
a remedy and overlap, and when go unaddressed result in the disempowerment and 
lack of awareness of rights and an actual or perceived subordination to the more 
powerful in the community. These factors cannot be ignored as they have an adverse 
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effect on vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. Social and cultural barriers are linked 
to poverty and create socioeconomic subordination, a lack of willingness to seek a 
remedy out of fear of reprisals from the more privileged in society, a lack of 
awareness of rights, discrimination and a lack of understanding in proceedings as a 
result of language barriers. 
6.2.1 Poverty and socioeconomic subordination 
‘Poverty is both a cause and consequence of inadequate levels of access to 
justice’.414 According to Beqiraj and McNamara, reduced human and financial 
resources by the government results in an inefficient and ineffective civil justice 
system. These failures have a disproportionate impact on the disadvantaged who lack 
the resources to overcome these systemic failures and navigate the state institutions. 
Carmona argues that the impact of poverty is magnified by multi-dimensional 
structural and societal impediments extend beyond low income, and include other 
elements such as literacy, access to information, limited political influence, 
stigmatisation, discrimination, powerlessness, economic dependence on others and 
their subordination to other groups, people and organisations.415 Additionally, when 
access to remedies is denied, the disadvantaged are unable to secure their economic 
and social rights, unable to avoid exploitation and are forced to accept unjust 
settlements. 
6.2.2 Fear of reprisal (penalties) 
Carmona believes that vulnerable individuals or groups may choose not to seek a 
remedy because they fear reprisal or sanctions from more powerful actors inside and 
outside the civil justice system or their community, and that that fear prevents 
vulnerable groups from asserting their right to seek a remedy.416 People who have 
been in forced labour or trafficked or have an illegal migration status may be led to 
believe they will be imprisoned or arrested, building on fears of mistreatment by the 
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authorities or elites in their home countries or abroad.417 Victims often endure long 
periods of abuse and exploitation without complaint. 418  People who have 
experienced the most severe forms of abuse are more likely to seek remedies because 
at that stage they may identify as a victim, motivated to seek a remedy or empowered 
through support providers.419 Vulnerable individuals living in constant fear and 
insecurity are more prone to making short term economic decisions, have an aversion 
to risk, and lack trust in the institutions that may assist them.420 
6.2.3 Lack of awareness of rights 
The lack of awareness and understanding of legal rights and the ways that these 
rights can be secured in judicial and administrative forums impedes full enjoyment 
of the rights and pursuit of a remedy.421 Victims raised in poverty may not have 
acquired the necessary tools and basic knowledge to assert their rights and be 
unaware of the obligations of governments toward them.422 They may also lack 
sufficient literacy and education that is the foundation of empowerment and 
increases the individual’s capacity to understand and exert their legal rights.423 The 
lack of these two factors reduces accumulation of economic resources and the 
capacity to understand and enforce rights that translates in to a denial of legal 
remedies.424 
To mitigate this deficiency and ensure the protection and realisation of rights for the 
most vulnerable, states must ensure access to information for the public generally 
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through easily accessible and effective means,425 taking into consideration these two 
factors and particularly language barriers of those needing the information. The 
public must also be made aware of laws and have access to material relating to 
judgments, trial transcripts and adjudication procedures.426 Vulnerable groups cannot 
effectively seek remedies for harms when they do not know their rights and 
entitlements under the law.427  Information concerning remedies must be made 
available and intelligible to them and serve their practical purposes.428 Without 
effective access to legal information and advocacy to minimise the imbalance that 
the lack of awareness creates, vulnerable groups risk effectively being deprived of 
remedies for harms.429 
The accessibility to information alone is insufficient and the state has the duty to 
address costs, waiting periods, and interaction with government officials which can 
act as disincentives for the most disadvantaged in society.430 States rarely consider 
the financial, technological, linguistic and geographical challenges experienced by 
the poor.431 The government may fail to inform the public about their rights and 
entitlements or they lack capacity to comply with their obligations.432 
6.2.4 Discrimination 
Discrimination is an obstacle that affects all aspects of accessing a remedy.433 It can 
be legislated against, but its elimination requires more substantial efforts to empower 
the disadvantaged through awareness and acknowledgement of their rights. In times 
of economic uncertainty, discrimination becomes a political and social issue, and 
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thus measures need to be taken to address inequality and exclusion through a legal 
framework as a long-term strategy and part of government policy434 to ensure equal 
and consistent treatment. Discrimination affects some segments of society more 
drastically due to their unique characteristics, such as ethnic and racial minorities and 
migrants who face barriers to claiming and enforcing their rights. Barriers to 
remedies may be as a result of race, gender or ethnicity, but discriminatory policies 
that place already disadvantaged groups at a further disadvantage reinforce or 
exacerbate their disadvantaged status and treatment.435 
6.2.5 Language 
Many people find it difficult to understand judicial processes, terminology, 
sequences of events and the manner of presenting information to an adjudicator. The 
complexities and intimidation are exacerbated when the proceedings are conducted 
in a language not familiar to litigants, especially in a multilingual and multi-ethnic 
society.436 Many of the services available to low-income individuals prove to be 
unusable due to a lack of proficiency in language skills, even when computer 
services are available. This barrier is exacerbated by rules that prohibit clerks from 
assisting out of fear that it may be viewed a giving legal advice to unrepresented 
litigants.437 
Social relationships are also affected as it is often confined to those who share the 
same language contributing to isolation. 438  Linguistic barriers also prevent 
vulnerable groups from contacting the authorities out of fear of being treated 
differently.439 Even when interpreters are used, these services may not be sufficient 
to counter communication problems with officials and depends on the degree to 
which interpreters act professionally and are unbiased. 440  Interpreters are not 
routinely available in crisis encounters, thus if an interested party calls the police, 
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unless the officers are versed in the complainant’s language or have interpreters 
available, the officers are likely to gather necessary information from the party that is 
best able to communicate in the familiar language and may control the outcome of 
the incident.441 In these situations, decisions and services rendered by the police are 
frequently based on incomplete information and can also undermine the justice 
system’s processes. Litigants in such situations can often be persuaded to accept 
inappropriate or second-best legal remedies or solutions, persuaded to waive their 
rights or sign documents that are not in their best interests.442	
6.3 Institutional barriers 
Institutional barriers are linked to governmental policy and resources dedicated to the 
structure and operation of the country’s justice and dispute resolution systems.443 
These barriers exist as a result of inadequate or non-existent legal frameworks, 
inadequate administrative structures lacking resources or effective management, 
limited judicial capacity, inadequate training of the judiciary and other officials 
resulting in poorly reasoned, inconsistent and biased decisions.444 Other factors 
concern the inadequate geographical distribution of resolution forums affecting 
physical access. The lack of diligence in recognising rights-holders and recording 
complaints that affects vulnerable groups leads to impunity for perpetrators of 
violations in contrast to victims who are disregarded or mistreated.445 
6.3.1 Legal framework – recognition of rights 
The most basic right in seeking a remedy is the recognition of the individual as the 
bearer of rights. Legal norms can determine people’s choices. 446  For many 
disadvantaged groups, existing legal frameworks – formal, traditional and informal – 
are inadequate for providing justice.447 For legal frameworks to be effective, they 
must be in conformity with human rights principles.448 The rule of law not only 
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ensures life and personal security, it also provides a stable framework of rights and 
obligations to be effectively realised.449 
The requirement that states adopt legislative, judicial, administrative, educative and 
other appropriate measures to fulfil the state’s positive obligations 450  is the 
mitigating factor for barriers to remedies. An effective legal framework is essential 
and must appropriately criminalise offenses, provide clear definitions, give avenues 
for protection and support appropriate and proportionate penalties.451 These legal 
frameworks must also include regulatory systems and monitoring schemes to prevent 
or stop violations.452 In crafting legislation, legislators may not take into account the 
issues that negatively affect vulnerable groups and may enact laws that reflect and 
reinforce the interests of the powerful in society.453 These laws are often biased 
against the poor and do not recognise or prioritise their rights or abuses they suffer 
which results in a disproportionate impact on them (impermissible advantages).454 
A redress system based on prejudices is incapable of protecting vulnerable groups 
and serves only to undermine guaranteed rights and autonomy and to control and 
segregate them by class.455 The lack of laws or lack of enforcement of laws aimed at 
protecting economic, social and cultural rights and discrimination on socioeconomic 
status is not recognised in many countries, and significantly impedes the pursuit of a 
remedy.456 The equal protection and access for all seeking equitable outcomes cannot 
be achieved if underlying structural inequalities arising from gender, race, ethnicity 
and social class divisions are not addressed.457 When countries do not implement 
                                                
449 Anderson, ‘Access to justice and legal process: making legal institutions responsive to poor people 
in LDCs’, p.2 
450 Committee, General Comment 31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States Parties to the 
Covenant, UN Doc), para 7 
451 Andrevski, Larsen and Lyneham, ‘Barriers to trafficked persons’ involvement in criminal justice 
proceedings: an Indonesian case study’ 
452 Satterthwaite, ‘Crossing borders, claiming rights: using human rights law to empower women 
migrant workers’ p.12 
453 Sepulveda Carmona, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights: 
Access to Justice’ p8 
454 Ibid 
455 Ibid p9 
456 Ibid 
457 Anne Phillips, Multiculturalism, universalism and the claims of democracy (United Nations 
Research Institute for Social Development 2002), p2-3, see also, Marjorie Mayo and others, 
‘Accessing social justice in disadvantaged communities: dilemmas for Law Centres in the context of 
public service modernisation’ (2012) p.4 
  
130 
legislation that defines and criminalises offenses recognised under international law 
and other types of exploitative conditions, it impedes the investigation and 
prosecution of violations and contributes to a system of impunity.458 A lack of strong 
legal frameworks perpetuates other social and cultural, institutional and structural 
barriers. 
6.3.2 Accessibility 
Physical accessibility of courts, police stations and government organisations is 
usually challenging for the poor as they live-in rural areas with few government 
services.459 Available literature supports this viewpoint, however there is a definite 
gap in the literature, particularly when it relates to migrant workers in domestic 
work. Migrants who ‘live-in’ with their employers may have restrictions placed on 
them that restrict their movement460 and access to assistance from the authorities. 
This restriction results in the same effect as if they were physically isolated. 
6.3.3 Judicial and adjudicatory independence and review 
Judicial independence is critical for a well-functioning justice system that is free 
from outside influence and where judges are capable of discharging their duties in a 
fair and impartial manner.461 The accountability of decision makers – in particular, 
the judiciary – encompasses two principles, answerability and enforcement.462 First, 
answerability requires public officials to provide information about their activities 
and give valid reasons for their actions.463 Secondly, enforcement is the ability to 
sanction wrongdoers and to issue authoritative decisions clarifying which actions are 
legal or illegal.464 There are rarely mechanisms available to review social policies or 
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administrative decisions that affect the enjoyment of rights, especially for the 
disadvantaged.465 The lack of remedies especially for social, economic and cultural 
rights domestically, is perceived as a charitable gesture instead of a justiciable right 
guaranteed by international human rights instruments.466 To ensure that decisions are 
in conformity with the constitution, higher court judges are empowered through 
legislation to check that decisions are based on the law.467 
6.3.4 Legal assistance and representation – effective claiming 
Access to legal advice and representation is a fundamental principle of access to a 
remedy, ensuring equality and due process. 468  Where individuals do not have 
adequate resources, a lack of legal assistance may severely hamper the effective 
assertion of their rights, and therefore legal assistance should be provided in criminal 
and civil processes for effective judicial protection.469 A lack of civil legal assistance 
is a significant barrier to a remedy when the vulnerable are unable to assert their 
rights in a variety of proceedings concerning abusive working conditions or 
discrimination in the workplace.470 These disputes have a significant effect on 
marginalised individuals, and so assistance is particularly useful in civil claims 
where the processes are complex and paperwork is difficult.471 Legal awareness can 
help disadvantaged groups understand that they have justiciable rights.472 However, 
in pursuing these rights, legal awareness needs the intervention of both government 
and civil society in implementing schemes to ensure effective representation.473 In 
instances where legal aid is provided to vulnerable individuals, the quality of care is 
undermined by inadequate allocation of human and financial resources.474 
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6.3.5 Lack capacity and awareness of government 
Insufficient financial, human resources and functional structure in the police, courts 
and prosecution services exacerbated by the lack of training in all areas of 
government, limits access to a remedy for many victims.475 These deficiencies 
including the delays in resolution, ineffective investigation and evidence collection, 
lack of enforcement and abuse of official positions undermine the justice process and 
translates into denial of rights.476 Lack of capacity and resources also creates an 
overburdened justice system and encourages the rejection of complaints, especially 
for the disadvantaged ‘…owing to bias and discrimination’.477 Faced with power 
imbalances and discrimination rooted in cultural norms and social structures, 
disadvantaged groups are ill-served by the lack of training afforded to those tasked 
with resolving their particular conditions.478 
6.3.6 Fees, cost and claiming 
Those in poverty experience costs which they cannot afford associated with claiming 
their rights, constituting a major barrier for vulnerable individuals.479 Fees and costs 
are required for travel, filing claims, photocopies and legal documentation. The 
possibility of losing a claim where the unsuccessful party is often required to pay the 
legal costs of the prevailing party is unaffordable for vulnerable individuals, and acts 
as a disincentive in pursuing claims.480 To mitigate this impediment, economic 
barriers should be removed by ensuring legal aid is available and reducing the cost 
for issuing and filing documents and court costs for low-income people and waived 
for those living in poverty. 
Effective operation of the justice chain is dependent on effective processes and 
administrative systems to register claims.481 Barriers to claiming can arise when 
there are too few staff, processes are unreliable, or staff and the judiciary lack the 
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appropriate training.482 Inability to access the justice system can arise at the earliest 
stages of the remedy process with a failure through corruption to accurately register 
the complaint or action being claimed or minimise the harm caused.483 Difficulties in 
commencing legal action are particularly challenging for disadvantaged groups 
especially when there are language barriers or claimants belong to a group that is 
subjected to discrimination.484 
6.3.7 Lack of corroborative evidence 
Lack of corroborative evidence significantly hampers the pursuit of a remedy. 
Migrant workers who live-in are frequently the only ones able to recount the abuses 
and circumstances of their employment or termination, ‘…yet, their testimony is 
often not enough to meet the burden of proof or credibility for prosecution or benefit 
of doubt’.485 MDWs may initially have difficulties recounting instances of abuse and 
may not seem credible to authorities. However, in instances where individuals have 
experienced trauma, it is common for them to provide inconsistent statements when 
they are first identified as victims and interviewed by authorities.486 
6.3.8 Enforcement 
Enforcement is key in minimising the insecurity of the disadvantaged and is a 
precondition for accountability and the mitigation of impunity.487 Many of the 
problems in formal and informal justice mechanisms are related to ineffective 
enforcement mechanisms both in enforcement of existing laws and enforcement of 
adjudicatory awards.488 Through lack of enforcement and oversight of government 
processes and ill-conceived policies, it is difficult for disadvantaged groups to bring 
claims as the government creates a ‘zero risk’ victim, perpetuating impunity where 
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perpetrators can coerce and exert exploitative acts without punishment. 489 The 
government should ensure the prompt enforcement of remedies.490 
6.4 Structural barriers 
Some barriers are a result of broader social and cultural structures and some are 
specific to justice systems, but some occur at the intersections of these structures.491 
These barriers may not be attributable on one specific and identifiable factor but are 
cumulative; they have a significant impact on the ability to seek remedies. These 
barriers relate to stigmatisation, corruption, formalism, delays, legal standing and 
distrust of authorities. 
6.4.1 Stigma, and lack of understanding of the needs of the poor 
In some instances, victims may be reluctant to identify themselves as such due to 
feelings of shame or rejection by family or community members.492 Some may 
identify with their abusers and not acknowledge they have been mistreated.493 
Victims may also feel responsible if they entered into an employment situation that 
turns abusive and may also be reluctant to identify themselves as a victim.494 
Law enforcement, courts and government personnel reflect the prejudices of wider 
society and are not adequately informed and trained to conduct the government’s 
business without imposing these discriminatory attitudes toward people of lesser 
social and economic status.495 Justice sector staff’s daily lives and background are 
drastically different from those of MDWs who migrate to escape poverty and who 
are there to serve them.496 Without proper training and sensitisation, these officials 
do not understand and value the choices, behaviours and problems of vulnerable 
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individuals and may be influenced by the negative stigma and stereotyping 
associated with a perceived low social status.497 The police are often the most 
common interface for those seeking a remedy, but their actions and procedures 
frequently treat complaints as trivial and vulnerable individuals are not treated as 
individuals with rights whose access to remedies should be protected, respected 
facilitated.498 
6.4.2 Corruption 
Weak institutional practices or prevalent corruption due to a lack of appropriate 
oversight contributes to corrupt practices that deny remedies to victims.499 In many 
countries where judicial and law enforcement functions are overburdened, corruption 
is a significant problem where illicit payments or social standing can affect decisions 
made by authorities.500 In those instances, vulnerable groups and individuals who 
lack resources find that their claims are rejected.501 Disadvantaged groups in society 
are less likely to avail themselves of the justice system if they perceive it to be 
corrupt or unfair.502 Corruption undermines the credibility of the entire justice 
system, reinforcing discrimination and further disadvantaging the poor and other 
marginalised groups who have claims for harms committed by the state or private 
parties.503 Corruption is often more prevalent at the lower levels of government.504 
Administrative staff may engage in corrupt activities for economic benefits or other 
quid pro quo reasons before a claim even reaches an adjudicatory forum.505 
6.4.3 Formal processes 
According to Carmona, poor and disadvantaged people who are unable to secure 
legal representation either as a result of financial limitations or as a result of 
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governmental policy are forced to navigate the civil justice system alone.506 These 
claimants at times find a range of barriers related to complexity of applicable rules, 
filing deadlines, confusing paperwork and legal terminology, all of which can limit 
access to a remedy or produce unjust outcomes. The hearing process, played out 
through traditional roles and strict procedures often intimidates those unfamiliar with 
the justice process. This general lack of awareness of the rules of conduct and 
procedure places marginalised individuals in and unequal and disadvantaged position 
before proceeding even begin. Claims that require evidentiary proof can prove 
challenging for marginalised individuals. Gathering evidence, preparing forms and 
developing strategy for claims, the correct language and the narrow focus on the 
claim at issue can frustrate many claimants without legal assistance. 
6.3.4 Excessive delays 
A lack of resources and qualified staff adds to unnecessary delays in adjudicating 
claims and enforcing judgments. 507  These delays disproportionately affect 
disadvantaged groups and are in essence a denial of justice as the process becomes 
unaffordable, costs greatly outweighing any potential benefit in most cases. In many 
instances, the claims of these disadvantaged groups are underprioritised due to 
biased and preferential treatment of the wealthy or ‘lack of sensitivity or 
understanding of the impact of the delay on weakest claimants’.508 Vulnerable 
individuals need their claims to be heard promptly.509 When the vulnerable reach the 
court, they are in ‘dire straits’ because they lack resources to sustain lengthy dispute 
processes and their basic components of livelihood are in jeopardy.510 
6.3.5 Legal standing 
Narrow rules on legal standing prevent civil society from being able to take a direct 
role in assisting the vulnerable who are unable to represent themselves.511 The 
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embracing of civil society in this regard may drastically improve access and 
outcomes of marginalised claimants by reducing financial cost and personal 
distress 512  and mitigate the imbalance caused by lack of awareness, time, 
representation, and social status. 
6.3.6 Distrust of authorities 
Victims may have distrust of authorities based on their past experiences, and these 
experiences may be vastly different based on their country of origin.513 Their 
respective socioeconomic status may also contribute to this distrust. In addition to 
the fact that contact with authorities may be unsettling, the uncertainty brought about 
by actual or perceived bias substantially contributes to the distrust and possible 
reticence to cooperate. 514  Vulnerable or disadvantaged groups may hesitate to 
approach the authorities because of concern over the impact on their immigration 
status or uncertainty about how they might be treated in the justice system.515 The 
unfamiliarity with the justice system in their current country of residence may be 
compared to their experiences, both good and bad, in their home country.516 
Similarly, the authorities may bring their own cultural, social and discriminatory 
perceptions of migrants, and while interacting with those groups. They may, through 
the lens of their own biases coupled with a lack of appropriate training, fail to 
recognise the needs, concerns and fears of vulnerable groups. 517  Vulnerable 
individuals, due in most part to their own economic instability, become averse to 
relying on legal processes, fearing further exploitation, corruption or unjust 
outcomes.518 
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Conclusion 
To ensure access to remedies, the consensus519 is that both formal and informal 
mechanisms be used. However, access to judicial and other remedies should not be 
restricted, and if cases involve any form of violence, cases should not be referred to 
an alternative dispute resolution procedure.520 Cases involving violence should be 
referred to an adjudicatory process, preferably a judicial one. ‘Adjudication is the 
most appropriate process of identifying the most appropriate remedy or 
compensation’.521 It has been argued that the tendency in addressing harms is to rely 
on formal justice mechanisms, but access to justice must consider formal and 
informal mechanisms.522 Both mechanisms should rely on the same basic principles 
in the settlement of disputes and should be impartial and include interpretation and 
application of the law, transparency and independence.523 Justice processes should be 
open to the public to facilitate public scrutiny that contributes to fairness and should 
also provide enforcement of decisions.524 ADR mechanisms can provide remedies to 
disadvantaged individuals that would have been beyond their reach by creating the 
conditions for dialogue525 but it should be regulated or backed by formal justice 
mechanisms such as the courts or tribunals and should function independently from 
the executive branch of government.526 
The use of informal mechanisms has been suggested in numerous access to justice 
documents, but the use of informal mechanisms for vulnerable groups appears to be 
inconsistent with the access to justice needs of vulnerable individuals and groups. 
The notion of referring vulnerable individuals experiencing the multiple and 
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overlapping barriers listed above into a process that provides limited procedural 
protections would seem to exacerbate an already vulnerable condition.  
Taking into account the overlapping barriers, vulnerable MDWs should not be 
steered toward conciliation as a first step in the resolution of claims. An adjudicatory 
process that relies on the application of the law should be the first step and if a MDW 
decides that they are unable to bear the cost of time, they should be allowed to 
consider conciliation.  The Tribunal/Court should be able to resolve claims that do 
not involve crimes in a more timely and just manner based on contractually obligated 
entitlements.  
Most of the Social and cultural, Institutional and Structural barriers can be mitigated 
through legislation, however, barriers such as discrimination, the effect of 
stigmatization and understanding of the needs and vulnerabilities of MDWs require a 
greater investment in time and resources through training and awareness raising. 
Training and awareness is an obligation ‘…to ensure the principles of human rights 
throughout its entire ‘legal, political and institutional system’.527 A shift in the 
perception of MDWs is required along with a genuine commitment from the 
government to effectively protect MDWs from violations of forced labour.  
Addressing the vulnerability of MDWs mandates that politics, ethics, and law be 
fashioned around a complete, comprehensive vision of the MDW experience if they 
are to meet the real-life needs MDWs.528 To ensure that the issue of concern is 
addressed, the focus by the government should be on ensuring that its polices and 
institutions are structured in such a manner to ensure no group is gaining 
impermissible advantages at the expense of other groups.529 This shift in perspective 
not only brings scrutiny to individual actions, but also to institutions ensuring that 
assets are not being provided unequally, even if unintentionally. 
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The focus on Social and Cultural, Institutional and Structural advantages and 
disadvantages would require changes in political culture. To reiterate Fineman’s530 
point, the responsibility in structuring this imperative would fall on the legislature 
and executive branches for primary manifestation and ultimate monitoring by the 
courts to ensure fulfilment of responsibility in assessing individual equality claims. 
State institutions collectively are important in lessening, ameliorating and 
compensating for vulnerability. Together, they provide assets which can be viewed 
as advantages, coping mechanisms, or resources that would allow MDWs to 
withstand misfortunes, disaster and violence. 
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Chapter 7. Conditions in Hong Kong 
7.1 Introduction 
Hong Kong has been an attractive place for the employment of foreign domestic 
workers for over 150 years. From the time of the seizure of the island by the British 
in 1841 to today, migrant domestic workers have been relied on to provide child 
care, elderly care and household work (cooking, cleaning, laundry), first to wealthy 
occupiers and currently as a means of freeing local households to take advantage of 
the opportunities of two income households and a cheap source of labour for 
expatriate and other wealthy employers. The complaints of domestic workers are as 
old as Hong Kong itself, and although there are some laws to ensure the protection of 
workers, complaints of ill treatment continue. 
In recent years there has been a focus on the treatment of some of the 340,000 
domestic workers in Hong Kong, mainly from the Philippines and Indonesia. These 
workers enter into two-year contracts with the aid of employment agencies to secure 
domestic work. Recent research conducted by non-governmental organisations531 has 
suggested that some of the abuses suffered by domestic workers can be classified as 
forced labour and human trafficking, and several cases of the ill treatment of MDWs 
in Hong Kong have been reported in the local and international media.532 While the 
crimes of forced labour and human trafficking are closely related, I will focus 
primarily on forced labour. 
Section 7.2 I will examine the current use of non-judicial mechanisms used in 
redress of MDW complaints; and Section 7.3 will examine common violators that 
contribute to the exploitation of MDWs to include the effect of government policy.  
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Labour migration and administration 
To overcome job shortages in both the Philippines and Indonesia, both governments 
resorted to the exportation of labour in the mid-1970s and early 1980s respectively. 
In both countries, recruiting agencies for labour export have been privatised, making 
it a significant factor of their national development strategy contributing billions of 
dollars yearly in remittances from overseas workers. Several other countries send 
migrant workers to Hong Kong but they make up a small percentage of the total 
migrant domestic worker population compared with the Philippines and Indonesia. 
The total population of Hong Kong in 2015 was 7,305,700 with a MDW population 
of 340,380, making up approximately 4.65% of the total population an 
overwhelming majority of them are women. (see Table 1 for trend and country of 
origin).533 
Table 1 - Hong Kong Domestic Worker Population 2015 & 2016 
Country 2004	 2005	 2009	 2010	 2011	 2012	 2013	 2014	 2015	
Philippines 119,711	 118,032	 129,875	 137,313	 144,553	 155,969	 164,628	 172,779	 181,861	
Indonesia 90,045	 96,904	 130,448	 140,941	 148,153	 149,236	 149,034	 149,837	 150,239	
India 1,294	 1,368	 1,814	 2,058	 2,306	 2,520	 2,702	 2,959	 3,275	
Thailand 4,922	 4,511	 3,858	 3,695	 3,323	 2,990	 2,710	 2,650	 2,560	
Sri Lanka 885	 876	 883	 890	 909	 1,040	 1,118	 1,171	 1,148	
Bangladesh 42	 421	 62	 65	 67	 70	 275	 594	 650	
Nepal 1,398	 1,349	 677	 542	 452	 389	 342	 310	 299	
Myanmar 27	 29	 23	 27	 37	 41	 45	 177	 147	
Pakistan 43	 38	 67	 70	 77	 62	 68	 70	 77	
Malaysia 29	 31	 31	 31	 33	 29	 24	 24	 22	
Singapore 3 2 3 3 3 3 2 1 2 
Others 31	 46	 37	 46	 48	 46	 40	 78	 100	
Total 218,430	 223,204	 267,778	 285,681	 299,961	 312,395	 320,988	 330,650	 340,380	
The Immigration Department of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
(HKSAR) administers the domestic worker programme. All workers are required to 
have a signed contract534 with an employer prior to arrival in Hong Kong. The MDW 
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534 Form ID 407 
  
143 
employment contract is governed by the Employment Ordinance and Employees 
Compensation Ordinance.535 
Only with the approval of contracts and the granting of a work visa, are domestic 
workers allowed to travel to Hong Kong. Only the Philippine and Indonesian 
consulates require an employment agency to submit domestic worker contracts for 
approval by their consulates. Domestic workers of other nationalities are not 
subjected to this requirement and thus are more likely to avoid the recruitment fees 
illegally charged by some employment agencies. 
To be eligible to hire a MDW, employers must have a household income of not less 
than $15,000 per month or comparable assets, and agree to pay the MDW not less 
than the minimum allowable wage (MAW).536 Additional criteria listed for eligibility 
for hiring MDWs include that the MDW is only permitted to perform duties per 
schedule of accommodation in the contract, is not permitted to take up any other 
employment and is to be provided with suitable accommodation. 
No definition of suitable accommodation is provided; however, examples of 
unsuitable accommodation are, ‘the MDW (Helper) having to sleep on made-do beds 
in the corridor with little or no privacy or sharing a room with an adult or teenager of 
the opposite sex’.537 
At the end of each two-year contract the employer and MDW must apply for a new 
working visa and under normal circumstances the MDW should return to their place 
of origin to await the new visa and use the yearly allowable vacation entitlement.538 
 Redress mechanisms 7.2
This section outlines several redress mechanisms used to remedy labour rights 
violations of MDWs.	
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7.2.1 Conciliation 
Conciliation is a non-judicial mechanism and is encouraged at all redress forums 
even after adjudication has commenced. It is accessible to both employers and 
employees and offers an informal, time saving and simple way of resolving labour 
disputes.539 Either party may approach Labour Relations Division for consultation on 
their rights and obligations under the Employment Ordinance or the contract of 
employment. 540  If requested by one of the parties, the LRD will arrange a 
conciliation meeting and request the other party to attend. At the conciliation 
meeting, the Conciliation Officer will assist parties in exploring the crux of the 
problem concerned, analysing the situation and seeking a mutually acceptable 
settlement. The purpose of the conciliation service is to provide for speedy 
settlement of labour disputes or claims; no legal representation is required or 
encouraged. However, if one party finds the company of a third party (e.g. a trade 
union representative) is necessary when attending the conciliation meeting, it is 
acceptable subject to the agreement of the other party. To ensure the trust of the 
parties concerned which is important for settlement, the conciliation meeting is held 
in confidence and both parties are free to make admissions during the meeting for 
settlement purpose. 
If the case can be settled by conciliation and the settlement involves compensation 
by cash payment, the Conciliation Officer will make arrangements for effecting 
payment. Where necessary, the Conciliation Officer will also assist in drawing up a 
settlement memorandum for signature by the parties. On the other hand, if one party 
declines to make use of the conciliation service or both parties have failed to reach a 
settlement at the end of the conciliation meeting, the Conciliation Officer will, at the 
request of the party concerned, refer him/her to seek adjudication at the Minor 
Employment Claims Adjudication Board (for cases involving not more than 10 
claimants and not exceeding $8,000 per claimant) or the Labour Tribunal (for cases 
involving more than 10 claimants or exceeding $8,000 per claimant). 
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Attendance at conciliation meetings is voluntary for both parties. This is because a 
settlement reached by conciliation is a result of compromise and mutual 
understanding between them. The willingness of both parties to make use of the 
conciliation service is the major factor for successful settlement of the labour dispute 
or claim. The Conciliation Officer is a neutral and impartial intermediary. They 
assist both parties to understand the problem and to have a frank dialogue so as to 
resolve each other’s differences and prevent the dispute situation from further 
deterioration. They also seek a settlement which is acceptable to both parties. 
The Conciliation Officer does not have adjudication power to impose settlement in 
disputes or claims. Whether or not to settle a case through conciliation is a free 
decision of the parties concerned. However, in the event that a breach of the 
Employment Ordinance is detected, it will be investigated thoroughly with a view to 
prosecution against the suspected offenders.541 
7.2.2 Minor Employment Claims Adjudication Board (MECAB) 
According to the Hong Kong Labour Department’s guide A Simple Guide to the 
Minor Employment Claims Adjudication Board, MECAB was set up under the 
Minor Employment Claims Adjudication Board Ordinance (Cap.453) and 
adjudicates minor employment claims in a quick, simple and inexpensive manner. A 
claim that cannot be resolved amicably through conciliation may be referred to the 
MECAB for adjudication.	
The MECAB is empowered to adjudicate employment claims arising from disputes 
of statutory or contractual rights of employment, involving not more than 10 
claimants in each case for a sum of money not exceeding $8,000 per claimant. 
Employment claims falling outside the jurisdiction of the MECAB are heard by the 
Labour Tribunal. Direct application to MECAB without first going to conciliation is 
not accepted. The Board has no jurisdiction over claims arising more than 12 months 
prior to the date of filing, unless the disputants provide a signed memorandum 
agreeing to MECAB’s jurisdiction.	
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The Board may decline jurisdiction if, in the opinion of the board, the MECAB is not 
appropriate or the amount of the claim is split into separate claims to fit the 
jurisdiction of the Board, in which case the claim will be transferred to the Labour 
Tribunal.	
Claims can be made by any party to a claim or any authorised officer of a limited 
company who provides authorisation in writing. An office bearer of a registered 
trade union or employers’ association who is authorised in writing may also appear 
as a representative of the claimant. Hearings are conducted in public and in an 
informal manner, and legal representation is not allowed. The Board may order the 
production of any documents or other exhibits and make enquiries of parties or 
witnesses as it sees fit.	
The adjudication officer is empowered with the same privileges and immunities as a 
judge of the Court of First Instance in civil proceedings. An appeal of an award may 
be made within 7 days of the award and the adjudication officer may reopen and 
rehear the claim, call or hear new evidence and confirm, vary or reverse the award or 
order. The registrar of the High Court on good cause may extend the appeal of an 
award. An appeal of an award made by MECAB may be made in the Court of First 
Instance on the grounds that it was erroneous in law, or the claim was outside the 
jurisdiction of the Board. Appeals of decisions by the Court of First Instance may be 
made to the Court of Appeal. The award or order made by an adjudication officer of 
the Board is legally binding and may be registered in the District Court and thus 
becomes a judgment of the District Court and can be enforced accordingly. 
Under the Employment Ordinance, if an award of the Board provides for the 
payment by an employer of any specified entitlement (such as wages, end of year 
payment, maternity leave pay and severance payment, etc.) and the employer 
wilfully and without reasonable excuse fails to pay the awarded sum within 14 days 
after it becomes due, the employer is liable to prosecution and, on conviction, to a 
fine of $350,000 and imprisonment for three years. 
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7.2.3 Labour Tribunal 
The information below is taken from the Labour Tribunal Guide to Court 
Services.542 The Labour Tribunal, like MECAB, seeks to offer an informal and 
inexpensive way of settling monetary disputes between employers and employees, 
with no maximum limit on the amount of the claim. The Tribunal entertains claims 
from MDWs for violations of the Employment Ordinance (Cap.57) and claims for 
breaches of the terms in their employment contracts. The majority of claims filed by 
employees concern outstanding wages for work done, wages in lieu of notice of 
termination of a contract by the employer without the required notice, wages for 
statutory holidays, annual leave and rest days, and severance pay, long service and 
terminal payments. Employers usually file claims for wages in lieu of notice on 
resignation of employees. 
The Tribunal hears cases over $8,000 for at least one of the claimants, or where there 
are more than 10 claimants. However, claims over six years old at the time of 
attempting a claim will not be accepted under the Limitation Ordinance (Cap.347). 
Conciliation must be attempted as a first step before lodging a claim at the Tribunal. 
To maintain impartiality, the Tribunal staff will not provide any advice or assistance 
to MDWs. A filing fee is required to complete the filing, which may be reclaimed if 
the case is successful, but if unsuccessful, they may have to pay the employer Wages 
in lieu of Notice (one month’s wages) and any associated costs. The MDW is 
provided with a date for hearing 10 to 30 days from the date of filing. Defence and 
witness statement are required to be completed before the hearing and copies 
transmitted to the opposing party. The Tribunal officer will use the documents to 
prepare a summary of facts outlining the allegations of each party to be submitted to 
the Presiding Officer before the hearing. Again, no legal representation is allowed. 
A defendant may ask for an award to be set-aside within 7 days after the hearing. A 
review of the judgment must also be filed within 7 days of the award to the Court of 
First Instance followed by the Court of Appeal if additional remedy is deemed 
necessary. 
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7.2.4 Other redress mechanisms 
MDWs may also make use of other mechanisms such as the Small Claims Tribunal 
to attempt to recover excessive recruitment agency fees. ‘The Small Claims Tribunal 
hears minor monetary claims involving amounts not exceeding $50,000. The hearing 
is informal and no legal representation is allowed’.543 MDWs find it difficult in many 
cases since the payment of illegal recruitment fees are not accompanied by receipts. 
The Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) is another statutory body set up in 1996 
to implement the Sex Discrimination Ordinance (Cap.480). The EOC is the primary 
organization tasked with handling discrimination related cases. 
7.3 Common violators 
MDWs experience a myriad of violations at the hands of employers and employment 
agencies and find it difficult to access remedies. At times, this is exacerbated by 
government policy. In all cases, the combination of factors limits the MDW’s 
decision-making relative to pursuing a remedy for labour rights violations. 
7.3.1 Employment agencies 
Exploitation of MDWs by employment agencies has been a major issue in Hong 
Kong.544 There have been numerous news articles and research that have attempted 
to address this issue. Three of those issues are discussed below; debt bondage, 
excessive agency fees and inaccurate travel documents.	
According to Part XII of the Employment Ordinance and the Employment Agency 
Regulations (Chapter 57, Part II) the maximum commissions which may be received 
by an employment agency, shall be:	
‘(a) from each person applying to the employment agency for 
employment, work or contract or hire of his services, an amount 
not exceeding a sum equal to ten% of the first month’s wages 
                                                
543 Department of Justice, ‘Legal System in Hong Kong’, The Government of Hong Kong 
 
544 United States Department of State ‘Trafficking in Persons Report’ (2015, 2016, 2017) the last three 
reports have reported that ‘employment agencies generally charge job placement fees in excess of legal 
limits, which may lead to situations of debt bondage of workers in Hong Kong. The accumulated debts 
sometimes amount to up to 80 percent of workers’ salaries for the first seven to eight months of 
employment.’ 
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received by such person after he has been placed in employment 
by the employment agency…’ 
In September 2015, MDWs received a minimum allowable wage (MAW) of $4,210 
per month.545 In October 2016, the Labour Department Administration decided that, 
with effect from 1 October 2016, the MAW would be increased to $4,310.546 Based 
on the MAW and the maximum commission outlined above, MDWs in Hong Kong 
should be charged a maximum of $421 based on 2015 MAW or $431 on the current 
rate by Hong Kong employment agencies. It has been consistently reported that 
MDWs are charged as much as $21,000 in recruitment fees a form of debt 
bondage.547 The fees are usually paid over several months548 in the amounts of 
approximately $3,000 per month over 7 months. 
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) implemented a 
reform in 2006 affecting Household Service Workers (HSW). 549  Under the 
resolution, employment agencies in the Philippines are not permitted to charge 
placement fees to overseas workers bound for Hong Kong. ‘They may charge for 
training, medical examination, photo, video and other necessary miscellaneous 
expenses but not placement fee’.550 Despite the decree, many agencies charge a 
placement fee of up to 150,000 Pesos (approximately $23,000 HKD) for processing 
applications of MDWs to Hong Kong. 551  Unlike the Philippines, Indonesian 
employment agencies are allowed to charge MDWs under a decree 
(KEP.186/PPTK/VII/2008) dated 10 July 2008 of the Director General for Training 
and Placement of Manpower. The cost structure for placement of IDW to Hong 
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547 Angharad Hampshire, ‘Help for the helpers: New Hong Kong employment agency aims to stamp 
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Kong was set at the equivalent of $15,550 HKD for processing a worker’s visa to 
Hong Kong.552 
Both the Indonesian and Philippine governments require partner employment 
agencies in the home countries. The agency fees collected by Hong Kong agencies 
are shared with the agencies in the home country so that employers in Hong Kong 
can benefit from low local fees.553 Philippine agencies although not allowed to 
collect agency fees but nonetheless subject MDWs to excessive agency fees before 
leaving the home country. In concert with lending companies, MDWs are 
encouraged to engage with lending companies to borrow the money to pay the fees 
although they never actually receive the money. The cash from the fake loans are 
collected by the agencies allowing denial and avoidance of legal problems 
concerning illegal and excessive commissions contrary to the 2006 decree 
implemented by the POEA. 
The issue of debt bondage and the use of employment agencies to process 
employment contracts go hand in hand. Research554 has shown that the exploitation 
begins at the recruitment stage. MDWs are required to sign contracts without being 
able to read them or being provided with a copy. Shortly before departing their home 
country, MDWs are told by their recruiting agents that they would have to pay their 
recruitment fees through salary deduction. The excessive amounts described earlier 
are then secured through monthly payments over a 3-7-month period. To secure 
these payments, MDWs’ passports and other documents are seized as collateral.	
Another sin attributable to employment agencies and the exploitation of MDWs 
relates to inaccurate travel documents. In an attempt to make candidates look more 
desirable and circumvent minimum age requirements in sending countries, agencies 
                                                
552 Amnesty International ‘Exploited for Profit, Failed by Governments, Indonesian Migrant Domestic 
Workers Trafficked to Hong Kong’ (2013), p.25 
553 R J Connelly, ‘Submission on ‘Policies relating to foreign domestic helpers and regulation of 
employment agencies’ – for Legco Panel on Manpower’, 21 February 2014, LC Paper 
No.CB(2)870/13-14(14) 
554 Amnesty International ‘Exploited for Profit, Failed by Governments, Indonesian Migrant Domestic 
Workers Trafficked to Hong Kong’ (2013), p.10, see also Lee and Petersen, ‘Forced Labour and Debt 
Bondage in Hong Kong: A Study of Indonesian and Filipina Migrant Domestic Workers’ p.2 
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have been accused of manipulating the dates of birth of MDWs.555 This manipulation 
is done without the knowledge of the MDW who only realises the inaccuracy shortly 
before departure and is now under the weight of an excessive agency fees that must 
be repaid and has little choice but to continue the process.556 This adds an additional 
level of control through fear of imprisonment if discovered by the authorities.	
7.3.2 Employer abuses and the contract 
The standard employment contract557 lays out in some detail the responsibilities of 
the employer and employee. It also outlines specific entitlements owed to the 
employee on termination of the employment contract. Some of the specific items are 
discussed below and are usually the claims most associated with the filing of a claim 
at through Labour Department and at times heard in MECAB or the Labour 
Tribunal. 
There is consensus that workers are subjected to a variety of abuses prohibited by the 
employment contract, the Labour Ordinance and other mechanisms. Common abuses 
are also consistent with the ILO indicators of forced labour that identify the 
conditions of work and coercive methods used to ‘intentionally subjugate the will of 
the [MDW]’.558 Common abuses that give rise to claims include denial of rest days, 
withheld wages, underpayment of wages, excessive working hours, and illegal 
deployment (MDWs made to work outside the contracted location).559 Contractual 
entitlements on termination include outstanding wages, annual leave, airfare to the 
place of origin and wages in lieu of notice. 
7.3.3 Government policy 
There has been common criticism of several state policies that are argued to 
contribute to the exploitation of MDWs. In June 2013, a paper regarding government 
                                                
555 R J Connelly, ‘Submission on ‘Policies relating to foreign domestic helpers and regulation of 
employment agencies’ – for Legco Panel on Manpower’, 21 February 2014, LC Paper 
No.CB(2)870/13-14(14) 
556 Amnesty International ‘Exploited for Profit, Failed by Governments, Indonesian Migrant Domestic 
Workers Trafficked to Hong Kong’ (2013), p.10, 
557 Standard Employment Contract Form ID 407 
558 United States v Kozminski 487 US931 (1988) 
559 Lee and Petersen, ‘Forced Labour and Debt Bondage in Hong Kong: A Study of Indonesian and 
Filipina Migrant Domestic Workers’ p.2 
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policy on excessive agency fees and the two-week rule was published by the Labour 
and Welfare Bureau and submitted to the Hong Kong Legislative Council.560 The 
paper clarified that there was no requirement for MDWs to use an employment 
agency and that the requirement was imposed by the governments of Indonesia and 
the Philippines.561 The paper noted that the Philippine government does not allow 
first time MDWs to be hired directly without aid of an employment agency, and 
Indonesia only allows hiring through accredited employment agencies. The Labour 
and Welfare Bureau did acknowledge overcharging by Hong Kong employment 
agencies in that they revoked two employment agencies’ licences and they were 
subsequently convicted ‘of overcharging, and aiding and abetting an MDW to breach 
her condition of stay, conspiracy to defraud and conspiracy to make false 
representation to an Immigration Officer’.562 In the first four months of 2014, they 
revoked the licence of one employment agency after it was convicted of an offence 
involving dishonesty.563 It was also acknowledged that the charging of excessive 
agency fees was a concern that had been raised with the sending country’s 
consulates. It was explained that the Employment Agency Administration was very 
diligent in pursuing the matter and were constantly engaged in unannounced 
inspections of employment agencies and had conducted just over 1,300 inspections 
in 2012 and had conducted and over 347 in the first four months of 2013.564 
In February 2014 R.J. Connelly (Barrister-at-law) submitted a response to the June 
2013 paper to the Legislative Council (Legco) Panel on Manpower. His response 
opened with the following paragraph: 
‘When formulating policies on migrant domestic workers 
(MDWs), the Administration has failed to strike a reasonable 
balance between the interests of employers and employees. The 
recent cases of Erwiana Sulistyaningsih and Kartika Puspitasari 
were exceptional in their brutality, but it is important to 
understand the policy failures which made them vulnerable and 
which facilitate lesser yet nevertheless serious abuses on a much 
                                                
560 Legislative Council HKSAR, ‘Intermediary Charges for Foreign Domestic Helpers’, (LC 
No.CB(2)1356/12-13(03), June 2013 
561 Ibid 
562 Ibid p.2 
563 Ibid 
564 Ibid 
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wider scale. Hong Kong’s policies on MDWs fall far below 
accepted international minimum standards. The difference 
between decent conditions of work or slavery-like conditions is a 
question of luck for MDWs. Respect for human rights cannot be 
left to the will of employers’.565 
Since the MDW programme is administered by the Immigration Department the 
paper examined five of the Immigration Department policies under the heading 
‘Unfair Immigration Policy’. It addressed the two-week rule, the live-in requirement, 
excessive agency fees, maximum working hours and rest days and inaccurate travel 
documents. Since excessive agency fees and inaccurate travel documents were 
covered under ‘Common Violators’ above they will not be addressed here. 
7.3.3.1 The two-week rule 
Domestic workers who have their contracts terminated must leave Hong Kong within 
two weeks of termination.566 The rule is intended ‘…for maintaining effective 
immigration control, preventing job-hopping and imported workers working illegally 
after the termination of contracts’.567 In defending this rule, it was explained that 
workers who wanted to return to work in Hong Kong could do so after returning to 
their home country and applying for a new visa. However, under special 
circumstances such as the MDW’s previous employer is unable to continue the 
contract because of migration, death, financial difficulty or there is evidence that the 
worker has been abused or exploited, the MDW may be allowed to change employer 
in Hong Kong without having to return to their home country. According to 
Connelly, the two-week rule was introduced in 1987 to manage what was considered 
illegal work by MDWs.568 Prior to 1987, a small number of MDWs on 6-month 
contracts would terminate their contracts prematurely shortly after arriving in Hong 
Kong and take up illegal employment, since at the time they were allowed to remain 
                                                
565 R J Connelly, ‘Submission on ‘Policies relating to foreign domestic helpers and regulation of 
employment agencies’ – for Legco Panel on Manpower’, 21 February 2014, LC Paper 
No.CB(2)870/13-14(14) Connelly specializes in Human Rights, Migrant Labour and Refugee law and 
is the Legal Advisor to the Hong Kong Helpers Campaign. 
566 HKSAR, Immigration Department, http://www.immd.gov.hk/en/forms/forms/id-e-989.html, 
accessed 01/10/2014 
567 Legislative Council HKSAR, ‘Intermediary Charges for Foreign Domestic Helpers’, (LC 
No.CB(2)1356/12-13(03), June 2013, p.4 
568 R J Connelly, ‘Submission on ‘Policies relating to foreign domestic helpers and regulation of 
employment agencies’ – for Legco Panel on Manpower’, 21 February 2014, LC Paper 
No.CB(2)870/13-14(14) 
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for the length of their visa. The adoption of the policy mitigated the illegal work 
issue but severely restricted MDW’s ability to seek new employment before having 
to leave Hong Kong, increasing the fear of unemployment. The policy exacerbated 
the matter since MDWs who feared arrest for overstaying their visa conditions 
sought ways to remain hidden from the authorities and took up illegal work or by 
filing asylum applications. In 2014, Indonesian and Filipino MDWs made up one 
quarter of all asylum claims. 
The two-week rule exacerbates the exploitation of MDWs in that the cumulative 
effect of the policy discourages MDWs who suffer abuse from reporting it. The 
policy that establishes such a short period to secure new employment after premature 
termination of a contract, the scrutiny of the number of times and the reasons why a 
MDW terminates a contract and the requirement to return to the home country for 
processing a new contract adds cost and contributes to the exploitation of MDWs.569 
On termination, the MDW is not allowed to work, and they are forced to find shelter 
in boarding houses as they can no longer live with the employer and they must bear 
the expense of visa extensions in order to remain in Hong Kong to pursue any labour 
claims. 
7.3.3.2 The live-in requirement 
MDWs are required to live with their employers during their two-year contract. 
Again, it is a common argument among advocates including the ILO that this 
measure isolates the worker, and places them on 24 hour on-call resulting in 
excessive working hours, denial of rest days or not enough rest because they are 
required to work prior to leaving the residence on their rest day and because of 
curfews. This practice violates the law regarding rest days outlined in the 
employment contract and the Labour Ordinance that should be 24 continuous hours 
of rest.570 Connelly makes the point that the Immigration Department through its 
policy fails to make the distinction between domestic workers and full-time live-in 
                                                
569 Ibid 
570 Labour Department of HKSAR, ‘A Concise Guide to the Employment Ordinance’, (2011) p.11, See 
Standard Employment Contract Form ID 407, para. 6
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domestic workers by resisting the adoption of standard working hours.571 The policy 
also affects MDWs in that living with their employers in cramped accommodation 
affects where they sleep and rest outside working hours; it does not constitute decent 
living conditions and does not reflect what was promised and represented by the 
employer to the MDW and the Immigration Department.572 
Conclusion 
The current conditions that contribute to forced labour of MDWs in Hong Kong can 
be significantly mitigated if he institutions responsible for their protection exercised 
the necessary due diligence in identifying violations of MDWs rights. The large 
number of MDWs employed in Hong Kong coupled with the specific underlying 
vulnerabilities they experience and the frequent complaints to government 
institutions in particular the Labour Department provides the ideal avenue to identify 
those abuses. The HKSARG should know or have a duty to know and investigate or 
refer for investigation the conditions documented in labour claims.  
The mechanisms for redress offering an informal, time saving and simple way of 
resolving labour disputes573 appear to be inappropriate to address the abuses suffered 
by MDWs. The encouragement for the use of informal settlement at all redress 
forums exhibit a strong institutional drive to resolve claims informally focusing on 
monetary value and ignoring documented abuses in claim statements and affidavits. 
Even in cases where there is no abuse, the resolution mechanisms may be 
inappropriate. The majority of claims filed by employees concern outstanding wages 
for work done, wages in lieu of notice of termination of a contract by the employer 
without the required notice, wages for statutory holidays, annual leave and rest days, 
and severance pay, long service and terminal payments. Employers usually file 
claims for wages in lieu of notice on resignation of employees.574 
                                                
571 R J Connelly, ‘Submission on ‘Policies relating to foreign domestic helpers and regulation of 
employment agencies’ – for Legco Panel on Manpower’, 21 February 2014, LC Paper 
No.CB(2)870/13-14(14) 
572 Ibid 
573 Labour Relations Division, ‘Conciliation Service of the Labour Relations 
Division’ LD 543 (Rev.05/2011) Labour Relations Division Hong Kong 
574 Judiciary of Hong Kong, Labour Tribunal: Guide To Court Services, August 2015 9 Ed. 
http://www.judiciary.hk/en/crt_services/pphlt/pdf/labour.pdf 
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The recognition that claims by employees reflect earned entitlements, yet negotiation 
is still encouraged ignoring the fact that the employer is profiting at the disadvantage 
of the MDW. The fact that the majority of the employer’s claims are for wages in 
lieu of notice of termination of the contract and the fact that MDWs are unable to 
provide corroborating evidence relative to who terminated the contract, provides an 
avenue for wealthier and resident employers who use the alternative processes to 
sidestep expensive litigation575 or settlement. 
In addition to inappropriate redress mechanisms, lack of identification of violations 
and lack of mitigation of employer and employment agency abuses, government 
policy also contribute to the exploitation of MDWs and act as a barrier to seeking a 
remedy. The two-week rule coupled with other deficiencies in enforcement and 
remedial mechanisms has a cumulative effect and discourages MDWs who suffer 
abuses from reporting it. The live-in requirement immediately and efficiently isolates 
the MDWs, creates multiple dependencies and limits the worker’s ability to refuse 
excessive hours of work that remains unregulated, limits the ability to separate work 
and rest hours and the cramped living accommodation affects where MDWs sleep 
and rest outside working hours.576  
 
 
 
                                                
575 Merry, ‘Disputing without culture’, p.2067 
576 R J Connelly, ‘Submission on ‘Policies relating to foreign domestic helpers and regulation of 
employment agencies’ – for Legco Panel on Manpower’, 21 February 2014, LC Paper 
No.CB(2)870/13-14(14) 
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Chapter 8. Analysis of the Prevalence of Forced Labour 
and Conditions of Work 
8.1 Introduction 
The data collected through the screening, semi-structured interviews and the 
questionnaires in this study found that there is a high prevalence of forced labour in 
the MDW population that sought assistance from the NGO. The data collected in this 
research found that approximately 66% of the MDW within the sample group fall 
into this category. In addition, to the ‘serendipitous finding’ discussed in the 
previous chapter related to the difficulty in applying the indicators of forced labour, 
the data also yielded two other noteworthy conclusions. The initial working 
hypothesis was that the use of the ILO methodology would readily identify MDWs 
in forced labour, and that most MDWs who fell into this category as a result of 
labour rights violations would likely file claims against their employers with the 
Labour Department. A part of the original strategy was to review these anticipated 
claims to assess the claims process. However, analysis of the data revealed the 
second finding, which was that most MDWs accepted their working and living 
conditions no matter how appalling and did not see themselves as victims. The most 
common refrain was ‘I have no choice’. This finding, a passive acceptance of abuse 
on the part of the victim, was clearly related to the MDW’s desire to meet their 
family’s financial needs in their home country. This overarching desire affected the 
decision making of MDW’s and was exacerbated by another factor related to the 
imbalance in power in the employment relationship. One of the most glaring 
contributors to MDWs’ limited decision-making ability is Hong Kong’s ‘live-in’ 
rule, requiring MDWs to live with their employers. By its very nature, this rule turns 
over almost absolute control of the day-to-day existence of the MDW to the 
employer by creating multiple dependencies for food, shelter and wages. This gross 
imbalance in the employer-employee relationship diminishes the ability of the MDW 
to make independent decisions that are free of actual or perceived coercion. The 
nature of domestic work outside the eye of the public provides the ideal opportunity 
for untold assaults on MDWs person, mind and legal rights. The effect of this 
secretive environment and its damaging consequence extends in all aspects of the 
relationship, including any redress process. 
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The factors that contribute to the high prevalence of forced labour also influence the 
MDWs’ decision making on whether to seek a remedy. For this reason, findings are 
separated into this and the succeeding chapter. In the following four sections, I will 
discuss: the findings related to the prevalence of forced labour and the frequency of 
occurrence of the 11 common indicators in identifying forced labour (8.2); the 
imbalance in power between the employer and MDW (8.3); and the fact that most 
MDWs do not see themselves as victims (8.4). A comparison with other research 
studies that show a high prevalence of forced labour will be made to gain an 
understanding of their relationship to this research and the general MDW population 
(8.5). 
8.2 The high prevalence of forced labour in Hong Kong 
When the accepted ILO criteria for identifying forced labour was applied to the 80 
MDWs who agreed to participate in the research, 53 were assessed to be in forced 
labour. Twenty-six of this group did not provide any information that indicated the 
presence of coercion. Below I will analyse the findings related to the 11 operational 
indicators used to identify forced labour. 
8.2.1 Prevalence of forced labour 
The information gathered from the 80 participants revealed a wide range of abuses 
showing the broad scope of forced labour, and demonstrated the difficulty in 
applying some the ILO guidelines to assess the presence of forced labour. The 
questionnaire I adapted from Hard to see, harder to count provides a valuable tool to 
assess the living and working conditions and the methods of coercion. The screening 
form represented the most common indicators of coercion associated with MDW 
employment situations (work and life under duress), and included indicators of 
involuntariness that allowed for a preliminary assessment for forced labour. Having a 
list of common indicators to use as a screening tool also eliminated the need for 
complex analysis to determine strong or medium qualifiers from a list of 77 
indicators. The investment of time for each of the initial interviews with the MDWs 
was approximately 45 minutes to cover the 11 indicators. If there were identified 
problems in the employment circumstances, the time period to assess was longer. 
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The screening tool revealed that the top three indicators in frequency were abuse of 
vulnerability, excessive working hours and debt bondage. The indicator ‘abuse of 
vulnerability’ is automatically assessed since the abuse on any other of the indicators 
is only possible through the abuse of the MDWs vulnerable position. The menace of 
penalty was expressed as fear of dismissal, loss of wages and, in some cases, fear of 
arrest on false accusations. Fear of dismissal is a significant concern for MDWs. 
Since they are outside their native country and are often subjected to high and illegal 
recruitment fees that place them in forms of modern debt bondage, the option to 
simply leave abusive employment is often impractical. The incurred debt along with 
other factors such as government policy or reprisals by employment agencies in the 
form of higher fees for premature termination, increases the fear of termination and 
thus limits decision-making in escaping the abusive employment. As a result, a 
participant MDW was assessed for forced labour when deception or involuntariness 
was found in addition to a menace of penalty. 
Figure 1 represents the frequency of indicators of forced labour within the sample 
group. 
Forced	Labour	66%	TrafWicking	1%	
No	Incidence	33%	
53	
26	 n=80	
Figure 1 - Frequency of forced labour 
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8.2.2 Abuse of vulnerability 
Abuse of vulnerability was present 84% of the time (67 out of 80 participants) when 
indicators identified performance of involuntary tasks or where the participant was 
subjected to some form of coercion. 
The single biggest vulnerability identified was the legal requirement that they live 
with their employers. This law makes the MDW completely dependent on their 
employer for almost all aspects of their lives, including food, wages and shelter. This 
single factor completely alters the employer-employee relationship, creating 
conditions that can lead to abuse and greatly diminishing the ability of the MDW to 
take any remedial action without reprisal. The response to abuse of vulnerability 
‘…is between continuing in employment and bringing a claim’.577 Being a live-in 
MDW, if notice of termination is given, most likely the employer would require the 
MDW to leave immediately.578 This results in the worker not being provided 
entitlements immediately as the employer has seven days to make final payments.579 
 
                                                
577 Sau Wei Chan et.al, A Practitioner’s Manual for Migrant Workers: ringing Claims in Hong Kong 
and from Abroad, Justice without Borders, (2015), p.5 
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579 Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Employment Ordinance CAP 57, (1997) Section 23 
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One participant explained during the screening process that she felt uncomfortable 
with the presence of cameras in the house. The employer had told her that the 
cameras were to better monitor their 5-year-old child who was in her care. On her 
rest day, the participant performed her regular tasks at 7:00am and again on her 
return at 9:00pm. The participant was unsure of what would happen if she did not 
work on her rest days and wanted to demonstrate to her employer that she was 
willing to work but was unhappy with the long work hours. The participant stated, 
‘…the Hong Kong Government should revise the law and set working hours’. She 
indicated that she determined her return time to provide time to complete routine 
tasks before the end of the day. Her daily work hours were from 7:00am to 11:00pm 
(16 hours, excessive work hours, strong involuntariness). Her salary was regularly 
late by as much as 3-4 days. She slept on a mattress on the floor in the main living 
area, which offered no privacy. The participant was willing to endure the described 
working conditions until an issue arose that she felt was deceptive. Three months 
earlier, when interviewed for the position, the employer failed to mention that she 
was pregnant. The participant was visibly upset when this was disclosed to her and 
stated in her own words, ‘They did not tell me. They lie in the contract. Why would 
they do that? Why not tell me so I could prepare and decide if I find another 
employer’. When asked if she would have taken the job had she known the employer 
was pregnant, she replied: 
‘Probably yes, probably no. One of my previous employer stated 
in the contract that she was pregnant and I took that job. Taking 
care of a baby is not easy. I need to sacrifice my sleep at night to 
take care of a baby, sacrifice my health. I need to know so I can 
decide if I want to care of a baby’. 
The participant was evaluating her options when she sought assistance at MFMW. 
She asked early in the interview if what the employer did was discrimination. I 
avoided the question by asking what the NGO staff had told her. She responded, ‘I 
want to know what I can do’. By the tone of her voice, she was clearly angry at the 
employer and at the same time despondent that she was now trapped in an 
employment situation she did not want or agree to. 
She indicated that she feared dismissal with no income because her employer had 
asked her to go on vacation (after only 3 months employment) which she felt was a 
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ruse to terminate her (menace of penalty). The consequences in her mind were the 
loss of wages, the strong possibility that she could not seek any form of redress once 
outside of Hong Kong, and the likelihood that she would have to start the long and 
expensive recruitment process again, but this time with history of an unsuccessful 
contract which might hinder future employment. 
This participant’s experience displays the broad scope of the concept of forced 
labour, the issue of free and informed consent (voluntariness), the unexpected 
dimension of deception in recruitment, and the menace of penalty in dismissal. 
8.2.3 Excessive work hours 
Excessive work hours were present in 83% of the participants (66 out of 80 
interviewed). This did not include the abuse experienced from lack of adequate rest 
on designated rest days, which should be one rest day per week, consisting of 24 
continuous hours in duration based on the Hong Kong Labour Ordinance (Cap. 57). 
During the normal workweek, MDWs worked on average 16 hours per day, with 
some required to work 19 hours; the average workweek was therefore between 96 
and 114 hours per week (6 days, not including work on a rest day). On designated 
rest days, MDWs worked before leaving the house and often worked on return at 
curfew time. The average number of hours not working on a designated rest day was 
found to be 12.5 on average, with an overall range of 6 hours at the low end to 15 
hours at the higher end of the range. The weekly average working hours of MDWs – 
96 – is well above the 69 hours for native workers per a six-day week.580 The highest 
number of work hours for a participant MDW was 114 hours for the 6-day period 
(see Figure 3). 
                                                
580 Labour Department, ‘Report of the Policy Study On Standard Working Hours’ Hong Kong 2012. 
p.120-123 
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Excessive working hours is the single most prevalent factor in assessing forced 
labour. Since this indicator is qualified as a strong indicator of involuntariness under 
the dimension of ‘work and life under duress’, any other indicator that qualifies as a 
medium or strong form of coercion in the form of threats, lack of food, assault, 
isolation, etc., satisfies the ILO’s criteria for forced labour. The long hours imposed 
on the MDWs are as a result of their vulnerable position 581 and one of the 
impermissible advantages afforded to employers. 582  In Fineman’s theory, the 
regulation of this issue permits the employer to receive the privilege of long hours of 
work free from any government regulation to the disadvantage of the MDW who 
receives no further compensation for excessive work hours. 
8.2.4 Debt bondage 
In accordance with existing Hong Kong Law (Part XII of the Employment 
Ordinance and the Employment Agency Regulations Chapter 57, Part II) the 
maximum recruitment fee that a recruiting agency is allowed to charge is limited to 
10% of the MDW’s first month’s wages after they have been placed. The current 
                                                
581 Satterthwaite, ‘Crossing borders, claiming rights: using human rights law to empower women 
migrant workers’, p.25 
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minimum allowable wage for MDWs is $4,310 and therefore, the maximum fee 
would be $431. The Indonesian government allows by decree 583  employment 
agencies to charge a maximum of $15,550.584 The Philippine government under a 
2006 decree585 resolved that MDWs should not be charged a recruitment fee. Despite 
the limitations set by these three countries, MDWs continue to be charged excessive 
recruitment fees, placing them in a form of debt bondage. Many of the participants 
interviewed described the payment of recruitment fees in their home country and in 
some instances, having to pay a further fee in Hong Kong. 
Of the 80 participants interviewed, 66% (53) indicated that they paid a recruitment 
fee above the legally allowed limit, 10% (8) paid the legal established amount, 
22.5% (18) paid no fees (they either self-processed or were hired directly without an 
agency), and one participant could not recall the fees paid. All participants indicated 
that the fees were paid by taking loans from family, friends or lending companies. In 
most instances, the total fees were between $6,000 and $24,000 and paid over a 3-8-
month period, in amounts ranging from $2,000 to $3,000 per month. This was 
assessed as a strong indicator for involuntariness at the recruitment stage for two 
reasons; first, because of its illegal nature, and second, because the workers involved 
in this research were from countries (Philippines and Indonesia) that require a 
partner agency in Hong Kong to process applicants. This partnering requirement was 
intended to introduce some oversight from the receiving/destination country on the 
fees being charged. This indicator was not used in determining the presence of 
forced labour since it is considered an indicator of involuntariness at the recruitment 
stage. 
Recruitment debt is a significant factor in creating vulnerability in forced labour 
situations.586 The debt may be held by the recruitment agency, moneylender, family 
member or friend making an indirect link that nonetheless directly affects the 
employment relationship and a MDW’s decision to leave the employment. In 
                                                
583 KEP.186/PPTK/VII/2008 
584 Amnesty International, ‘Exploited for Profit, Failed by Governments, Indonesian Migrant Domestic 
Workers Trafficked to Hong Kong’ (2013) p.25 
585 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, Resolution No.7 (2006) 
586 United States Department of State ‘Trafficking In Persons Report’ (2015, 2016, 2017) 
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instances where the employer may have paid the agency and the MDW is indebted, 
the link between ‘menace of penalty’ and any coercion is clear. 
8.2.5 Deception 
Deception in recruitment appeared in 35 of 80 of cases (44%). An indicator of 
deception was assessed each time a participant indicated that some element of their 
employment entailed tasks, wages, living conditions or conditions where the 
employer was not what or who was promised, either verbally or in writing. Examples 
of deception included participants being prematurely terminated because they could 
not speak Cantonese despite informing the recruiting agency of this. 
Illegal deployment was another form of deception that occurred when an employer 
required a MDW to perform work outside the specified address in the contract. 
Illegal deployment included work to be performed at residences of family and 
friends of the employer, and work performed at commercial, retail businesses and 
restaurants. In all instances, this additional work was never mentioned until the 
MDW was placed with the employer. In one instance, a participant was prematurely 
terminated because she challenged the employer about making deliveries for the 
employer’s ‘side business’ selling contact lenses. 
8.2.6 Intimidation and threats 
Intimidation or threats were reported 34% (27 of 80) of the time. This indicator 
included the use of abusive or demeaning language, threats of termination, loss of 
wages through illegal deductions, excessive reimbursement costs charged for alleged 
damage to household items, and sleep deprivation as a form of punishment. One of 
the other cited forms of intimidation was the employer’s threat to report false crimes, 
most often for alleged theft of valuables from the household. 
Twenty-three of the 80 participants (29%) indicated that they were not given a 
reasonable amount of food (Food Depravation, strong coercion). Although, there are 
no standardised ways to measure what constitutes daily subsistence, the interviews 
did provide anecdotal information that corroborated the reporting MDWs concerns. 
One participant indicated that over a 4-month period of employment she lost 44 lbs. 
As the participant explained in her own words: 
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‘Sir, I am stressed. I want to break my contract. I went from 60 
kg (132 lbs.) to 40 kg (88 lbs.). There is only dinner no 
breakfast, no lunch. I don’t think I can survive two years with 
this employer’. 
While there was a consistent complaint about the lack of adequate amounts of food, 
the research identified several reasons: 
1. limited budget of the employer; 
2. family members eating first, leaving the MDW with whatever was left; 
3. being given stale left-overs; and 
4. religious restrictions on diet which were not accounted for by the employer. 
Lastly, sleep deprivation was another coercive method used to exert control over the 
MDW. One participant described being awakened at 1 – 2 AM daily to perform 
household work that the employer decided did not meet acceptable standards. 
8.2.7 Abusive working and living conditions 
Abusive working and living conditions were reported by 33% (26) of participants. 
This indicator was assessed when participants described substandard living 
conditions, demeaning treatment, or lack of privacy especially in sleeping 
accommodation. One example cited was an employer’s requirement that the MDW 
wash her clothes with water used by the employer or family members to bathe. 
Another example given was where the MDW was called to join the employer for 
dinner but was required to eat from the same bowl as her male employer. 
8.2.8 Restriction of movement 
Restriction of movement was reported 24% of the time (19 instances). In instances 
where CCTV cameras were installed, this indicator was assessed only when 
participants indicated that the use of the cameras were intended to monitor their 
movement or restrict breaks during the day. 
8.2.9 Retention of documents 
Retention of identity documents by the employer or the contracting agency was 
recorded 24% of the time (19 instances). This act involved the seizure of passports, 
contracts or ID cards. The seizure of documents by employment agencies was 
observed in cases where there was outstanding recruitment debt. Sometimes the 
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employer held documents on behalf of the agency, providing no reason to the MDW. 
In other instances, the employer seized the documents to prevent the worker from 
being able to take out loans while employed. 
8.2.10 Isolation 
Isolation was reported 21% of the time (17 cases). This tactic involved the employer 
taking away the MDW’s mobile phone to limit contact with anybody outside of the 
place of employment. In addition to the seizure of communication devices, all 17 
participants reported prohibitions from speaking to other MDWs in the area, 
neighbours and even other workers in the same household. 
8.2.11 Physical/sexual violence 
Physical violence was reported eight times (10%). Each of the cases involved 
physical assaults that ranged from repeated twisting of the ear as an expression of 
displeasure to more serious incidents of beatings administered with clothes hangers 
and other objects. No sexual assaults or harassment were reported. Based on the 
available literature on this latter issue,587 I would have expected some participants to 
report on this issue. It is unclear if the lack of reporting was due to the location of the 
interviews (lack of privacy) or the male gender of the researcher. 
8.2.12 Withholding of wages 
Withholding of wages occurred in 6 cases (8%). These incidents had a wide range; 
arbitrary underpayment of the contractual minimum allowable wage, illegal 
deductions for alleged damage done to the employer’s clothing or minor damage to 
household items, deductions of illegal recruitment fees by the employer on behalf of 
the employment agency, and refusal to pay final entitlements on termination. In 
instances where MDWs were terminated without the required one month’s notice, 
the employer is required to pay one month’s wages in lieu. At termination, 
employers frequently refuse to fulfil this binding contractual obligation. This refusal 
                                                
587 The Hong Kong SAR Equal Opportunities Commission conducted a survey of 981 Foreign 
Domestic Workers in 2014. It found that 6.5% of respondents reported being sexually harassed during 
the 12 months prior to the survey. 
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to pay is largely responsible for delays in settling a complaint filed with the labour 
department. 
8.3 Imbalance of power 
In most instances, MDWs are subject to an inordinate amount of control that is 
exerted by employers or employment agencies, negatively affecting their ability to 
make basic decisions about their finances and assert themselves when asked to 
perform work that was not contractually agreed. The effect of this domination also 
extends to claims that are heard in redress forums. Adjudicating officials at times 
find it unbelievable that a complaining MDW can be subjected to the abuses and yet 
appear not to possess enough autonomy to resist.  
A case that best exemplifies that occurred in 2011. A Philippine woman claiming to 
be a victim of human trafficking was arrested and charged by immigration 
authorities for violating her visa restrictions.  She told authorities that she had been 
brought into the country on a tourist visa by her employer who had family in Hong 
Kong. She was then handed over to that family to temporarily care for their elderly 
mother. She had worked for this employer for two years, never leaving the home 
because she feared the repercussions. Her passport was in the possession of the 
employer during the entire two-year period and she was never paid for the work that 
she did. The woman had never previously travelled outside of the Philippines. 
Learning of her father’s death, she demanded to be sent home. That request was 
denied and her condition remained unchanged. When she subsequently went on a 
hunger strike to force her employer to release her, she was placed in a taxi cab with 
$5,000 Hong Kong Dollars and sent to the Philippine Consulate. The subsequent 
police investigation resulted in the arrest and prosecution of this worker for working 
in Hong Kong without a valid visa; after a trial during which she testified to all of 
the above facts, she was found guilty of the offenses charged and sentenced to four 
and a half months imprisonment. The “Sun” 588 reported that the magistrate hearing 
this case had concluded that based on the facts he could not agree that that the 
worker had been brought to Hong Kong against her wishes; further the magistrate 
                                                
588 Jan Yumul, ‘Filipina claiming to be trafficked Jailed’, Sun Internet Edition mid-February 2012, 
http://www.sunweb.com.hk/Story.asp?hdnStoryCode=7179;  
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stated that given her age and her prior work experience he also could not accept her 
testimony that she could not escape from the home in instances when the employer 
may not have been in. The Magistrate, in concluding that she was not a victim of 
human trafficking, opined that despite the fact that this was her first time in to Hong 
Kong, it was illogical that she could have worked with her employers for two and a 
half years against her will.  
There is a lack of understanding or recognition that domestic work reinforces 
relationships of power and inequality in societies where it is found.589 It ‘emerges 
from, reflects and reinforces some combination of hierarchical relationships of class, 
gender, race, ethnicity migration or age’.590 Most studies on domestic work recognise 
that there is a link between inequality and oppression in the employer-employer 
relationship.591 Of the 87 participants asked if they were able to negotiate the 
conditions of their employment, 58 indicated that they could not. Six indicated that 
they could negotiate with their employers, but when asked why they had not, they 
replied that they feared being terminated. In 23 interviews, the question was not 
asked due to the circumstances of the employment, in that there was no indication 
that there were problems with the employment and in some instances termination 
was the result of reasons other than mistreatment. The two cases below highlight this 
imbalance. 
8.3.1 Case 1 – Alma 
At the time of the interview, Alma had been employed for only 4 months. She had 
been interviewed by the employment agency and directly placed in the employer’s 
home. After the first month, she complained that she was unhappy with her 
employer’s treatment of her. She also complained that she was required to work at 
the employer’s office (illegal deployment, strong involuntariness, work and life 
under duress), which was not in her contract. The agency told her that she had no 
right to change the employer and she still owed the lending company. When 
recruited in the Philippines, Alma was told she should pay a recruitment fee in Hong 
Kong. On arrival in Hong Kong, she was referred to a lending company where she 
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took a loan for $10,960 to be paid over six months. Alma explained that this was a 
concern for her and one of the reasons she continued working:	
‘I was afraid if I refused my employer, she would terminate me. 
If I got terminated I cannot pay my lending and I might go to jail 
for not paying. I asked advice from Mission because I don’t 
know what to do. If they find me working not at my employer, I 
could go to jail also’. 
Alma was working approximately 19 hours for each workday (excessive work hours, 
strong involuntariness)) and was allotted 11 hours of rest on her rest day. She was 
told by her employer not to communicate with anyone (isolation, strong coercion) in 
the neighbourhood or building, and not to befriend other MDWs. Alma also 
complained that she was not being given enough food for daily sustenance (food 
depravation, strong coercion). On the day that she sought assistance, she told me that 
her employer who had gone on vacation for approximately two months, and had 
instructed her to work for her employer’s friend during their absence. She had no 
prior notice of this move or understanding of the work or living conditions at the 
friend’s residence. Alma informed her employer that she did not think the 
arrangements were legal per the Labour Ordinance. The employer became enraged 
and threatened to kill Alma, telling her, ‘Do not follow the contract, immigration 
rules or labour department. Follow my rules. You are in my house’ (threats against 
the victim, strong coercion). Alma explained that she sought assistance because she 
felt that the employer’s arrangements were in violation of the contract and a violation 
of Hong Kong’s labour laws. Alma was never interviewed by her employer and had 
never met her before being taken to the employer’s house. 
Alma was provided with a letter by MFMW to be taken to the Immigration 
Department explaining the conditions of her employment. She returned to her 
employer’s residence that day. When contacted a month later, Alma was still 
employed and her employer was still on vacation. She advised that the recruitment 
agency had informed her that her employer had been banned by HK Immigration 
from hiring another MDW. In this case, the imbalance is clear. The worker had no 
autonomy or confidence that she could ignore the request of the employer without 
some form of reprisal. Alma’s bargaining position was limited in that the debt was a 
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factor in deciding what options she had but also the employer felt entitled to instruct 
Alma to disregard the authorities and the contract that governed the relationship. 
8.3.2 Case 2 – Jenny 
Jenny arrived at the NGO at the end of July 2015 having just terminated her contract. 
At 46 years old, Jenny had worked for 5 years in Saudi Arabia and 2 years in Taiwan 
as a domestic worker. She had been working for this employer for three months at 
the time she terminated her employment contract due to abuse. Jenny’s interview 
catalogued a long list of issues and abuses that began the moment that she arrived in 
Hong Kong. She told me that she had been deceived in her recruitment because she 
expected to care for two adults, but on her arrival in Hong Kong found that she 
would be responsible for six people at the employers’ residence, and would also be 
required to work at two additional homes of the employer’s family members. She 
was working 16-hour days, with 12 hours’ rest on her rest days. She slept on a 
mattress on the floor, near the living room, which severely impacted privacy and her 
ability to sleep as family members were frequently awake until 2:00 a.m. watching 
television. Her passport had been seized by the employer on arrival in Hong Kong. 
Jenny, a practicing Muslim, was unable to eat meals prepared for the employer and 
their family due to dietary restrictions. She was not provided any food allowance and 
her meals consisted of a slice of bread at breakfast and some rice at night. Jenny 
explained that she endured the 3 months because she needed to pay off her 
recruitment fees and was afraid of termination. 
At the time Jenny sought help, she was paying two different recruitment fees to the 
same employment agency, one from a previous employment that was prematurely 
terminated in 2014 and her current employment. She had been charged a recruitment 
fee of $8,800 and had made an initial payment $2,000, with $1,000 due each month 
for six months. Since Jenny had terminated her contract, she wanted to recoup as 
much of the recruitment fee that she was entitled to. Jenny had two options; she 
could file with the Small Claims Tribunal or file a claim with the Labour Department 
against the employer for illegal deductions of $5,000. The employer had been 
deducting money from her salary each month, sending it to the employment agency. 
In early August 2015, Jenny filed her claim with the Labour Department. Her 
employer did not attend a conciliation meeting that was scheduled, and as a result the 
  
172 
case was scheduled for MECAB. In mid-October, Jenny attended MECAB, with her 
employer present. The Adjudicating Officer, gesturing in the direction of the man 
across from her, opened the proceedings by asking Jenny to explain why her 
employer should pay the claim. Jenny replied, ‘That’s not my employer!’ Jenny then 
pointed to a man seated in the observing seats and identified him as her employer. 
The hearing determined that the person seated across from her was the individual 
who had signed the contract but Jenny had been working for his brother. After 
several hours of the hearing, the employer offered to pay $3,000, which Jenny 
accepted. 
In the second claim, Jenny’s ability to recover additional fees was hampered by the 
fact that the recruitment agency did not provide her with receipts for payments made. 
However, with the support of the NGO, she did file a complaint against the employer 
to recover fees that were also deducted from her wages and sent to the employment 
agency. Under the Hong Kong Labour Ordinance (Cap. 57, section 26), the employer 
is required to pay the worker directly. The agency had received $6,667 in recruitment 
fees through an arrangement with the employer to ensure the monthly payments were 
made over a period of 6 months. At the beginning of the hearing, the Adjudicating 
Officer informed both parties that the claim was outside the jurisdiction of the 
MECAB since it was more than a year old. The Adjudicating Officer asked both 
parties if they wanted to waive their right to have the case moved to the Labour 
Tribunal or have the claim heard in MECAB. Both parties declined to waive their 
right and agreed to have the case sent to the Labour Tribunal. The Adjudicating 
Officer then counselled Jenny, informing her that she should claim against the 
agency not the employer. He then advised the employer to file a claim in the Small 
Claims Tribunal if she (employer) paid the agency on behalf of Jenny completely 
ignoring the illegality of the recruitment fee and the fact that the employer informed 
the Adjudicating Officer that, ‘I asked the agency to come here, but they don’t want 
any part of this case because they know it is illegal to charge the maid the money’. 
Jenny continued to object, ‘I did not give her permission to deduct money from my 
wages. The employer has no place in any agreement between me and the agency’. 
The case was adjourned and both Jenny and her employer were informed that the 
claim along with all documentation would be transferred to the Labour Tribunal.  
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Both the employer and employment agency were dominant in the relationship with 
Jenny. The employer felt that she had the authority to insert herself into Jenny’s 
financial affairs and relationship with the agency without resistance from Jenny. The 
agency overcharged Jenny twice for securing an employer, taking advantage of 
Jenny’s position as a domestic worker needing employment. 
Interviews with several key informants, K4592, K5593, K6594, K7595 and K8596 were 
corroborative of the issue of imbalance of power between the employer and 
employee and was clearly perceived as different from the normal hierarchical 
relationship found in the workplace. K8’s belief was that it stemmed from 
discrimination based on their status as migrants, issues of race and that they are 
women. All five key informants agreed that their status as migrants underscores their 
unequal position as outsiders, temporary and replaceable, workers were powerless to 
ignore demands that fall outside their contractual agreements. K6 commented that 
MDWs view themselves as mere workers who do not have the right to speak or act 
without the approval of the employer. This imbalance is further solidified through 
the “live in” requirement, and a systematic process that K7 described as “grooming”. 
K7 explained that the employment agencies “brain wash” the MDW in the 
orientation and training process, conditioning them to be subservient;   
 ‘You have to work hard because you love your employer’s family. If you love your 
employer’s family they would love you. If you want to have better performance than 
Filipino, you have to work harder because Filipino may work only eight hours but 
you Indonesian you have to work. If your employer ask you to do some more work 
in the evening time or in the night time, you have to follow because of your work, 
your love”. 
This perceived responsibility to please their employers coupled with the fear of 
termination for disobeying, extends to infractions of the immigration ordinance 
concerning the “conditions of stay” and an inequitable application of law based on 
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overt discrimination. K5 explains that when MDWs are found working illegally at 
locations not in their contracts, ‘…MDWs are the ones that are arrested and charged. 
The employer bears no responsibility.’ 
K4 explained that some employers engage in abusive treatment of their workers 
because ‘…they have the money. They can treat them [the MDW] as they wish 
because they are just workers. They (employer) can do anything’. The MDWs are 
powerless to overcome this imbalance. MDWs, ‘…don’t have the power to fight’. 
K7 expressed a similar view and explained:	
‘… we as Hong Kong people are naïve because we 
underestimate about the power relationship between the 
employer and the domestic worker (helper). Our society is who 
pay the money, who (we) can define who you are’. 
  8.4 ‘I have no choice’ 
One of the unanticipated findings of the research was that many of the participants 
did not see themselves as victims and, despite having legitimate grievances, 
repeatedly returned to their work without taking any legal or remedial action. They 
accepted the abuse and mistreatment as a norm, something to be endured for their 
own well-being and that of their dependent family. Again, of the total participant 
population, 64 participants indicated that they had ‘no choice’ when describing why 
they stayed in the employment as long as they had prior to termination or decided to 
continue. Of the 53 participants who were initially identified as being in forced 
labour, 41 chose not to make a claim. Out of those 41, more than half (24) returned 
to their place of employment after complaining of abuse. Seventeen of those 24 were 
terminated by the employer or ended their contracts prematurely. Six people assessed 
as being in a forced labour situation had never filed a complaint despite the obvious 
issues raised, and indicated that prior to termination, they had no problems with their 
employer and did not see the conduct as an issue. 
Other research597 has identified a reluctance to accept the ‘victim role’ in accepting 
assistance as trafficking victims. I found similarity in this participant group. Some 
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victims did not see themselves in this light as they were ‘…used to taking care not 
only of themselves but also their families and the desire to support their family was 
the motivation for migration’.598 Family situations were exacerbated by debt incurred 
to cover the cost of migration, and those who returned home appearing worse off or 
not able to send money may bear the stigma of being viewed as a failed migrant.599 
The case studies below will describe the working conditions of MDWs and the 
reasons why they have ‘no choice’ in enduring the employment conditions exacted 
on them by their employers. While evaluating the decision to remain in an 
undesirable employment situation and the need to meet family needs, I was 
compelled late in the process to consider what family means. 
One participant informed me that there is a social and cultural responsibility to take 
care of other family members if they are unemployed. It was then explained that 
there were 11 people in her family which included aunts, uncles, cousins, nieces and 
nephews. She continued to explain that, ‘…this is a factor in deciding if to terminate 
your contract’. This participant was not in forced labour and had worked in Hong 
Kong for almost 32 years, 24 years with one employer then 8 years with the daughter 
of the first employer. 
8.4.1 Case 3 – Vera 
Vera was in a forced labour situation working excessive hours of 17 hours per day, 
she had her passport seized, she complained of lack of food, isolation, poor 
accommodation and she was in debt associated with her recruitment fees. Vera had 
only been working for two months before she was terminated. She had borrowed 
60,000 Pesos from a lending company and another 40,000 Pesos from a family 
member. 
When asked if she would have stayed with the employer if she hadn’t been 
terminated, Vera explained that she had given it some thought but she considered the 
financial implications to be too severe. She explained:	
                                                
598 Ibid p.28 
599 Ibid p.21 
 
  
176 
‘I have no choice. We have no home, we are renting, I have 3 
children and one is special needs. My husband does not work as 
he has to take care of our child who needs a lot of medication’. 
8.4.2 Case 4 – Christine 
Christine was in forced labour employment. She was working 20 hours per day 
(strong involuntariness), she complained about a lack of food (strong coercion), she 
was isolated, and she was constantly verbally abused. Christine was required to clean 
the exterior of the fourth story windows via a narrow ledge. Considering that other 
MDWs have fallen to their deaths doing the same thing, this was considered a strong 
indicator of involuntariness. Christine was made to sleep in the kitchen and 
explained that she was frequently awakened by the male employer cooking at 
2:00am. The employers threatened Christine that if she did not obey their 
instructions, she would be terminated. Christine was one of the early participants and 
when she explained having to clean the exterior of the windows on the 4th floor, I 
questioned her decision to acquiesce to the employer’s request considering that such 
an act could result in serious injury or death. Christine replied: ‘I have no choice. We 
have to do what they say. I have to support my family. I need this job. I borrowed 
50,000 pesos from my friend and I’m only one month here and cannot pay her’. 
After one and a half months, Christine sought assistance and claimed constructive 
dismissal. Her claim was unsuccessful and she was required to compensate the 
employer. In both cases, decisions are limited due to family circumstances and debt. 
Both Vera and Christine were in forced labour not because of their poor working 
conditions or economic necessity600 but because of the involuntariness and coercion 
applied by the employer.601 
8.5 Comparison – similar methodology and findings 
The methods used in this research are similar to those in other types of research only 
in respect of the identification of forced labour. Across all studies, the prevalence of 
forced labour was found to be high. The results of this study found 66% of the 
people interviewed were in forced labour. Although MFMW has not specifically 
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done research on forced labour, a look at the clients they serve and the reasons for 
seeking assistance may shed some light on the prevalence of forced labour within 
their clients. I will examine MFMW clients first before comparing other studies. 
8.5.1 Prevalence of forced labour in MFMW clients 
In 2015, MFMW assisted approximately 4,600 MDWs. Many of the complaints 
involved multiple issues ranging from contract termination, illegal recruitment fees 
and maltreatment by the employer. Some 54% of MDWs who sought assistance 
complained of contractual violations, premature terminations, unpaid wages and 
other entitlements governed by the Labour Ordinance. Another 41% reported 
problems involving malpractice of recruitment agencies associated with over-
charging of recruitment fees and fraudulent loans that places MDWs in modern 
forms of debt bondage. The 80 participants interviewed in this study represent 
approximately 2% of the clients assisted by MFMW in 2015. Considering that the 
clients that appear at MFMW are suffering the worst types of abuses, it would be 
expected that the number of them in forced labour would be high. At a rate of 66%, it 
may suggest that, of the 4,600 clients assisted by MFMW, approximately 3,036 
could in forced labour. These numbers may differ from a randomised sample of the 
general MDW population as the types of participants suffering abuses would be 
more concentrated in NGOs than the general population. 
8.5.2 Other research 
8.5.2.1 Justice Centre Hong Kong 
Between April and May 2015, at the same time this research was being conducted, 
the Justice Centre Hong Kong conducted first-of-its-kind, comprehensive research to 
establish the prevalence of forced labour and human trafficking in Hong Kong, 
intended to be representative of the larger MDW population.602 The research relied 
on the 67 indicators outlined in the ILO’s 2009 Operational indicators of trafficking 
in human beings to identify victims of forced labour and human trafficking based on 
the Delphi methodology. It also used the ILO’s questionnaire in Hard to see, Harder 
to Count as a survey instrument adapted to the Hong Kong context to gather 
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quantitative data, administering it to over 1,000 MDWs. The survey examined the 
experiences of MDWs both in Hong Kong and the MDWs’ home countries, focusing 
on recruitment debt, recruitment practices, working hours, working and living 
conditions, access to adequate food and treatment by employers. The survey results 
were then analysed against the indicators of forced labour and validated through five 
qualitative focus groups consisting of MDWs from five countries. 
The research found that 17% of surveyed MDWs were in a forced labour situation, 
or 1in 6 MDWs in Hong Kong. The MDWs most vulnerable were those on their first 
contract and those who had significant recruitment debt. MDWs worked on average 
11.9 hours per day, six days a week, equivalent to 71.4 hours per week. 33.7% of 
MDWs had to work before leaving home on their rest day and on their return, in 
clear violation of the Hong Kong Labour Ordinance requiring a full 24 hours of 
continuous rest. Some 31.9% of respondents did not feel free to leave their jobs, and 
37.5% were concerned that it they terminated their contracts it might negatively 
impact their future prospects (‘job hopping’) and draw the attention of the Hong 
Kong Immigration Department, which discourages resignation. Over half of the 
respondents, 55%, felt they could not leave their abusive situations; the MDWs 
viewed all of the jobs as similar in nature, including abuses and deprivations. 
The use of indicators to identify victims of forced labour makes the real-life abuses 
of victims a subjective issue and is a means to quantify, validate and defend forced 
labour findings. If, for example, an interviewed victim was assessed with a medium 
indicator for involuntariness and a medium indicator for coercion, it would not fit the 
criteria for forced labour. This assessment is void of any consideration of the 
victim’s capacity, age, cultural background, social or economic status. A medium 
indicator of coercion may be the most traumatic experience of the participant’s life. 
Furthermore, the identification of forced labour cannot simply rely on established 
indicators and the qualification of strong or medium. This approach eliminates the 
real possibility of forced labour occurring on a continuum of severity and creates a 
reactive posture of identification if service providers must wait on experts to identify 
new indicators. Indicators can never cover every abusive act, as abuses of MDWs are 
only limited by the imagination of the abuser. In considering this issue, I believe that 
the use of indicators to identify behaviours of forced labour is a starting point of 
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identification and not a definitive end. All instances of forced labour, however slight, 
that meet the criteria of involuntariness or deception and coercion should be treated 
as a crime. Thus, considering the method of measurement, the incidence of forced 
labour could very well be higher than reported. I recognise the necessity for both 
approaches, as it establishes that there must be differing methods of identification; at 
least one method that establishes statistical validity to influence government policy 
and another to rapidly identify victims in the field. 
8.5.2.2 Amnesty International 
Between May 2012 and March 2013, Amnesty International produced a report603 
after examination of the experiences of Indonesian MDWs from recruitment to 
employment in Hong Kong. They conducted 97 in-depth interviews and surveyed 
930 Indonesian MDWs. As part of their study, they interviewed Indonesian migrant 
domestic workers who had arrived in Hong Kong between 2008 and 2012, and 
experienced problems during the migratory process. The interviewees represented a 
purposive sample that provided an in-depth understanding of the migration process 
and the types of human and labour rights abuses experienced. The study gathered 
information on the recruitment process, at the training centres in Indonesia, while 
working in Hong Kong, and when they returned to Indonesia. Amnesty International 
also conducted interviews with recruitment agencies, brokers, local trade unions, 
NGOs, employers’ associations and intergovernmental institutions in both Hong 
Kong and Indonesia. They conducted site visits to two training centres in Indonesia 
and met Indonesian officials from several relevant government agencies, including 
the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration, the National Board for the Placement 
and Protection of Indonesian Overseas Workers, the Consulate General of Indonesia 
in Hong Kong, the Labour Office in Indonesia, and Hong Kong officials from the 
Labour and Immigration Departments. 
Amnesty international made three specific findings: 
1. Recruitment agencies in Indonesia and Hong Kong were routinely involved 
in the trafficking and exploitation of MDWs, placing them in conditions of 
                                                
603 Amnesty International, ‘Exploited For Profit, Failed By Governments’, 2013 
  
180 
forced labour using deception and coercion to recruit and to compel them to 
work. The prevalent mechanisms of coercion applied were the confiscation of 
identity documents, restrictions on freedom of movement and the 
manipulation of debt incurred through recruitment fees. 
2. Employers in Hong Kong frequently subject migrant domestic workers to 
physical or verbal abuse; restrict their freedom of movement; prohibit them 
from practicing their faith; pay them less than the minimum wage; deny them 
adequate rest periods; and arbitrarily terminate their contracts, in collusion 
with placement agencies. 
3. The Indonesian and Hong Kong governments have not complied with their 
international obligations to prevent and suppress trafficking and the use of 
forced labour. They have failed to properly monitor, investigate and sanction 
individuals and organisations violating domestic legislation, such as 
recruitment agencies in Indonesia and recruitment agencies and employers in 
Hong Kong. Both governments have regulations in place that increase 
migrant domestic workers’ risk of suffering human and labour rights 
violations. These include the obligation of migrants to migrate through 
government-registered recruitment agencies in Indonesia, and the imposition 
of the two-week rule and live-in requirement in Hong Kong. 
As both these studies illustrate, once the migrant domestic workers arrive in Hong 
Kong local placement agencies and employers may confiscate their documents and 
restrict their freedom of movement. Amnesty International documented that the vast 
majority of MDWs interviewed had their documents taken by either their employer 
or the placement agency in Hong Kong, and about a third of the respondents were 
not allowed to leave the employer’s house. A survey by one migrant organisation 
found that nearly three quarters of the MDWs interviewed (74%) had their 
documents confiscated by their employer or the placement agency. Migrant domestic 
workers are normally told that they will only get their documents back after their 
debt is fully repaid. 
Interviewees reported that contracts could be terminated if the worker complains 
about their treatment, is not considered to be a good worker or if the placement 
agency manipulates the situation to collect a new recruitment fee. Some 17% of the 
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MDWs surveyed had their contract terminated before the agency fee had been 
repaid. The fear of having their contract terminated and either not being able to 
secure a new job or having to repay a recruitment fee a second time, compels many 
Indonesian migrants to remain in abusive and exploitative jobs. As a result of these 
abusive recruitment practices and poor government oversight of legal requirements 
for both recruiters and employers, Indonesian migrant domestic workers are at risk of 
serious human and labour rights violations in Hong Kong. 
Amnesty International found that interviewees worked on average 17 hours a day; 
numerous respondents did not receive the mandated Minimum Allowable Wage; 
they were physically or verbally abused by their employer; were prohibited from 
practicing their faith; and did not receive a weekly day off. Some of the polices and 
regulations in place further exacerbate this problem. The live-in requirement was 
again identified as a factor in the exploitation of the MDWs. Legally requiring the 
MDW to live-in the employer’s home as a condition of their employment, offers 
limited alternatives when they suffer abuse at the hands of their employer and 
contributes to an environment of vulnerability. Amnesty International documented 
that many of the respondents did not have their own room, leaving workers with 
diminished privacy, literally putting them on call 24 hours a day, and potentially 
making them more vulnerable to sexual harassment or violence. 
The two-week rule pressures workers to stay in an abusive situation because they 
know that if they leave their job, they are likely to have to leave the country, which 
in turn may make it impossible to repay recruitment fees or support their families. It 
might also diminish their chances for future employment in Hong Kong. This 
requirement also makes migrant domestic workers dependent on placement agencies 
to find another job quickly. Their uncertain state places them at risk of further 
exploitation, including having to accept excessive recruitment fees, a salary below 
the Minimum Allowable Wage, and poor living and working conditions just to 
continue working in Hong Kong. 
The two-week rule also acts as a barrier to justice. If a migrant domestic worker 
leaves an abusive situation and is not re-employed within two weeks, they must 
leave Hong Kong, making it difficult and costly to pursue a case against an abusive 
employer. The only available alternative is to apply for a visa extension of 14 days, 
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at a cost of $160 (US$20). As the studies noted, to take a case to the Labour Tribunal 
takes nearly two months. During this time, the MDW would have to renew their visa 
several times, and pay for their own accommodation, food and any other living 
expenses while not earning any income. The costs of doing so makes it impossible 
for the majority of migrant domestic workers to seek redress for human and labour 
rights violations. In practice, the two-week rule provides a clear disincentive for the 
workers to denounce exploitative practices and pursue any claims through available 
mechanisms. 
The Amnesty International research did not use established indicators of forced 
labour; however, their findings are consistent with those in this research. Debt at the 
recruitment stage places MDWs in a vulnerable position that limits their ability to 
make decisions later in the employment. The live-in requirement conceals a variety 
of abuses that go unreported and a lack of enforcement and effective redress 
mechanisms prevent MDWs from accessing a true remedy. 
Conclusion 
Both the Justice Centre and Amnesty International research make similar 
recommendations: abolishing or amending the live-in requirement, abolishing the 
two-week rule, taking action to prevent and address human rights abuses, and 
introducing legislation in compliance with the Forced Labour Convention No.29 
(1930). In comparing the other research with this one, the prevalence of Forced 
labour identified by both Justice Centre and Amnesty International may be higher in 
reality. The methodology executed in this research revealed that there were 
indicators that were identified that may not have been captured in the other research 
methods (section 3.2.3.5).  
The most prevalent indicator that contributed to the forced labour conditions of 
MDWs was excessive working hours that result from the employer’s abuse of the 
MDWs vulnerable position and made permissible by governmental policy requiring 
the MDW to “live-in”. The lack of standard working hour legislation contributes to a 
lack of equity in the employer employee relationship. The employee performs work 
in excess of the average working hours compared to the general population with no 
opportunity for remuneration for the excess hours beyond the national standard.  
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MDWs are constantly under threat of dismissal for non-compliance to requests that 
fall outside their contracts and also lack the ability to adequately protect themselves 
from excessively long and physically demanding working hours. Decent working 
conditions fall on the discretion and whim of the employer. This inherent imbalance 
and the inability to overcome it forces the MDW to develop coping methods which 
includes the acceptance of their condition and the perception that they have “no 
choice”. The perception of a lack of options results in the MDW enduring long 
periods of abuse until conditions become so extreme that they are no longer able to 
cope and eventually seek help. The lack of a comprehensive legal framework to 
protect MDWs and the punitive policies such as the two-week rule adds to the lack 
of options. 
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Chapter 9. Analysis – Barriers to Remedies 
9.1 Introduction 
The original goal of the research was to determine the effectiveness of conciliation in 
providing an effective remedy to labour rights violations. In pursuit of this goal, 
three significant findings emerged. First, there was a finding that most MDWs who 
were classified as being in forced labour did not seek any form of remedy or file 
official complaints for the variety of abuses suffered at the hands of their employers. 
They experienced multiple barriers that limited their decision making in whether to 
pursue a remedy. Second, those MDWs who did seek a remedy also experienced 
barriers that limited their decision-making during the redress process, and at times 
provided inappropriate outcomes. Third, because of the strong institutional drive for 
conciliated settlements, the conciliation mechanism intended to provide resolution in 
a quick, simple and inexpensive manner proved to be another barrier to an effective 
remedy. 
With both groups of participants, actors both inside and outside the civil justice 
system and government policy-makers had a negative effect on the filing or handling 
of claims. The barriers that MDWs experienced included many of those barriers 
examined in Chapter 6 that frustrated efforts towards or outright denial of a remedy. 
The research and the observations of the redress process also showed a lack of 
enforcement of laws and regulations that are in place to protect MDWs. In many 
instances, government personnel that became involved in any disputed situation 
failed to recognise obvious signs of mistreatment or potentially criminal conduct on 
the part of employers. Lastly, the lack of criminal redress options ultimately served 
to undermine any effective remedy. The findings are also very clear that the cases are 
not recognised as criminal in nature; they are categorised as simple labour disputes 
and at times provide outcomes that appear unfair as workers settle claims for less 
than entitlements under their contracts. Ironically, the conciliation process intended 
to assist parties in exploring the problem concerned, analysing the situation and 
seeking a mutually acceptable settlement in a speedy manner without legal 
representation proved to be a barrier to an effective remedy in of itself. 
  
185 
The five sections below will provide the analysis of data collected as part of Phase 
two, accompaniment to redress processes in section 9.2. The case studies in 9.3 
Social and Cultural Barriers, 9.4 Institutional Barriers and 9.5 Structural Barriers are 
intended to elucidate some of the barriers to remedies attributable to factors and 
actions of actors inside and outside the redress processes, including the police, 
employers, employment agencies, Conciliation Officers and adjudicatory third 
parties, and how they affect MDWs’ filing or handling of claims during the redress 
process. The case studies encompass multiple and overlapping actions and actors that 
contribute to the denial of a remedy. In section 9.6 I will address the use of 
Conciliation, an Informal and non-judicial mechanism that acts as a Barrier to a 
remedy highlighting the cautions of the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution some 
of which are reflected in this thesis. 
9.2 Data analysis 
Of the 53 participants classified as being in forced labour, 41 chose not to seek a 
remedy and 12 chose to file claims with the Labour Department. Of the 41 
participants who did not seek a remedy, 24 returned to their employers after 
complaining about their work conditions and 17 contracts were prematurely 
terminated, 13 by the employer and 4 by the MDW. 
The 17 participants who did not seek a remedy and the 12 that did file claims, 
experienced a variety of barriers and actors that limited their ability to decide 
whether to pursue a remedy, or they were outright denied a remedy. In some 
instances, participants settled claims for less than contractual entitlement. The 7 
participants who were added outside the original cohort of 80 through referral 
brought the total number of participants accompanied to a redress process to 17. I 
was unable to accompany two participants. 
Of the 24 participants who returned to their employment after making a work related 
complaint, almost all indicated that they did so because they had “no choice” but to 
tolerate the abusive conditions of their employment. The primary fear expressed was 
termination of their employment, with all of the attendant consequences. For some of 
the MDWs, the primary concern was the financial impact on their dependents. A 
premature termination also came at a financial cost to them; new employment meant 
having to pay recruitment fees, while still paying off the debt incurred from the fees 
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paid to secure the employment that was terminated.  16 of the 24 MDWs had been 
employed for 2 years or less; 7 had been with their employer between 3-4 years; and 
1 over 4 + years. Those who fell into that first category expressed the need to 
complete the 2-year contract to mitigate the higher recruitment fee.  
Of the 17 MDWs in the study that were terminated but filed no claims, 12 were paid 
their outstanding entitlements by the employer. 1 MDW received airfare only after 
being convinced by the employment agency that she was not entitled to the 10 days 
wages (the length of the employment) because she (the MDW) terminated the 
contract. This position taken by the employment agency was despite the fact that the 
MDW had been the victim of an assault by the employer. 1 MDW decided to file a 
complaint at a later date after she had secured another employment contract. 2 
MDWs left without pursuing any claims because they prematurely terminated the 
contract. They had previously given the required one-month’s notice but then agreed 
to extend their arrangement for an additional three months. Unable to complete that 
agreement due to the conditions of their employment made them liable to pay 
WILON, the cost of which negated any outstanding wages owed. 1 decided to forego 
her final wages of $5,316 after she was threatened with criminal charges/arrest over 
an incident that occurred four months prior to termination. It did not appear that the 
threat was a legitimate one and may have been intended to achieve the result that it 
did.   
17 participants were accompanied to the three redress forums, Conciliation, MECAB 
or Labour Tribunal, with the following results: 
• 4 participants withdrew from the process: 1 participant was convinced by the 
Conciliation Officer into withdrawing. She was told by the Conciliation 
Officer that a failure to withdraw would likely result in the employer filing a 
case of assault against her. This was an unsubstantiated claim by the 
employer, which had been previously reported. The second participant 
withdrew because of the length of time the resolution process was taking. A 
third withdrew after being paid by the employer. The employer resolved the 
dispute when she learned that the MDW had requested a review of the 
manner in which the police were investigating a criminal case of assault 
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alleged against her (the employer) by the MDW. The fourth MDW withdrew 
her complaint after finding a new employer. 
• 2 participants were unsuccessful in their claims at MECAB: The MECAB 
conclusions were based on the fact that the MDWs could not present 
evidence to substantiate their claims of mistreatment. Following this ruling, 
the 2 MDWs were required to pay the employer WILON, and associated 
costs.  
• 5 participants were successful and awarded their full claims. 
• 6 participants settled their claims for less than they were legally entitled to:  
o A claim of $6,000 was settled for $895 in airfare only, at the Labour 
Tribunal 
o A claim for $13,777 was settled for $5,757 after the employer refused 
to pay $8,020 in severance at Conciliation, and the MDW decided to 
“move on”. 
o A claim of  $6,667 was settled for $760, as compensation for visa 
extensions at the Labour Tribunal. 
o A claim for $6,600 was settled for $3,000 at MECAB 
o A claim for $8,400 was settled for $3,835, less WILON at 
Conciliation (the MDW found new employer) 
o A claim for $16,000 was settled for $12,000, less WILON. The 
reason for this conclusion was the lack of corroborative evidence of 
assault on the worker by the employer. The lack of evidence nullified 
the claim of WILON.  
Eight of these 17 participants were administered questionnaires after completion of 
at least one of the redress processes. In 9 instances, I decided not to pursue any data 
on the redress process out of concern of the negative impact on the participants. The 
practical reality was that going through the redress process had created a lot of stress 
for the participants. Some of these factors included the uncertainty of the redress 
process, the length of time it took in in resolving their claims, the stress of literally 
confronting their employers while maintaining their composure in handling the 
queries of the adjudicating officers. The questionnaire addressed the confidence level 
of the participants in presenting their claim, their motivation in filing the claim and 
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whether they felt the process was fair. The following questions bear mentioning, and 
demonstrate some of the barriers in seeking a remedy. 
How did you feel about presenting your case? 
To this question, four participants indicated that they felt confident in presenting 
their claim and four did not feel confident. In three claims involving the conciliation 
process where there was a lack of confidence, the participants identified language 
barriers as an obstacle when the Cantonese-speaking employer and the Conciliation 
Officer dominated the process, hampering the MDW from understanding what was 
being said. The fourth participant engaged in the Labour Tribunal expressed a lack of 
confidence as she felt the Presiding Officer was dismissive and ‘not listening to her 
argument’. 
Of the other four participants who expressed confidence in presenting their claims, 
two indicated that that it was their right to claim their entitlements, and the third had 
decided to accept a settlement for less than contractually entitled as she had secured 
another employer and wanted to “move on”. The fourth participant, while feeling 
confident, explained that she was frustrated that the Conciliation Officer ‘believed 
the employer’, and she wanted to focus on finding a new employer and so settled for 
less than she was entitled to. 
What was your motivation when you filed your claim? 
One participant expressed that it was a means to a fair hearing about her claim. Two 
participants wanted the employer to live up to the contract and pay what was owed. 
In five claims, participants expressed the desire to have their employer punished for 
violating the contract or treating them poorly. 
Overall, would you say the process was fair? 
Seven participants indicated that the process was not fair, with only one identifying 
the process as fair. 
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9.3 Social and cultural barriers to remedies 
Social and cultural barriers are reflected from wider society and are characteristic of 
the particular jurisdiction, poverty, economic factors, income, inequality gaps, 
ethnicity, nationality, religion, literacy, discrimination and education. 604  These 
overlapping factors are widely identified as obstacles to a remedy605 and, when they 
go unaddressed, result in the disempowerment and lack of awareness of rights and an 
actual or perceived subordination to the more powerful in the community. Due to the 
deep imbalances of power, the stigma and discrimination MDWs suffer, and their 
socioeconomic disadvantages, MDWs often reasonably decide against seeking a 
remedy, thereby precluding any possibility of obtaining justice.606 MDWs may 
choose not to seek justice because they fear reprisal or sanction from more powerful 
actors within or outside their community, or fear being stigmatised or discriminated 
against.607 
This section provides the analysis through case studies of two significant social and 
cultural barriers found in this research. Threats of reprisals from outside the labour 
redress processes such as employers, employment agencies and lack of awareness on 
the part of MDWs have a negative impact on the filing or handling of claims in 
pursuing a remedy. 
9.3.1 Threat of reprisals 
The threat of reprisals includes the intended or unintended consequences of acts of 
the employer and employment agencies that affect the decision making of MDWs 
and deter them from pursuing a remedy. The fear of reprisals stems from the ability 
of the more powerful members of society to impose sanctions or other retributive 
actions on weaker members.608 Reports to the authorities about abusive working 
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conditions can have disastrous consequences. Employers have been known to make 
false accusations of theft, assault and other infractions as a means of terminating the 
MDW without repercussions.609 Employers may also feel the need for retributive 
actions when the abusive treatment of MDWs is exposed, causing embarrassment 
when efforts to maintain the secrecy of their actions are unsuccessful.610 
9.3.1.1 Reprisals by the employer 
Case 5 – Mariah 
Mariah is a 32-year old Filipina who had been working in Hong Kong for 1 year. At 
the time of the interview, Mariah revealed that her employer had assaulted her on 
numerous occasions but ‘today was the worst’. The employer had instructed Mariah 
to boil some water and to use a spoon to transfer the boiling water into a thermos. 
Mariah, fearing that using a spoon could cause boiling water to spill on her hand, 
decided to use a cup to fill the thermos. The employer became angry and yelled at 
Mariah, ‘Why you don’t do what I tell you? Why did not you follow my rules?’ 
Mariah explained that she placed her hands over her ears:	
‘…to stop the yelling. I was so tired of all the shouting. The day 
before was my rest day. She called me six times while I was out. 
She is always doing this. She wakes me up at 4:30 in the 
morning, her excuse is that if she doesn’t tell me what she has to 
say, she might forget. Why must she do that?’  
When Mariah attempted to call the police, the employer blocked her path striking her 
in the head with her elbow and causing her to strike her head on the bedroom door. 
When Mariah again attempted to enter the room, the employer twisted her arm. The 
employer warned Mariah not to report the incident because if she did, the employer 
would put some of her (the employer’s) personal property amongst her belongings 
and accuse her of theft. Mariah eventually retrieved the purse and mobile, took the 
daughter to school and went to the police station to report the incident. The police 
took her statement and then took her to the hospital for an examination. The police 
Detective instructed Mariah to call her employer and advise her that she had reported 
the case to the police and would not be returning to work. 
                                                
609 K-4, Director NGO, K-7 Social Worker 
610 K-6 Deputy Director NGO 
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Five days later, Mariah returned to the employer’s residence to collect her 
belongings accompanied by her sister-in-law. On arrival at the residence, Mariah 
encountered a group of police officers at the residence along with the employer and 
the employer’s attorney. The employer had accused her of theft and assault. The 
police arrested Mariah and took her to the police station where she was 
‘cautioned’.611 The police informed Mariah that if she dropped the case against her 
employer, the employer would not pursue the charges against her. Mariah realising 
that she would not fare well and feeling powerless in the situation agreed. The police 
took two statements from Mariah, one concerning the assault on the employer and 
the other concerning the accusation of theft. When asked by the detective if she 
understood her right and wanted to make any statements, Mariah wrote, ‘yes I 
understand. I have nothing to say and I don’t want to pursue this case’. 
I have been a detective responsible for investigation in major criminal cases and I 
find the statements of Mariah to be important, lending credibility to the quid pro quo 
arrangement she entered into. In both statements Mariah is the suspect and would 
have no ability to decide that she did not want to pursue a case. In these instances, it 
is the employer who would need to make such a statement. Due to the secretive 
nature of this type of employment, Mariah also lacked any corroborative evidence612 
and coupled with the corrupt actions of the police, this factor could not be 
overcome.613 The subtle forms of coercion are highlighted in this case. Mariah’s 
description of the on-going ill treatment, the constant shouting, sleep depravation and 
the constant phone calls reflects the psychological coercion intended to control the 
day to day aspects of the worker’s lives.614 The actions of the employer and the 
police will have negative implications for Mariah when she files her claim for wages 
and other entitlements with the Labour Department. 
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Case 6 – Lynn 
Lynn is a 35-year old Filipino who was terminated by her employer after she decided 
that she would no longer make deliveries for the employer’s contact lens business 
(medium involuntariness), a task outside the scope of her contract. Her employer had 
seized her passport (strong coercion) and she was constantly threatened with 
withholding of wages. For the first 6 months of her employment, Lynn did not have 
any rest days. After refusing to make the deliveries, Lynn continued working for 
another three months. In the latter 3 months, she was allowed only 13 hours rest on 
her rest days. She was not allowed to take rest breaks during the day. After Lynn had 
worked for 9 months the employer notified her that they were terminating her 
contract. Lynn did not receive final wages, airfare, travel allowance, food allowance 
or accrued vacation-pay. In total Lynn intended to claim $5,316. When the employer 
threatened that if a labour claim was filed, they (the employers) would report her to 
the police for child neglect for an alleged incident that occurred during her first week 
of employment. She did not file a claim. Lynn decided that she did not want to 
‘cause any trouble’ and so she returned to the Philippines without filing a claim for 
any contractual entitlements. 
Case 7 – Sophia 
Sophia is a 29-year old Filipina who had been working for her employer for six 
months. On or about the 23 September 2015 Sophia asked her employer if she could 
be allowed to have a holiday on 1 October. She explained that the employer became 
angry at her request and shortly thereafter asked her to ‘pack your things’ 
(termination of contract). Sophia packed her things and was forced to immediately 
find a boarding house where she could sleep and store her belongings. The employer 
instructed her to go to the agency to receive her final contractual entitlements but 
because of the pressing need to find shelter, Sophia did not go to the agency until the 
next day. On arrival at the agency, Sophia was paid her final entitlements except 
‘wages in lieu of notice’ (WILON). Sophia indicated that the agency informed her 
that the employer failed to pay WILON because 4 months earlier, she had cut the 
employer’s daughter’s fingernails too short. Sophia hesitated making a Labour 
Department claim since the employer had told Sophia that if she pursued a claim 
with the Labour Department, she (employer) would file a report with the police 
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claiming mistreatment of her (employer) daughter regarding the fingernail cutting 
incident. The employer also did not provide airfare to Sophia’s ‘place of origin’, 
another contractual obligation of the employer, but the employer was willing to 
provide it on notice of a departure date provided by Sophia. The employer claimed 
that Sophia was the one who terminated the contract. Sophia filed a claim with the 
Labour Department claiming WILON of $4,110. 
In all three cases, the participants shared a real fear of arrest and possible conviction 
for the offenses alleged. This significantly impaired their ability to assess the 
information presented to them and impaired their decision making resulting in 
actions that ultimately frustrated efforts for an effective remedy. Mariah withdrew 
her claim, Lynn did not file a claim even after being advised to do so at the NGOs 
office, and Sophia did pursue a claim and prevailed. 
9.3.1.2 Reprisals by the employment agency 
In the recruitment process of MDWs, the employment agency holds a critical 
position in the movement of workers. Agencies are the link between the employer, 
the worker and the Immigration Department. The influence of the employment 
agencies could be an opportunity for the protection and mitigation of some barriers 
when MDWs claim their rights, since the agency is at the centre of the hiring and 
termination process. Unfortunately, in many instances the agency provides some of 
the barriers to accessing a remedy. It represents both parties in the employment 
contract; they are the representatives of the employer seeking a worker and the 
representatives of the worker seeking an employer, a direct conflict of interest. In the 
event of a dispute concerning abusive working conditions, which party receives the 
benefit of the doubt? The economic benefit to the agency through the chronic 
overcharging of MDWs not only contributes to the MDWs’ conditions of 
employment in violation of the prohibition of forced labour, but also through 
reprisals that directly impacts the MDWs decision to seek a remedy. Four 
participants discussed the practice of agencies charging a higher fee for MDWs who 
do not finish their contracts. 
One Indonesian MDW explained that the policy of the Indonesian Government was 
that Indonesian MDWs were not permitted to change employment agencies, and thus 
there was little or no ability to escape abusive employment situations without 
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expecting some form of retribution. Not only would there be an expectation of higher 
fees for changing employers, but there is also a possibility that the agency may 
refuse to process a new employment contract.615 
The agency also has the ability to influence the termination of MDWs through the ‘3 
for 1’ scheme. Two Key Informants 616  described the scheme as when the 
employment agency promises the employer that they (the agency) will change the 
MDWs up to three times at no additional cost to the employer. This scheme makes it 
easier for the employer to terminate the worker as a form of reprisal; the worker is 
constantly in fear of the threat and the agency boosts its economic rewards by 
supplying a new worker and at the same time requiring additional fees from the 
terminated worker for new employment. 
Case 8 – Aque 
Aque is a 34-year old Filipina who worked for her employer for only 10 days. She 
reported that: she was working 18-hour days (strong involuntariness); was not 
provided with sufficient food (strong coercion); was isolated by lack of 
communication with people outside the employer’s residence (strong coercion); and 
over the short employment period, threatened with assault. She was also subjected to 
demeaning treatment, as she was required to wash her clothing in the bath water 
remaining after her employer had taken her bath. Aque was only allowed to launder 
her bed sheets at 10pm in the parking lot of the residence. 
On the day Aque terminated her contract, she was assaulted by her employer who 
became angry over what was considered poor performance and while scolding Aque 
grabbed her by the arm and twisted it. Aque explained that the employer was very 
demanding and required that her ‘hair pins’ were cleaned one at a time and that the 
floors were mopped six times per day. Aque complained to the agency, since she did 
not know what to do as she was only employed for a short time. The agency 
convinced Aque that she was the one who terminated the contract and was thus not 
entitled to any salary or benefits, only a ticket home. The agency promised Aque that 
they had another employer for her and instructed her to return to the Philippines and 
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wait for her new contract. Seven days after the interview, Aque’s cousin informed 
me that she had returned home to the Philippines without seeking entitlements in 
wages for the 10 days of employment, travel allowance and WILON. Additionally, 
the employer was not prosecuted for assault. 
The actions of the agency in this case suggest that it was intent on protecting the 
employer from arrest. To achieve their aim, they promised Aque that they would 
secure another employer, and ensured that she exited Hong Kong thereby preventing 
a complaint to the police. The need for employment outweighed the need to 
complain about the assault or seek compensation for the days worked. Additionally, 
the agency convinced her that she was the one who terminated the contract, that 
would mean that Aque would have to pay the employer WILON (1-month wages) 
for early termination, a cost Aque could not afford. Surprisingly, Aque followed the 
instruction of the agency rather than the advice of the NGO, which would have been 
to make a complaint of assault. 
9.3.2 Lack of awareness by MDW 
A lack of understanding and awareness on the part of MDWs of remedy procedures 
and their rights in applicable hearings makes it difficult to realise a remedy to their 
complaints. During the interview process, it was evident that many MDWs were not 
fully aware of their contractual obligations and rights.617 The assistance provided by 
NGOs provides a significant improvement, but when MDWs are asked about their 
claims or to explain how it is based in the Labour Ordinance or their contracts in 
administrative and judicial proceedings they are unable to do so. Five of eight Key 
Informants provided similar assessments of this finding.618 
Case 2 – Jenny 
In the case of Jenny (see Section 0), she resorted to memorising her statement 
provided to the Labour Department at filing, but when asked about specific elements 
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of her case, Jenny could not explain. Similarly, the cases below demonstrate this lack 
of understanding of laws, policy and contractual elements by MDWS that affects 
their ability to present their claims effectively. 
Case 8 – Aque 
Aque (see Section 0), like Jenny, was unaware of her rights and was convinced by 
the employment agency that she was the one that terminated the contract even 
though she was assaulted. She was convinced to return to the Philippines without 
wages and other entitlements. 
Case 9 – Jaz 
Jaz was a 31-year old Filipina who had been working for her employer for 23 
months. She was working 17-hour days, subjected to psychological coercion through 
demeaning language when the employer constantly called her a stupid, crazy Filipino 
and telling her that Filipinos were bullshit. Jaz was also threatened with physical 
violence on several occasions. Sometime between May and June 2015, Jaz’s 
employers were leaving on vacation and sent her to live with their friends and to 
work in their restaurant. Jaz did not feel as though she could refuse, because she was 
only 20 months into her 2-year contract and she feared termination if she 
complained. She knew working at the restaurant was illegal, but she needed to work 
and felt that if she broke the contract it would be difficult to find new employment in 
Hong Kong. She explained that MDWs who break their contracts are seen as ‘trouble 
makers’ by agencies and employers and agencies will charge higher agency fees. 
When asked why she eventually terminated her contract, Jaz stated that she was 
afraid that the immigration authorities would arrest her for working outside her 
contract. 
Jaz filed a claim with the Labour Department and, in late August 2015, a conciliation 
meeting was scheduled. I attended the meeting with Jaz. The Conciliation Officer 
began the meeting, explaining that it was intended to establish a framework for 
settlement, that it was not a court and that she had no judicial authority. She was to 
facilitate dialogue between the employer and the MDW. The Conciliation Officer 
asked Jaz to explain her claim against her employer. After Jaz explained the 
conditions in which she was employed, the employer, through the aid of an 
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interpreter, denied Jaz’s account and accused her of filing the claim to remain in 
Hong Kong. The employer further explained that he had provided airfare in the form 
of a ticket in accordance with his contractual obligations. The Conciliation Officer 
then asked Jaz to explain why she did not use the ticket and leave Hong Kong. Jaz 
seemed confused, and told the Officer that she had the right to remain in Hong Kong 
for 14 days. The Conciliation Officer asked to be excused from the room and left, 
returning after approximately 10 minutes. On her return to the meeting, the 
Conciliation Officer produced a copy of Immigration policy relating to the ability to 
remain in Hong Kong after termination and began reading it to Jaz. The Conciliation 
Officer explained to Jaz that while she had the ability to remain in Hong Kong, it 
was not a right and that she should have used the ticket provided and left Hong 
Kong. At this point Jaz became emotionally incapacitated and turned to me and 
asked, ‘sir, what should I do?’ The Conciliation Officer turned to me and nodded, 
encouraging a response. I felt compelled to assist and, being familiar with the claim, 
I explained that the main issue was that the employer was obligated under the 
contract to provide airfare to the worker’s place of origin. The ticket provided was 
from Hong Kong to Manila and Jaz would need another flight to get home, so 
accepting the ticket from the employer could have been a tacit acceptance that the 
employer’s obligation had been fulfilled. Jaz was simply claiming the appropriate 
airfare to her home. The employer protested for another hour but, on convincing 
from the Conciliation Officer, finally agreed and paid Jaz’s claim with a request that 
she apologise to his wife who had become very fond of Jaz. The Conciliation Officer 
explained that she could not ask Jaz to agree to an apology, and that the request was 
unrelated and not within the scope of the services provided by the Labour Relations 
Division. 
Jaz’s case, while demonstrating the lack of awareness about her rights, also shows 
that conciliation is not necessarily concerned with the law (Labour Ordinance) and is 
focused on settling the claim at hand.619 The Conciliation process was not concerned 
with the merits of the claim.620 There was no initial interrogation of what Jaz’s 
concerns were, and the initial focus was on why Jaz wanted to remain in Hong Kong. 
                                                
619 Genn, ‘What is civil justice for? Reform, ADR and access to justice’ p.411 
620 Ibid  
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The priority of the process was on the parties willingness to settle and reach an 
agreement they both could live with,621 but the parameters were framed by the 
position of the employer. This case also demonstrated the element of language 
barriers. The employer spoke Korean, and was accompanied by a translator. The 
translation was into Cantonese to communicate with the Conciliation Officer. The 
Conciliation Officer was then required to translate the dialogue into English so Jaz 
and I could follow the conversation. Jaz’s preferred language is Tagalog. This 
language barrier created two problems. First, the numerous translations and 
interpretations may well have not accurately conveyed the original message. Second, 
there was no way for Jaz or me to know if everything that was being conveyed by the 
employer was being translated to us. 
9.4 Institutional barriers to remedies 
Institutional barriers are linked to governmental policy and dedicated resources to the 
structure and operation of the country’s justice and dispute resolution systems.622 
These barriers exist as a result of inadequate or non-existent legal frameworks, 
inadequate administrative structures lacking resources or effective management, 
limited judicial capacity, and inadequate training of the judiciary and other officials 
resulting in poorly reasoned, inconsistent and biased decisions. Other factors concern 
the lack of diligence in recognising rights-holders and recording complaints that 
affect vulnerable groups and lead to the impunity of perpetrators of violations, in 
contrast to victims who are disregarded or mistreated.623 
Most of the barriers identified fell into this category and included a lack of legal 
frameworks, a lack of access to authorities linked to government policy, a lack of 
representation, a lack of awareness on the part of the government, a lack or 
corroborative evidence, a lack of awareness or recognition on the part of 
administrative and judicial decision makers, and a lack of enforcement of decisions. 
                                                
621 Ibid  
622 J Beqiraj and L McNamara, International Access to Justice: Barriers and Solutions (Bingham 
Centre for the Rule of Law Report 02/2014, International Bar Association, October 2014) 
623 Ibid 
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9.4.1 Lack of legal framework 
The legal framework provides the foundation on which the effective preventive and 
redress measures are built, and mitigates socio-cultural, institutional and structural 
barriers to adopt holistic approach.624 An effective legal framework is essential and 
must criminalise forced labour, provide clear definitions, give avenues for protection, 
and support appropriate and proportionate penalties.625 These legal frameworks must 
also include regulatory systems and monitoring schemes to prevent or stop 
violations.626 
When accompanying participants to redress processes and evaluating the inability of 
many others in accessing a remedy, the most significant and glaring gap was the lack 
of any legislative measures criminalising forced labour (see Chapter 2). All cases 
that proceeded to conciliation, MECAB or Labour Tribunal regardless of the 
working conditions and circumstances described, were treated as a labour disputes 
and the focus was solely on reaching a monetary settlement. In some cases, the 
participant was successful and awarded the claim amount and in some cases, they 
settled for less than their entitlement. Although Hong Kong is bound to the Forced 
Labour Convention and the prohibition of forced labour has been incorporated 
domestically627 using the language directly from the ICCPR, no further steps have 
been taken to give effect domestically. This lack of a legal framework provides no 
basis for the recognition, investigation, prosecution or punishment of violators.628 
Even when the claims of MDWs pointed to violations of the Labour Ordinance or 
Employment Contract, in none of the 17 claims I attended was the employer 
sanctioned in any manner. 
                                                
624 Sepulveda Carmona, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights: 
Access to Justice’ 
625 Andrevski, Larsen and Lyneham, ‘Barriers to trafficked persons’ involvement in criminal justice 
proceedings: an Indonesian case study’ 
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627 Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, CAP. 383, Article 4 
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In a recent High Court case in the Hong Kong,629 the government argued that there 
were sufficient existing laws to provide a framework to combat trafficking and 
forced labour. In the government’s assertion, it was presented that: 
‘Although Hong Kong does not have a single piece of legislation 
dealing with human trafficking, or forced labour as such, we do 
have a comprehensive and solid legislative framework to deal 
with various conduct encompassed within the definition of TIP 
in the Palermo Protocol, which includes forced labour. 
Moreover, the HKSARG has in place a system of 
comprehensive and multi-faceted administrative and operational 
measures to deal with the issue in practice’.630 
The Judge disagreed with the government’s argument, having considered the 
jurisprudence of other forced labour and human trafficking cases in Europe631 and 
included in his ruling that: 
‘There is a specific prohibition against a form of conduct and yet 
there is no legislation that criminalises it. Claims are made that 
features or symptoms of the prohibited conduct are addressed by 
existing criminal or regulatory offences, but the real mischief is 
not being criminalised as required. There is no law that prohibits 
slavery or trafficking in slavery, servitude or trafficking in 
servitude, and forced labour or trafficking in forced labour’.632 
In this regard, Hong Kong is not fulfilling its positive obligation to give effect 
domestically to the rights enshrined in the ICCPR or the Forced Labour Convention 
No.29. To fully discharge its obligations, it must ensure the protection of all 
individuals against violations, not only from its agents but also from private people 
or entities.633 The incorporation of the ICCPR and the Forced Labour Convention 
into the Basic Law of Hong Kong is insufficient, as steps must be taken to establish 
whether a violation has occurred and to redress the violation.634 The lack of legal 
frameworks does not absolve Hong Kong from responsibility; this understanding is 
                                                
629 ZN v Secretary for Justice and Others, HCAL15B/2015  
630 Ibid para. 300 
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made clear in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.635 Hong Kong is also 
responsible for providing reparations for human rights violations. Without 
reparations, the obligation to provide an effective remedy is not discharged.636 
In response to questions submitted to the Director of Public Prosecution on whether 
there had been any prosecutions or cases of forced labour in Hong Kong since 2013, 
the response was that there were no statistics on prosecution of cases of forced 
labour.637 The response to an additional question on whether there was any specific 
legislation criminalising forced labour was: 
‘Although there is not a single comprehensive piece of anti-
human trafficking legislation, different forms of human 
trafficking or human exploitation are covered by various existing 
common law and statutory offences, which prohibit a wide range 
of criminal conduct such as assault, intimidation, blackmail and 
establishing a vice establishment, etc., and to that extent prohibit 
a broad range of underlying criminal conduct that may be 
categorised as forced labour’.638 
9.4.2 Access to authorities and redress 
Access to authorities such as courts, police stations and government organisations 
are not hampered by geography,639 but by government policy that MDWs live-in 
with their employers who control their daily existence and movement. MDWs 
needing assistance are primarily limited to their day off to access support service 
providers (NGOs). MDWs experiencing problems may be unable to seek advice or 
assistance from government organisations since they are unable to leave their places 
of employment during the workweek.640 This constraint also impacted this research 
with the majority of participants interviewed on their day-off. In addition to the 
restriction of movement in seeking assistance from governmental agencies during 
normal working hours, MDWs are also exposed to similar unfamiliar environments 
                                                
635 United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties , 23 May 1969, United Nations, Treaty 
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639 Sepulveda Carmona, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights: 
Access to Justice’ 
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encountered when seeking help from NGOs. Access to adjudicatory tribunals is also 
controlled by government policy. MDWs seeking remedies for labour rights 
violations are required to schedule a conciliation meeting with their employers on 
filing a claim for final contractual entitlements. 
Although the conciliation process is voluntary, all 17 people that I accompanied 
attended or attempted conciliation, viewing it as a first step even when termination 
included assaults on the MDW. For a variety of reasons, the MDWs settled; some 
because they couldn’t afford to wait for resolution, some withdrawing their claims or 
considering withdrawing, and some withdrew because of coercive actions by actors 
inside and outside the system. 
9.4.3 A lack of representation 
Lack of representation presents a significant barrier to MDWs who are not versed in 
the Hong Kong Labour Ordinance or, at times, their own employment contract. The 
inability to be represented or accompanied by someone who can effectively present 
their case puts MDWs at a disadvantage because, within the redress process, neither 
party is allowed legal counsel. This factor is not mitigated by the NGOs’ provision 
of statements and affidavits, since MDWs must still accurately articulate those facts 
contained within their statements which, rooted in labour law and the interpretation 
of labour laws, may be too technical or beyond them. Representation goes beyond 
the redress process and extends to instances of contact with the police, whether as a 
victim or suspect, the Immigration Department or at the Labour Department. The 
case below will provide an example of how the lack of representation hampers the 
ability to effectively present a claim and can have a negative effect and produce an 
inappropriate outcome of a claim. Again, this barrier is also linked to the lack of 
awareness on the part of the MDW and the third parties within the resolution process 
that are unaware of or disregard the disadvantaged position of MDWs. 
The problem with the lack of representation is that even when a MDW knows their 
case, when it is their time to speak they’re not able.641 The process in MECAB and 
the Labour Tribunal is that it ‘…is supposed to be informal but the court requires 
                                                
641 K-5 Deputy Director NGO. 
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formal evidence, documents and the procedure is foreign to MDWs’.642 If MDWs are 
allowed representation, many of the barriers could be mitigated. The consensus of 
five of the key informants is that MDWs do not fare well without assistance.643 The 
pressure to settle in all resolution forums may be overcome with representation. 
9.4.3.1 Case 2 – Jenny 
Jenny’s claim (see Sections 0 and 0) was transferred to the Labour Tribunal. Jenny 
was assisted by the NGO in providing a statement to the Tribunal when she filed her 
claim. I was provided a copy of the statement, and the crux of the complaint relied 
on two elements of the Labour Ordinance: 
• The employer must make payment of wages directly to the employee. 
• A Hong Kong employment agency may not charge more than 10% of the 
employee’s first month’s wages as a recruitment fee. 
Since Jenny’s employer withheld wages from Jenny’s salary and made the payments 
to the employment agency, Jenny claimed against the employer as she claimed that 
she did not give the employer permission to deduct any money or make payments to 
the agency. Furthermore, the amount of $6,667 deducted was above the legally 
allowed recruitment fee (at the time $410). Jenny could not articulate the reasons for 
her claim and resorted to memorising her statement in anticipation of the hearing. 
In late October, Jenny attended the hearing and, when asked to explain her claim, she 
had difficulty explaining to the Presiding Officer the grounds for her claim. She 
referred to being mistreated by her current employer, and by employers in the past. 
She discussed her family in the Philippines and then suddenly appeared to remember 
to mention that she did not give permission to her employer to deduct money from 
her wages and forward it to the employment agency. 
The employer repeated her statement from the earlier MECAB hearing, where she 
had told the Tribunal that she tried to encourage the employment agency’s owner to 
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come to court and explain the fees but ‘they did not want any part of this case 
because they know it is illegal to charge the helper the money’. 
The Presiding Officer spent a significant amount of time trying to convince both 
parties to settle the claim. The employer initially refused, but was eventually 
persuaded by the Presiding Officer to agree to settle. Once the employer agreed, the 
Presiding Officer turned to Jenny and explained to her:	
‘you the claimant may win in the Labour Tribunal but, the 
employer may file against the agency in small claims court. The 
agency will file against you claimant, and if (you) out of the 
country, judgment may be entered in your absence and may 
affect your ability to work in Hong Kong’.  
The Presiding Officer never addressed or relied on the Labour Ordinance and did not 
address the fact that the employer admitted to transferring the wages to the agency 
and that she (employer) knew from conversations that the amount was illegal. 
Jenny appeared confused and dispirited, and she eventually agreed to settle the claim 
of $700 to cover the cost of four visa extensions. The employer, however, was 
directed to provide copies of the receipts from the employment agency to Jenny so 
she could seek assistance from the Philippine Consulate in recovering the 
recruitment fee. 
Jenny’s inability to understand and argue her claim could not overcome the Presiding 
Officer’s position on the matter. The illegality of the recruitment fee was never 
addressed, not even as a means of educating the employer. The Labour Tribunal is 
part of the judiciary and has the power to compel the employment agency owner to 
appear, but this was never presented as an option. The caution to Jenny that the 
agency may claim against her even in her absence removed any hope that she would 
prevail in the Labour Tribunal and she agreed to settle the claim. The employer 
similarly did not appear to understand the implications of her actions, and may also 
have benefitted from representation. 
9.4.4 Lack of government awareness 
The lack of awareness of government officials at all stages has a significant effect on 
the pursuit and handling of remedies. Government officials failed to recognise 
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violations of forced labour and resolved the complaints in a forum inappropriate and 
ineffective for the nature and gravity of the violation. In no claim where I 
accompanied participants to resolution forums, did any Conciliation Officer, 
Adjudication Officer or Presiding Officer make any analysis of the conditions of the 
employment, or make any determination whether a more serious violation than a 
labour violation was occurring. 
In addition to the lack of recognition of forced labour in the Tribunals, two places 
where significant gaps appear are the response of the police to initial termination 
disputes where the employer of MDW seeks assistance, and at the border crossing 
into Mainland China. The police, as the first point of contact, in many instances lack 
the awareness to recognise forced labour or forms of exploitation and the 
immigration officers at the border allow MDWs to cross frequently to and from 
China without question. The frequency with which some MDWs make the crossing 
should draw the attention of immigration officials for two obvious reasons. First, 
MDWs are not allowed to work outside the employer’s residence and frequent 
crossing should be a ‘red flag’. Second, MDWs as a group are vulnerable to 
trafficking and a part of the government’s due diligence to prevent forced labour or 
exploitation, mechanisms should be implemented to detect frequent crossing and to 
determine the purposes and voluntariness of the travel. 
The cases below highlight the response and impact of the lack of awareness in the 
police response and the Immigration officials. 
9.4.4.1 Case 10 – Angel 
Police first point contact 
Angel was one of the additional seven participants who were only accompanied to 
the redress process. She explained that she decided to terminate her contract out of 
frustration that her employer was never satisfied with the quality of her work. A 
separate assessment of Angel’s circumstances determined that she was a victim of 
forced labour under the dimension of ‘inability of leaving’. The circumstances of this 
case support a finding that a MDW may be employed and not be in forced labour 
while working (work and life under duress), but may be classified as being in forced 
labour under the work dimension of ‘inability of leaving’. Had this case been part of 
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the initial group of participants, it would have been classified as forced labour under 
the dimension ‘work and life under duress’. 
Angel was a 25-year old woman from Indonesia. She had been working for her 
employer for four months. During her employment, Angel worked 18-hours per day 
(strong involuntariness), her passport was held by the employment agency (strong 
coercion), and she made payments to cover her recruiting fees of $2,145 per month 
for a period of six months. Angel was isolated by the denial of the use of 
communication devices and was unable to contact her family during the four months 
she was employed (strong coercion). Angel had no privacy, as there were six CCTV 
cameras in the residence, with one in the kitchen where she was made to sleep. In 
August 2015, Angel gave her employers the required one month’s notice. When 
Angel produced the notice to her employer, she refused to sign it. The employment 
agency staff told Angel that it was not a problem and that the employer did not have 
to sign; she just needed to provide the notice. 
In early September 2015, the employer received a call from the Immigration 
Department attempting to determine if Angel was terminating her contract. Angel 
assumed that the employment agency had notified the Immigration Department. On 
receiving the call, the employer became angry and told Angel that if she wanted to 
leave, she had to provide a new ‘notice letter’. Angel refused to write a new letter 
and the employer then demanded she pay them (employer) one month’s salary for 
premature termination of the contract. When Angel refused to provide a new notice 
or to make any payment, the employer called the police and told Angel she would be 
reported for theft of $20. 
During the first month of employment, Angel needed to ‘top up’ her mobile phone 
but did not have cash at the time. She decided to use the employer provided ‘Octopus 
card’644 to top up the phone. She later explained that she had reimbursed the 
employer with cash shortly after topping up her phone. At this stage Angel is in a 
forced labour situation. She has given the proper one-month notice as required 
indicating that she no longer wants to continue working for the employer 
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(voluntariness). The employer refusing to recognise Angel’s right to terminate the 
contract and demanding a new notice of termination that would extend the 
employment by at least one month,645 is demanding payment from Angel and 
threatening arrest (strong Coercion) and has not paid angel any outstanding wages 
and other entitlements (penalty). 
When the police arrived at the residence, they told Angel not to worry after she 
explained that the money was repaid and the incident was ‘old already’. The police 
then tried to convince Angel that she should sign a letter the employer had drafted 
and pay them the one-month salary. After 3 hours, Angel reported that another police 
officer arrived and urged her to sign the letter and pay the employer so she could 
leave the house and later claim to the Labour Department. Angel finally signed the 
letter and paid the employer $1,600 in cash that she had from her previous month’s 
salary, and only then was she allowed to leave. 
Angel filed a claim against the employer with the Labour Department for a total of 
$3,918. At the time of filing, Angel was told that if she wanted to recover the $1,600 
she had paid to the employer, she would have to file a separate claim with the Small 
Claims Tribunal. Angel was scheduled for a conciliation meeting in late September, 
but the employer did not attend. The claim was then scheduled for a hearing at the 
MECAB in mid-October, but again the employer did not attend. On 21 October, I 
received a call from Angel indicating that she would no longer pursue he claim and 
that she had already travelled to Macau to seek new employment as she needed to 
work, and waiting for her claim would take too long. 
The lack of awareness by the police exacerbated the situation, as they were unable to 
recognise the crime of forced labour and their encouragement to sign a termination 
letter and pay the employer made it more difficult for Angel to realise a remedy. The 
letter could be used in any hearing as proof that Angel prematurely terminated the 
contract although she had provided the proper notice of termination. This lack of 
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awareness and improper handling of calls for assistance from MDWs contribute to 
violations of labour rights and a cycle of impunity on the part of employers.646 
9.4.4.2 Immigration checkpoint 
Case 11 – Judy 
Judy was a 42-year old Filipina who had been employed for two months with her 
employer. She described working 18-hour days (strong involuntariness) and had 12 
hours rest on her days off. She was isolated while in her employer’s residence, and 
was prohibited from using any communication devices or speaking to others in the 
neighbourhood (strong coercion). Judy was being paid $3,100 instead of the 
minimum allowable wage of $4,210, a shortfall of $1,110. She slept on the living 
room sofa with no privacy because there was a CCTV camera in the room. When she 
asked her employer about the legality of working in China, her employer told her 
‘…don’t worry is ok’. Judy explained that she did not feel she could negotiate terms 
of employment, and since she had paid 70,000 pesos in agency fees, she could not 
afford to process a new employer. When asked if she thought of leaving the 
employment, she explained that she thought about leaving but was afraid of losing 
her salary owed. 
In the two months of her employment, Judy had been taken across into Mainland 
China 4 times for approximately one week each time. In China, Judy was locked 
inside the residence, was not allowed to go outside, not allowed to use her mobile, 
not allowed to speak with neighbours, had no rest days, and was not provided with 
sufficient food. At the time of interview (6 August 2015) Judy complained that her 
arms were weak from cleaning the floor with small pieces of cloth with her hands. 
When she had complained to her employer about her weak hands, she was taken to 
the hospital but was told that that was her rest day. On 7 August Judy was again 
taken to China to work at the employer’s parents’ residence. On 8 August, I received 
a call from Judy who was in China. She informed me that she was terminated 
because the employer’s parents felt that she was not cleaning the floor well. She also 
informed me that her employer was on the way to pick her up and bring her back to 
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Hong Kong. After the phone call from China I did not have the opportunity to 
interview her again. 
Another participant relayed similar circumstances. When directed to remain in China 
indefinitely, she feared she would be left in China and became emotionally 
distraught. The employer reconsidered his instruction and she returned to Hong 
Kong. On return to Hong Kong the employer terminated her, paid all outstanding 
wages and contractual entitlements, so there was no need to file a claim. 
Both instances, the first where multiple crossings occurred within two months of 
being employed and the second case after being employed for only three weeks, 
should have raised questions about the MDWs travel to China by immigration 
control at the border crossing. MDWs have visas specific to the nature of their work, 
and Hong Kong identification cards numbers for MDWs begin with a two-letter 
designation (WX) to identify the holder as a MDW. The underlying principle of how 
states are required to ensure protection against future violations is by raising 
awareness, educating members of key government sectors about indicators on 
trafficking, and to establish institutional mechanisms to deter and to identify 
violations.647 This proactive preventive measure obligates Hong Kong SAR ‘…to 
ensure the principles of human rights throughout its entire ‘legal, political and 
institutional system’. 648 The state must organise its government in such a manner 
that all institutions are capable of ensuring that individuals can fully enjoy rights 
granted to them, 649  and to be free of exploitation, forced labour and human 
trafficking. 
Both cases raise the issue of due diligence in protecting domestic workers across the 
border into China. Even though Hong Kong is a part of China, to work in China a 
MDW would need a visa. Therefore, work being done in China by MDWs contracted 
to Hong Kong would be illegal. In Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia, the ECtHR held 
that the Cypriot authorities were aware that women were being trafficked across the 
border to Russia for the purposes of prostitution. The Council of Europe 
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Commissioner of Human Rights noted the absence of immigration policy and 
legislative shortcomings that encouraged trafficking to Cyprus, and the visa regime 
that facilitated the movement of women as cabaret artistes did not provide practical 
and effective protection.650 It was further determined that the Cypriot authorities 
were aware of the practice and the immigration authorities tolerated it, thereby 
violating their positive obligation to take protective measures. Similarly, Russia had 
programmes in place to educate the public about trafficking to Cyprus and was 
unaware of circumstances that gave rise to a credible suspicion to take operational 
measures. Therefore, no fault was attributed to the Russian authorities in either their 
obligations to implement appropriate legislative and administrative frameworks or to 
take protective measures. 651  However, the Russian authorities were found in 
violation of their duty  (Article 4 European Convention on Human Rights) to 
investigate potential trafficking to Cyprus.652 
By extension, Hong Kong similarly has a duty under the Forced Labour Convention 
at a minimum to implement legislative and administrative frameworks, take 
protective measures to prevent MDWs being exploited by being taken across the 
border to work in China and, considering the frequency of travel, to investigate the 
possibility that MDWs are being forced to work in China against their will. 
9.4.5 Lack of corroborative evidence 
Lack of corroborative evidence significantly hampers the pursuit of a remedy. 
MDWs are frequently the only ones able to recount the abuses and circumstances of 
their employment or termination, ‘…yet their testimony is often not enough to meet 
the burden of proof or credibility for prosecution or benefit of doubt’.653 This lack of 
evidence negatively affects the MDWs and at times results in awards against them as 
the burden of proof is placed on them to satisfy any claim against the employer. 
The lack of evidence affects a variety of areas concerning the termination 
circumstances and seeking a remedy. In a purely labour related claim, one of the 
                                                
650 Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia app. No.4239/08 para 291 
651 Ibid para 301 - 306 
652 Ibid para 306 - 309 
653 Andrevski, Larsen and Lyneham, ‘Barriers to trafficked persons’ involvement in criminal justice 
proceedings: an Indonesian case study’ 
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main problems surrounds WILON and this is often one of the most filed 
counterclaims by employers against MDWs.654 Employers frequently avoid paying 
WILON, as there are usually no witnesses to corroborate the MDWs claim that the 
employer is the one that terminated the contract prematurely. A lack of witnesses 
also affects criminal cases where the MDW is the victim, unless there are significant 
injuries as proof.655 
In the case of Mariah (see Section 0), the employer was never arrested for the initial 
complaint of assault. However, Mariah was arrested the very day the employer 
claimed an assault by her. Similarly, Angel (case 10) reported that she had given the 
employer the required one-month’s notice, which the employer denied receiving. 
The responding police officers encouraged Angel to pay WILON to the employer 
and sign a termination letter. The end result of these actions created a de facto 
penalty in the loss of wages without any appropriate process and generated a piece of 
negative evidence that would be difficult for the MDW to overcome at any 
subsequent hearings. 
9.4.5.1 Case 7 – Sophia 
In mid-October, I again accompanied Sophia to the MECAB hearing. At the hearing, 
the Adjudicating Officer asked each party to explain the evidence to support their 
claim. Sophia explained the circumstances surrounding her termination, but had no 
other evidence to produce. She did, however, inform the Adjudicating Officer that 
the employer had CCTV cameras in the residence and the video recordings from the 
cameras should be produced, as it would support her version of events. 
The employer filed a counterclaim for one month’s wages, claiming Sophia 
terminated the contract without notice, and one day’s salary because Sophia took too 
long leaving the residence causing her to miss a day of work. The employer provided 
a video on her mobile phone showing Sophia on the phone calling for a friend to 
come and assist her. The Adjudicating Officer took a short recess to review the video 
and at the same time encouraged the parties to discuss a settlement. During the 
recess, both parties indicated that they were not interested in settling. This hearing 
                                                
654 see section 7.5.3 
655 K4 
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was emotionally taxing on Sophia, as she felt that she could not overcome what she 
described as the ‘employer’s lies’. 
The Adjudicating Officer resumed the hearing and asked if the parties had any other 
evidence to support their case. Both parties indicated that they did not and, at that 
point, the Officer, citing the late hour (the hearing had been going on for four hours) 
and a need for additional evidence, decided to adjourn and give the parties additional 
time to find additional evidence or witnesses to support their claims. The case was 
adjourned until mid-November. 
In November when the case was recalled, the Adjudication Officer again asked the 
parties if the wanted to settle the claim and both parties indicated they did not. The 
Adjudication Officer then indicated that he had reviewed the phone video provided 
by the employer and was able to hear the conversation between Sophia and the 
employer at the time of termination. In the recording, Sophia could be heard saying, 
‘You will have to pay one month salary’. The employer then responded, ‘It’s OK’. 
The Adjudication officer concluded that the employer’s response was an admission 
that she was the one that prematurely terminated the contract. It is worth noting that 
had the employer not provided the video, Sophia might not have been successful in 
her claim. 
9.4.5.2 Case 12 – Rose 
Rose was a 37-year old Filipina who was with her current employer for three years 
and five months. She had over 17 years’ experience, having worked in Singapore, 
Dubai, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Hong Kong. Rose left her employer in late July 
2015, claiming constructive dismissal after her employer physically assaulted her. 
Following the assault, Rose left the residence and went to the hospital where she was 
diagnosed with a contusion to the right shin. Rose later made a police report. 
In early October, Rose was asked to report to the police station as a decision had 
been made as to whether criminal charges would be filed against the employer. I 
accompanied Rose to the police station, where we met with the investigating 
detective and his superior, an Inspector. The Inspector explained that the police had 
concluded the investigation and had forwarded a report to the Prosecutor’s Office, 
resulting in a decision of insufficient evidence to charge the employer. Rose was 
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disappointed and began to cry, but mustered the courage to ask the question ‘why is 
there not enough evidence? Must we, domestic helpers be bleeding or killed before 
there is evidence?’ 
This decision not to prosecute the employer nullified Rose’s claim of constructive 
dismissal and therefore she was unable to claim WILON at the Labour Tribunal. 
9.4.6 Lack of awareness of redress 
MDWs who file claims with the Labour Department provide the opportunity at all 
stages of the claim process and during assistance by the police to assess their 
working and living conditions. MDWs often explain their living conditions and the 
reasons for their termination, which are documented in their detailed statements and 
affidavits, required for filing a claim in MECAB and the Labour Tribunal. At 
conciliation, the circumstances surrounding the employment conditions and reasons 
for termination are only minimally documented. At all stages of the claims process, 
Labour Department officials fail to recognise instances of forced labour, treat the 
instances as a crime, or select a mechanism that is appropriate for the abusive 
treatment exacted on MDWs. This lack of assessment, recognition and appropriate 
redress denies MDWs a remedy consistent with international law and Hong Kong’s 
obligations. The cases below will highlight this lack of awareness and reflects 
information documented in support for her claim. 
9.4.6.1 Case 13 – Citra 
Citra was a 28-year old Indonesian who had been employed in Hong Kong for 3 
months. She was classified as being in forced labour as she reported several 
indicators consistent with the ILO’s established criteria concerning excessive 
recruitment fees, her passport being retained by the recruitment agency. She was 
made to work 16 hours a day and was not provided sufficient food. She was allowed 
8 hours rest on her day off and complained of little sleep as she slept in a ‘storage 
room’ that had no door and provided no privacy. Citra was also instructed to refrain 
from speaking with others in the neighbourhood, and her use of communication 
devices was restricted. She was also physically assaulted by the employer who would 
physically push her around the residence if she (the employer) were unhappy with 
any aspect of Citra’s performance, while calling her ‘crazy’. Citra also reported that 
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she was required to clean the outside of the windows that ‘was very dangerous’ as 
the residence was on the 13th floor. 
Citra filed a claim with the Labour Department after she was terminated in mid-June 
2015, claiming airfare, wages and WILON, putting the monetary value at 
approximately $10,000, within the jurisdiction of the Labour Tribunal if conciliation 
was unsuccessful. On the day of conciliation, the employer agreed to pay airfare and 
salary, but Citra rejected the offer and insisted on WILON since the employer was 
the one who abruptly terminated the contract. In late August 2015, the claim was 
heard in the Labour Tribunal and focused solely on trying to get the parties to settle. 
The employer had filed a counterclaim for WILON against Citra, claiming she 
terminated the contract. 
When Citra was asked to explain her claim and how the contract was terminated, she 
had difficulty, even with the aid of an interpreter. The hearing was conducted in 
Cantonese so I was unable to follow in detail what was being said, but I interviewed 
Citra after the hearing and she provided a recap of what she told the Presiding 
Officer. 
On the day Citra was terminated, she was denied any rest breaks during the day as 
was the custom imposed by the employer. To resist this treatment Citra would eat her 
lunch slowly to get some rest:	
‘Because she no allow me to take rest whole day. Sometimes 
when I eat lunch I take time very long because I can take a rest 
also, she say, ‘why you eat very long?’ She take my plate and 
then she throw in the rubbish bin’. 
Citra continued to explain that the employer scolded her, ‘Don’t waste your time, 
faster eat’. When the employer tried to force Citra to continue working past 10:00 
pm, she refused due to fatigue, and the employer terminated her. 
Citra explained that the Presiding Officer told the employer that she should not have 
filed a claim for WILON against her because she (Citra) felt unsafe. The employer 
provided a video recording to the Presiding Officer that showed her physically 
pushing Citra who was refusing to work past 10:00 pm. 
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She explained that the aggressive behaviour continued over a long period of time 
during which Citra threatened to call the police, and eventually threatened to jump 
from a window if she was not allowed to leave. When the police arrived, they 
intervened and Citra was allowed to leave the residence. 
The Presiding Officer strongly suggested that the parties reach a settlement and the 
employer finally agreed to provide airfare and all the cash she had in her purse, 
which was $895. Citra accepted the offer of settlement. When asked why she decided 
to settle, Citra replied, ‘I just wanted it to be over so I could go home’. 
This case, like so many others, demonstrated a bias in favour of the employer. The 
Presiding Officer, recognising that the employer’s behaviour was inappropriate in 
that it made Citra feel unsafe and that it was also inappropriate to file a counterclaim 
against Citra, did not provide any relief to Citra in finding merit and awarding Citra’s 
claim, even as a labour violation. The Presiding Officer’s handling of this claim 
raises the question of impartiality in the process. The disregard of the facts and 
relevant doctrine diminished the goals of rights vindication and application of the 
law.656 The desire for settlement seemed to be more about getting rid of the claim 
rather than facilitating the exercise and recognition of Citra’s rights.657 The expected 
protection of the more formal Labour Tribunal process658 was absent and supports 
the concern that reliance on settlement processes amounts to unconstitutional 
evisceration of statutory and common-law rights.659 
9.4.7 Lack of enforcement of judgments 
MDWs who go through the redress process at times encounter problems receiving 
awards because the current mechanisms are unable to enforce their decisions. The 
two cases below involve multiple elements of the effect of time on securing a 
remedy and a lack of awareness on the part of those within the administrative redress 
mechanism. However, the cases demonstrate that when employers fail to comply 
                                                
656 Surbin, ‘A Traditionalist Looks At Mediation: It’s Here to Stay And Much Better Than I Thought’ 
p.216 
657 Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema? P.679 
658 Ibid p.679 - 680 
659 Resnik, ‘Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the 
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with the judgments against them, the Adjudicating bodies appears unwilling or 
incapable of forcing compliance and the MDW is further burdened with pursuing 
fulfilment of their awards. 
9.4.7.1 Case 14 – Jean 
Jean was a 35-year old Filipina who had worked for her employer for one year 
before she was prematurely terminated. During her employment, Jean’s passport and 
contract were confiscated by the employer (strong indicator of coercion), she worked 
18-hour days (strong indicator of involuntariness), she was deprived of food (strong 
coercion), and for the entire year of employment, she was only allowed one meal per 
day at dinner, there was ‘no breakfast, no lunch, only dinner’. She was isolated 
(strong coercion) by the mere nature of her job and she was also instructed to refrain 
from speaking with neighbours or others in the neighbourhood. She had wages 
deducted of $1,400 for allegedly damaging the employer’s clothing (strong 
coercion). 
On the day Jean was terminated, the employer had summoned a representative from 
the building management who was told to watch Jean because she was going to be 
terminated. The employer asked Jean to sign a letter but she repeatedly refused to 
sign. The employer then told her that if she was not going to sign the letter, ‘you 
pack your things’. While Jean was packing, six police officers arrived at the 
residence and entered Jean’s room. The police officer instructed Jean to bring all her 
things out of the room so the employer could see what she was packing. The 
employer accused Jean of stealing a ‘Prada’ purse that was to Jean from a friend. 
When contacted, Jean’s friend confirmed Jean’s claim to police. This scenario was 
repeated with another article which Jean was forced to leave behind finally ending 
with the employer’s demand that Jean compensate her $100 for a broken mug. Jean 
informed the police that she had not yet been given her final payments but she was 
told that her employer would settle at the agency the next day. The following day the 
employer did not present herself at the employment agency to meet Jean. The second 
day after she was terminated, the employer sent an unknown man to meet Jean. He 
informed Jean about the amount the employer was willing to pay, and showed a 
plane ticked booked for her to fly five days later. Jean did not agree with the amount 
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the employer was willing to pay and, fearing that accepting the air ticket would 
hamper her chances to collect her contractual entitlements, she refused both. 
In February 2015 Jean filed her claim with the Labour Department with the 
assistance of the NGO. Jean was not paid her final entitlements that were calculated 
at $9,261. On attempting to file her claim, Jean was told by Labour Relations 
Division Officer that she could not claim airfare since her employer had already 
provided it. A conciliation hearing was scheduled for mid-March 2015, but he 
employer did not attend. The Conciliation Officer advised Jean that she would 
contact her within two days and, if the employer could not be contacted, the claim 
would be transferred to the Labour Tribunal. In late March, the claim was transferred 
to the Labour Tribunal and between April and early June, the employer failed to 
show up for Tribunal hearings on three different occasions. On 4 June 2015, the 
Presiding Officer ruled on the claim and awarded Jean $8,164 plus costs of $190. On 
15 June, the employer filed an appeal challenging the award, and the appeal hearing 
was scheduled for 23 July. 
By 19 July, it was six months since Jean’s termination and six months since Jean had 
been unemployed due to the immigration policy. She had a potential new employer 
who was willing to wait, but Jean was unsure how long she would have that benefit. 
The cumulative effect of the length of time, lack of work and the possibility for new 
employment caused Jean to divulge that she was considering abandoning her claim. 
Jean expressed her anxiety to the NGO staff and discussed her intended plan to 
abandon her claim. The NGO staff tried to encourage her not to withdraw, but to 
fight. Jean was visibly upset when she later told me; ‘I need to work. It’s been so 
long. What about my kids in the Philippines? I just want it to be over. Is it my right 
to stop the claim?’ 
On 23 July, the employer again failed to appear for the scheduled appeal hearing and 
the appeal was dismissed. On 27 July, I accompanied Jean to the High Court to 
obtain a copy of the final award needed to provide to the Immigration Department to 
extend her visa on the 28 July. Jean expressed the frustration that she had to extend 
her visa six times at a cost of $198 each time for a total cost of $1,188. Although 
Jean had a claim pending, the Immigration Department extended her visa for only 
one week while awaiting the resolution of her claim. On 29 July, Jean finally picked 
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up the appeal but her employer did not show up for the hearing and would not pay 
the award. Fearing that the employer would not pay the award, Jean contacted the 
Labour Department to ask what options she had in the event the employer refused to 
pay. She was advised if this should occur, she could get the court bailiffs through an 
‘execution order’ to seize the employer’s property, but she would need to provide a 
$12,000 deposit to cover the cost or she could apply to the ‘solvency fund’ for 
payment. Approximately one week later, Jean contacted me to report that her 
employer finally paid the awarded amount. 
Jean was in a forced labour situation. The circumstances of her employment were 
missed by the employment agency, the police in the initial contact, the Labour 
Department Conciliation Officer, the Labour Tribunal Presiding Officer even though 
the circumstances were documented in Jean’s statement when filing her claim. The 
government’s policy that MDWs cannot work while awaiting resolution of their 
claims has the potential to prevent a remedy for even labour claims, the time needed 
to resolution has the same impact when it relates to process or as a tactic by 
unwilling employers to fulfil their contractual obligations. The Labour Department 
resolution mechanisms lack the teeth to force employers to pay awards and finally 
there was a lack of recognition of Jean’s employment conditions as a crime. 
9.4.7.2 Case 12 – Rose 
Rose (see Section 0) lived with her male employer and looked after his six-year old 
daughter. She left her employer in late July 2015, claiming constructive dismissal 
after he physically assaulted her. Rose’s case was complicated, since the employer of 
record on her employment contract was the employer’s ex-partner and mother of his 
child. She had left the residence a year earlier due to domestic violence. 
Rose filed a claim with the Labour Department for $5,410 against her employer and I 
accompanied her to the conciliation meeting in mid-September. The employer 
claimed that he had intended to terminate Rose and presented her with a termination 
letter on the day she left the residence after she claimed he assaulted her. The 
employer then produced a list of damage to appliances that he claimed Rose had 
caused. When questioned about the damaged appliances by the Conciliation Officer, 
the employer admitted that he had never discussed it with Rose. After discussing the 
claim for approximately an hour, the Conciliation Officer asked the employer if he 
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wanted to make an offer to settle. The employer made an offer of $3,600 which Rose 
rejected, and the decision was made to proceed to MECAB. 
In late October, I accompanied Rose to the MECAB hearing. The employer did not 
attend. The Adjudication Officer informed Rose that the notification of the hearing to 
the employer was returned undelivered. Rose was informed that the claim would be 
dismissed and once a valid address was obtained, she should re-file. It was also 
determined that due to the years of service with the employer, Rose was entitled to 
severance pay of an additional $9,000 which would put the claim outside the 
jurisdiction of MECAB and thus, the claim would be transferred to the Labour 
Tribunal. 
Rose eventually discovered the ex-partner’s address, and notice was served on her. 
After several months of the employer failing to show, requesting postponements or 
being ill, Rose eventually prevailed in the Labour Tribunal in February 2016, seven 
months after filing her claim. On 1 March Rose received her award letter of $12,000 
less wages in lieu of notice (WILON). By the end of March, the employer had not 
made payment, and she was encouraged to apply to the ‘insolvency fund’. While 
waiting for the processing of the claim to the insolvency fund, the employer finally 
made payment to the Labour Department in middle of May 2016. In the latter part of 
May, the Labour Tribunal informed Rose that the cheque from the employer could 
not be cashed and Rose would have to go to the police and make a report of fraud. It 
was not until mid-June 2016 that Rose received her award from her employer, 11 
months after she left the job. 
Even after award, time needed to satisfy claims may deter MDWs from a remedy. 
Rose complained constantly about the length of time for resolution of the labour 
claim, but she was determined that the employer would have to pay what was owed. 
She was not going to abandon her claim and was willing to stay in Hong Kong as 
long as it took to remedy the actions of the employer. The frequency with which 
these lengthy types of cases occur, was not ascertained. 
Both Jean and Rose encountered problems in getting the employers to satisfy the 
judgments against them. The employers, almost defiantly, made no diligent efforts to 
comply and the adjudicatory bodies were essentially sidelined, exerting no coercive 
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power to force compliance. Jean and Rose were counselled on what they should do 
to get the employers to comply with the awards. The realisation of a remedy even for 
labour claims is not realised unless the awards of the adjudicating bodies are 
enforced through some more severe sanction if need be.660    
9.4.8 Government policy as reprisals 
In addition to the live-in requirement that places MDWs in a vulnerable position by 
creating multiple dependencies on the employers, domestic workers who have their 
contracts terminated must leave Hong Kong within two weeks of termination.661 The 
‘two-week rule’ is intended to maintain ‘…effective immigration control, preventing 
job-hopping and migrant workers working illegally after the termination of 
contracts’.662 It is one of the factors that impairs the MDW’s ability to make a 
decision on whether to leave forced labour, considering the high costs to migrate for 
employment opportunities in Hong Kong. It also requires repatriation within two 
weeks after termination, which has the same effect as the threat of deportation 
associated with irregular migrants who experience threats of denunciation to the 
authorities, which is considered a strong indicator of coercion.663 If MDWs are 
investigated for job-hopping, it can also affect their ability to secure future 
employment. The ILO considers the exclusion of MDWs from future employment 
opportunities a medium indicator of coercion.664 The cases below highlight this 
issue, and how it affects decision making about seeking a remedy. 
‘The purpose of the ‘two-week rule’ is to provide sufficient time 
for an FDH to prepare for returning to their place of domicile in 
case of pre-mature termination of their contract. On the other 
hand, the rule has also been an effective immigration control 
measure in preventing an FDH from job-hopping or taking 
illegal employment after contract termination’.665 
                                                
660  Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary p.73  
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The ‘two-week rule’ was intended to provide a solution for one issue, but the effect 
on MDWs has not been addressed effectively. The CESCR has noted its concern 
stating:	
‘The Committee is concerned about the unfavourable working 
conditions faced by migrant domestic workers in Hong Kong, 
China, particularly due to the ‘two-week rule’, whereby migrant 
domestic workers have to leave the territory within two weeks 
on termination of their contracts, and the requirement for 
migrant domestic workers to live-in the employing household. 
The Committee regrets that Hong Kong, China, has not taken 
any concrete measures to repeal these rules, and that migrant 
domestic workers are therefore exposed to abuse and 
exploitation’.666 
9.4.8.1 Case 15 – Jackie 
Jacki was a 51-year old Filipina who had been working for her employer for five 
months. Using the established ILO indicators, she was assessed as being a victim of 
forced labour under the dimension ‘work and life under duress’. She was working 
16-hour days (strong involuntariness), was required to work at three other locations 
in violation of her contract (medium involuntariness), was isolated by the restriction 
of communication devices and instruction not to communicate with others in the 
neighbourhood, to include other MDWs (strong coercion), and was constantly under 
intimidation and threat (strong coercion) described as constant shouting667 by the 
employer who always seemed angry. 
The excerpt below is part of the conversation with Jackie: 
Q. Are you comfortable with your work conditions? 
A. No problem 
Q. Do you know it is prohibited working in a location not in 
your contract? 
A. Yes 
Q. Why did you? 
                                                
666 Concluding observations on the second periodic report of China, including Hong Kong, China, and 
Macao, China, UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), E/C.12/CHN/CO/2 
13 June 2014) 
667  United States v Kozminski US (Supreme Court) 487 US 931 (1988) 
  
222 
A. I don’t want argument. 
Q. You’re concerned if you raised the issue of working in 3 
houses there would be an argument? 
A. Yes and possibly early termination. 
Q. Why are you so concerned about termination? 
A. I don’t want to go home. It’s not easy to find a job in Hong 
Kong if you’re terminated. You only have 14 days and if you 
cannot find, you have to go home. Sometimes it is easy, 
sometimes you run out of time. If you’re terminated, the agency 
fee is higher. If finished contract or employer no longer need me 
it is 10%. If I break the contract the fee is higher. 
Q. If you had known about the conditions of this employment, 
would you have taken the job? 
A. Yes, no problem. I come to work but I don’t want shouting. It 
makes me feel she is angry. It scares me. I think she will call the 
police and accuse me of doing something wrong. We are afraid 
of the 14-day rule, it is expensive going back home, paying 
agency again. Even if complain at Labour (Department), no 
action. 
Jackie’s decision-making was influenced by the two-week rule, even though she 
realises she is engaging in employment contrary to the conditions of her employment 
contract. She is willing to perform, albeit illegally, to retain her job because of the 
two-week rule, compounded by the illegality of the employment agency’s practice in 
charging higher recruitment fees for MDWs who do not complete their two-year 
contracts. The rule and the lack of regulation of the employment agencies affects 
Jacki’s decision to even consider seeking a remedy for relief from her conditions of 
employment. 
9.4.9 Excessive delays 
A lengthy remedy process more negatively impacts MDWs. One of the major 
barriers to MDWs seeking a remedy is time. This issue becomes more limiting when 
coupled with the government’s policy that MDWs are not allowed to work while 
pursuing a claim. MDWs either withdraw or considered withdrawing claims because 
of the uncertainty about the length of time for resolution. Of the 17 participants 
accompanied to redress processes, four withdrew their claim, four considered 
withdrawing before prevailing in their claims and six accepted settlements lower 
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than entitled in order to ‘move on’ and secure new employment. Employers often use 
time as leverage in getting MDWs to settle by postponing hearings. The length of 
time to settle also works against the MDWs who must bear the cost of visa renewals. 
9.4.9.1 Case 16 – Ellen 
Ellen was a 50-year old Filipina who had been working for her current employer for 
three years and five months. She was considered to be a victim of forced labour as 
she revealed during the interview that was frequently assaulted by the employer 
(strong coercion). She was not provided with sufficient food (strong coercion) and 
was required to work in two additional houses (medium involuntariness). Ellen was 
terminated abruptly at the end of June 2015, but her final wages were not 
immediately paid. Ellen was forced to file a claim with the Labour Department and 
was scheduled for a conciliation meeting on 20 July. Due to the requirement that she 
leave Hong Kong within 14 days (2-week rule), Ellen was required to extend her visa 
on 14 July, at a cost of $198, which allowed her to remain until the 29 July. Ellen’s 
claim totalled $13,777, which included severance pay based on the number of years 
she was employed by the same employer. On 20 July, the employer agreed to pay all 
final entitlements except the severance pay, which amounted to Ellen being offered 
$5,757 to settle her claim. Ellen expressed the view that the resolution of her claim 
might take too long and	
‘I feel the period of 14 days I am allowed to stay here is very 
short for me to find another job which I must need to do. I think 
I will be troublemaker and might not be good for my new 
employer’. 
On 24 July, I received a call from Ellen indicating that she was withdrawing her 
claim and accepting the employer’s offer. She explained that, ‘it will take too long 
for this case. I must take care of my family so I need to focus on a new employer. 
This will hamper me processing a new employer’. Ellen returned to the Philippines 
on the 27 July relinquishing $8,020 in severance pay. 
9.4.9.2 Case 7 – Sophia 
To pick up from where we left off, (see Section 0), in mid-November, the hearing 
resumed and Sophia indicated that she had no other evidence to provide. The 
employer provided a series of printouts of text messages she claimed were sent 
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between the employment agency and Sophia. The messages purported to show that 
Sophia intended to terminate the contract and included in the messages were 
warnings to Sophia about the employer’s dissatisfaction with her performance. The 
employer also informed the MECAB that Sophia’s performance was unsatisfactory. 
The Adjudicating Officer countered her assertion by asking why did she not report 
the unsatisfactory performance of Sophia in the notification to Immigration about the 
termination, and the reason for termination. The employer responded that she did not 
understand how to fill out the notification and she did not know Sophia would file a 
claim. The Adjudicating Officer again decided to adjourn to consider the additional 
evidence, and instructed both parties to return in early-December for his decision. 
Again, this hearing was emotionally draining for Sophia, who had to be comforted 
by another MDW who had accompanied her to the hearing. Sophia was also 
concerned about the length of time the process was taking and was constantly 
assessing whether she should discontinue the process. 
In early December, I again accompanied Sophia to the MECAB hearing. At the 
beginning of the hearing, the Adjudication Officer again asked if there was any 
additional evidence to be presented. After both parties indicated there was not, the 
Adjudication Officer again asked the parties to consider settlement so they would not 
have to return an additional time. Both parties indicated that they did not want to 
settle. The Officer later found in favour of Sophia and awarded her the one-month’s 
WILON, the cost of airfare, and costs for a total of $5,310. The Officer justified his 
decision on the video recording provided by the employer. In the video, Sophia could 
be heard telling the employer that she would have to pay ‘the one month salary’ 
(WILON) to which the employer responds, ‘no problem’ indicating that the 
employer was the one that terminated Sophia without notice. 
These two cases demonstrate the dilemmas of MDWs when faced with the 
possibility of lengthy periods of time to resolve their claims. In Ellen’s case, she was 
terminated at the end of June and within a month’s time, she settled for less than 
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entitled. The employer received a clear advantage from the process by not having to 
pay the full amount owed.668 
In Sophia’s case she endured approximately four months to realize the successful 
resolution of her claim.  During the four months, Sophia considered withdrawing her 
claim could not afford to lose the month’s wages being claimed. Since the video that 
ultimately supported Sophia’s claim was received by MECAB in October, the delay 
seemed unnecessary.  
The delays fail to take into consideration the special urgency of cases involving 
individuals living on the economic margins669 and the need for the adjudicating 
bodies to exercise the necessary force to enforce judgments to ensure an effective 
remedy is realised.670 
9.4.10 Fees of cost and claiming 
MDWs encountered fees for filing claims and renewing visas as there are restrictions 
on their stay after termination. These fees of $198 per extension are burdensome, as 
government policy prohibits employment while MDWs are engaged in claims for 
final entitlements. The fees for counterclaims by employers are also a deterrent to 
MDWs filing claims, who are already sceptical of the resolution process and aware 
of the existing imbalances and low expectation of their success. The possibility of 
losing to an employer who files a counterclaim where the unsuccessful party is often 
required to pay the legal costs of the prevailing party is unaffordable for MDWs, and 
acts as a disincentive.671 Employment agencies also charge higher recruitment fees to 
place MDWs who do not complete their two-year contract. 
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9.5 Structural barriers to remedies 
Structural barriers are less clearly attributable to social-cultural or intersectional 
barriers. Rather, they are characterised as operating at the very intersection of 
societies and their justice institutions.672	
The structural perspective focuses on the interdependent aspects of society or 
culture, and relationships among individuals, institutions and organisations.673 It 
seeks to understand how individuals are affected in their decisions to resolve 
disputes and the impediments encountered through state-imposed mechanisms and 
those that occur naturally in wider society. One significant factor that denies MDWs 
a remedy is corruption. The lack of diligence in recognising the rights of MDWs and 
recording their complaints leads to impunity of perpetrators of violations leaving 
MDWs mistreated or their complaints disregarded.674 
9.5.1 Police corruption 
9.5.1.1 Case 17 – Celia 
Celia was a 25-year old Filipina who terminated her contract prematurely after being 
assaulted by her female employer. Celia began working for her employer whom she 
referred to as ‘my master’, in early September 2015. She reported that her employer 
would frequently kick, pinch and punch her and use her fingers to poke Celia in the 
temple while telling her she was ‘stupid’. When asked why she stayed after being 
constantly being assaulted, Celia replied that she did not know where to go to seek 
help, but she had told a friend. 
Celia worked 20-hour workdays. During the first 40 days of employment, she did not 
get any rest days. On Sundays, she was required to go to the employer’s father-in-
law’s house to clean. In the middle of October 2015, Celia was allowed to go out on 
her rest days on Sundays, but limited to only six hours rest. Her passport and 
contract had been seized by the employer. During the interview, Celia indicated that 
her employer had told her that surveillance cameras in the home were there to keep 
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watch on her. Celia explained that she was afraid of her employer and, because the 
cameras were there, she never tried to retrieve her documents. On one occasion, 
Celia misplaced a household item resulting in the employer deducting $200 from her 
wages. Despite the contract indicating that Celia would share a room with the 
employer’s mother, she was made to sleep on a mattress in a corner of the living 
room. This meant that Celia had no privacy and there was an additional surveillance 
camera in the living room. 
On 27 October 2015, Celia was serving dinner to her employers in the living room 
when some food almost fell off a plate she was carrying. The employer threw a pair 
of serving tongs at her, hitting Celia in the arm and chest. The following night on 28 
October, the employer again became angry and asked Celia, ‘can you use your 
mind?’ Celia reported that the employer became angrier and asked her ‘did I hurt 
you?’ Celia responded, ‘Yes ma’am, you hurt me last night’. The employer then 
punched Celia in the eye and again asked, ‘Did I hurt you?’ Celia again answered 
yes and the employer punched her again in the nose. The scene repeated with the 
employer again asking Celia if she had hurt her. The third time when Celia 
answered, the employer took her by the jaw and slapped her face ‘more than ten 
times’. Celia remained silent that night but indicated that she did not sleep, she cried 
all night. The morning of 29 October Celia informed her employer that she was 
terminating the contract. Celia left her employer’s residence and sought help from a 
friend who advised her to go to the hospital. On the 30 October, Celia went to the 
hospital for examination and made a formal report of the assault to the police post at 
the hospital. Because the assault occurred outside the police area of jurisdiction, 
Celia was informed that she would have to go to the police station in the district 
where her employer lived. Celia later sought assistance from the NGO and was 
provided shelter while awaiting the police investigation and payment of her final 
entitlements. 
On 8 November, Celia received a call from the police, asking her to go to the police 
station to provide a statement. She did so, accompanied by Rose (Case 12). After 
Celia and Rose had waited for some time, a police detective arrived and instructed 
Rose to leave the room so he could begin the interview. Celia reported that the 
detective asked her if the statement she had provided to the police at the hospital was 
  
228 
correct and she answered ‘yes’. Celia said that the detective ‘wrote and wrote, he 
wrote the whole statement without any question’. When he was finished writing, he 
asked Celia to sign the statement while using his hand to cover what he had written. 
Celia asked why she ‘should need to sign. I already had. I had already a statement in 
(place of prior statement), I did not change what is in my statement’. The detective 
responded, ‘No your employer will pay you, your employer will give you the plane 
ticket. Nobody, nobody can know about this you and me only’. Celia again asked, 
‘why I need to sign sir?’ The detective replied, ‘Just sign it because your employer 
will give you the money, we’ll pay you and she will give you the plane ticket, so that 
you can now go home. Don’t worry me and you only to know this, nobody can 
know’. 
Celia signed the statement and was provided a copy. Once Celia read the statement 
she realised that the statement did not reflect what she had previously reported. The 
detective had written (excerpt): 
Q1. Are there any witnesses who can see the whole course that 
your employer assaulted on you, on your mentioned date and 
location? 
A1. No, anyone was there, just only me and my employer. 
Q2. According to the medical examination form of you done in 
(hospital), there were tenderness and bruising on your left face 
and left wrist respectively. Do you remember the causes of your 
injuries and happened on which day? 
A2. I refuse to talk more about it and I decide not to inquire into 
my employer’s liability, but I do remember all the things my 
employer she did to me. The requirement for me, not inquiring 
into my employer’s liability is that my employer give me back 
all the things, passport, salaries and contract to me. 
I have read the above statement and I have been told that I can 
correct, alter, or add anything I wish. This statement is true. I 
have made it at my own free will.	
Realising the inaccuracy of the statements, Celia asked the detective, ‘why like this 
Sir? This is a liar. I remembered all what my statement in the (hospital). You ask me 
before and then why you write it like this’. The detective continued to insist that the 
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statement was okay and the employer would pay all entitlements. When asked why 
she signed the statement, Celia replied that she was locked in the interview room and 
was afraid of the police, ‘I’m afraid, maybe because they are the police sir so that’s 
why I’m afraid. Because they locked me (locked inside interview room) sir so that’s 
why I confuse already’. 
Celia reported the incident to the NGO staff and was assisted in filing a complaint 
with the Complaints Against Police Office (CAPO). Celia was also scheduled for a 
conciliation hearing on 4 December 2015. Celia’s claim against her employer 
consisted of outstanding wages, wages in lieu of notice, travel allowance, bus fare to 
the airport and airfare totalling $8,936.08. Shortly after filing the complaint with 
CAPO, the employer paid the claim amount and a conciliation hearing was not 
necessary.  
When I asked Celia if she understood what conciliation was and what she expected, 
she replied that she wasn’t sure what conciliation was only that that is where she 
would settle her claim with her employer. 
Celia was clearly in forced labour, she was involuntarily working excessive hours of 
20 hours per day, she was being illegally deployed at the employer’s father-in-law’s 
residence in violation of her contract, she was experiencing strong coercion through 
physical assault, and her documents had been seized by the employer, all strong 
forms of coercion. The police response was ineffective, not only in relation to the 
assault for which they had a medical report, but the detective (although providing a 
false report protecting the employer) included in the statement that the passport and 
contract was in the possession of the employer and that the employer was willing to 
pay final salaries for signing the statement. The actions in this case clearly meets the 
criteria of forced labour but appeared to have been ignored. Regardless of the 
motivation, the resulting effect was the denial of an effective remedy for the harm 
caused. The employer escaped prosecution for the assault, the crime of forced labour 
went unrecognized and again the only sanction of the employer was the payment of 
entitlements that was already owed. 
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9.5.2 Corruption at conciliation 
9.5.2.1 Case 5 – Mariah 
Mariah (see Section 9.3.1.1) filed a claim with the Labour Department for 
contractual entitlements such as wages in arrears, travel allowance and airfare to her 
place of origin, with a total amount of just over $8,000. On the day of the 
conciliation meeting, the employer failed to attend and Mariah met the Conciliation 
Officer alone. I was not allowed to accompany her, but she recorded the meeting on 
her phone which was later transcribed.  
During the Conciliation meeting, the Officer continued the coercive practice that had 
been initiated by the employer and reinforced by the police, and the final denial of 
any remedy was to be delivered. The Conciliation Officer persuaded Mariah to 
withdraw her claim as, if she did not, the employer would decide to pursue the case 
of theft and assault. Mariah was advised to consider the predicament and to inform 
the Conciliation Officer of her decision. A week later she withdrew her claim and 
received nothing in compensation. She was advised to go to the Immigration 
Department for an extension of her visa and seek another employer. Mariah did 
receive the visa extension and approximately 2 weeks later I received a call that she 
had found a new employer. 
Under the employment contract,675 if a party fails to give the required notice of 
termination of the contract, they are obligated to pay one month’s wages to the 
damaged party. In Mariah’s case, if the assault charge against the employer had been 
pursued, she could have claimed constructive dismissal, arguing the employer’s 
conduct was so egregious that she could no longer be expected to continue working 
there and she would be entitled to the wages in lieu of notice. The accusation of 
against Mariah worked in favour of the employer, since she could claim that Mariah 
was summarily dismissed for theft and assault. 
Mariah was in forced labour and sought assistance from the authorities. Although she 
did not specifically report that she was a victim of forced labour, her report of the 
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employer’s treatment and her vulnerable status as a MDW should have been a trigger 
for a thorough investigation. Not only did Mariah suffer from the loss of all 
monetary entitlements, she was threatened with possible imprisonment. 
Denunciation to the authorities is often associated with workers with an illegal status, 
however workers with a legal status also suffer from threats of arrest or 
imprisonment for false crimes because of their status and discrimination. The police 
are likely to believe the employer, rather than the MDW. 
9.5.2.2 Case 7 – Sophia 
In early October, I accompanied Sophia to the conciliation hearing but was not 
allowed to attend due to the objection of the employer. After approximately an hour, 
Sophia emerged from the meeting visibly upset. She reported that the Conciliation 
Officer had informed her that the employer had filed a police report the day before, 
accusing her of mistreating her daughter by cutting the daughter’s fingernails too 
short. The Conciliation Officer also told Sophia that the employer would file a 
counterclaim against her if she did not settle the claim and pursued it in MECAB. 
The Officer produced a settlement document that reflected a zero amount of 
settlement. Sophia expressed concern that the Conciliation Officer was trying to 
force her to settle. Unable to decide what to do, Sophia called MFMW and later 
indicated that she was encouraged to reject the offer of settlement and pursue the 
claim at MECAB. 
9.6 Conciliation as a Barrier 
This section links the vulnerability of MDWs, barriers to accessing remedies for 
forced labour and the non-judicial resolution mechanism of conciliation, a form of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) that produces inequitable outcomes. 
Literature on ADR and on barriers to remedies often cites findings to show that 
marginalised or poor communities are more likely to make use of the informal civil 
justice process or ADR.676 However, the true effectiveness of this mechanism has 
been in dispute given that both parties to disputes are not always on an equal footing. 
These differences are often exacerbated due to deficiencies in the informal process, 
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to include limited procedural protections. 677  Without the formal procedural 
protections offered in traditional courts, ethnic minorities and those at the lower end 
of the socio-economic spectrum in a society are placed at a further disadvantage in 
ADR settings.678 Fiss long ago recognized the shortcomings of informal processes 
when vulnerable individuals are engaged with the system and warned that ADR 
should be seen as highly problematic and should not be implemented in a 
indiscriminate manner.679 
Laura Nader posits that power imbalances adversely impact the disadvantaged in 
society, ‘[U]nequal power does not enter the paradigm’.680 Methods of ADR are not 
neutral because they are designed and implemented by parties, court administrators 
or governments who have specific goals and agendas.681 To better evaluate and 
understand the use of a specific process, she suggests an interrogation of the purpose 
for which a dispute resolution process is created.682 The questions to be asked toward 
this goal are: 
• How did this particular institution come to be? 
• What value does it serve? 
• Who is achieving what with the particular structure of the system 
in place? 
Nader’s scepticism rests on the belief that power imbalances that exist within a given 
society find their way into the resolution process as well.683 Her argument reinforces 
the claim that barriers to remedies are at times developed through poorly formulated 
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laws, and policies which may reflect the values and interests of the elites in a society. 
Nader’s position also dovetails with Fineman’s vulnerability theory, that those more 
privileged in society disproportionately receive advantages. Nader’s and Fineman’s 
perspectives provides a framework to evaluate the appropriateness of conciliation 
when dealing with MDWs, in Hong Kong.  
While ADR proponents argue for more use of informal mechanisms, the benefits 
afforded through the use of formal mechanisms are undeniable. The ongoing 
contention reflected in the ADR discourse evolves around how much procedural and 
substantive protections should be afforded to disputants as these protections are 
discarded in the name of efficiency. Formal mechanisms are more in alignment with 
international human rights norms discussed earlier and are better able to mitigate 
impediments to an effective remedy.  
In the three sections below I will highlight the benefits of using the formal and 
adjudicatory processes. In section 9.6.1 I will discuss the benefits of formal 
mechanisms that provides more meaningful access to justice. In section 9.6.2 I will 
discuss procedural justice and the relevance of the perception of fairness and 
transparency. In section 9.6.3, I will discuss the often overlooked impact of culture 
on the resolution process and society as a whole. 
9.6.1 Benefits of Formal Processes 
Formal mechanisms are consistent with human rights principles and jurisprudence 
and mitigates some if not all of the critiques of he use of ADR such as conciliation. 
The critiques relate to the lack of application of the law than enables vindication of 
rights, lack of protection that harms the vulnerable, losses to society through the 
private nature of Conciliation. Additionally, formal mechanisms it is argued 
mitigates discrimination and prejudice in the justice system.  
9.6.1.1 Formal Mechanisms 
Benefits related to formal mechanisms include the protection of rights granted by 
law, the availability of judicial review, the ability to enforce settlements resulting 
from a resolution process, the availability of legal representation, fairness in the 
process, and impartiality. Proponents for the use of ADR have long advocated its 
many positives, including greater efficiency in reaching a resolution, reduced 
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formality in the process and procedures, and reduced legal costs.684 There appears to 
be significant agreement that, depending on the ADR process, some sacrifices of 
‘public law rights …such as the right to an attorney, due process and the appellate 
process’s assurance of accurate application of public laws’.685 Many have recognised 
the need for legal protections and have advocated for ADR processes to be 
incorporated into the court system,686 but there is concern that even this may not 
afford ADR parties the full protection of the law.687 
Proponents of ADR even while promoting its use concede that ADR mechanisms are 
problematic for vulnerable individuals. Menkel-Meadow asserts that it is the 
participation in ADR and not substantive agreement that is required, even when 
mandated ADR processes are used as a means of diverting cases to ‘manage’ or 
reduce caseloads.688 She contends that due or just process does not necessarily 
require litigation or a day in court. There is very little argument that the ‘creative and 
gentler’ forms of ADR such as mediation and conciliation can provide ‘greater 
access to more individualised justice in a variety of case types’ that affect the 
disadvantaged, and there are concerns of ‘equality, access, and economic support’.689 
She contends that creative and participatory problem-solving should be available to 
everyone and that ‘…access and resources are as important in mediation and 
consensus building as in the formal justice system’.690 
Reuben691 acknowledges the need for legal protections through application of law, 
but suggests developing an ADR mechanism that, while offering avenues of 
negotiation, must ensure that rights that are constitutionally protected remain in 
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focus. He proposes that in creating this mechanism, constitutional integration would 
need to be ‘minimal but meaningful’ to avoid recreating the litigation system. If due 
process standards are taken to extremes, it could erode the ADR process by limiting 
its informal nature and making rules complicated.692 In his analysis of informal 
mechanisms - outside court constitutional protections are absent.693  
Reuben contends that legal protections are greater in an adjudicatory process such as 
litigation or arbitration, while consensual processes such as mediation and 
conciliation offer far less protections. Reuben recognises the need for due process. 
Under the established system, an individual’s waiver of right to due process of legal 
claims is required. In the alternative process, ‘the waiver is of one’s substantive legal 
rights and most, but not all, of the full panoply of procedural rights available at 
trial’.694 However, he further explains that for the waiver of one’s rights to be valid, 
the waiver must be voluntary, clearly and knowingly given. This voluntary and 
consensual waiver is less troubling to a settlement reached through ADR, but an 
agreement where there is no such waiver and where the process is compelled, it can 
result in the removal of available redress protections, either substantively or 
procedurally. 
Resnik695 and others believe that the requirement that ADR be used as a remedy 
amounts to unconstitutional evisceration of statutory and common-law rights. Those 
that advocate that the rule of law should remain in focus realise that ‘mechanisms for 
ADR should be cause for concern’.696 In the traditional court system, the process is 
adversarial, adjudicatory in nature and focuses on the law.697 ADR processes are 
informal in nature and operate outside the public view, while constitutional processes 
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are based on formality to ensure procedural fairness and assure public witness.698 An 
‘essential function of law is to reflect the public resolution of irreconcilable 
differences’699 and the use of ADR may be more about getting rid of disputes instead 
of the application of law and vindication of rights.700 Democracies enact laws that 
grant rights and protect them through application of the law that is predictable, non-
arbitrary701 and relies on formal processes to facilitate fairness.702 Facts trigger 
consequences, and legal consistency is critical to society’s wellbeing.703 If ADR 
disregards the facts raised during a dispute and the ‘relevant legal doctrine, then the 
goals of rights vindication, law application and predictability are diminished’.704 
‘Once a law has been duly enacted its interpretation and enforcement is for the 
courts; courts have been instituted, not to mediate disputes, but to decide them’.705 
Arbitrators, like mediators and Conciliation Officers, are generally not bound by the 
law in the procedures or standards they use to resolve disputes, other than rules 
outlined in court-related programmes or defined in contractual documents.706 
Genn 707  expresses similar views and argues that ADR can be an important 
supplement to courts and should be made available to anyone contemplating settling. 
It is not suitable in all cases, nor is it suitable for all parties, and therefore it should 
not be made compulsory.708 One of the pillars of ADR is self-determination.709 It is 
the belief in the act of disputing parties coming to a voluntary uncoerced decision 
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where both parties are responsible for crafting the process and outcomes desired.710 
In attempting to establish ADR as a viable alternative to litigation, there is a danger 
of overestimating what mediation can offer to the wide range of civil disputes.711 
There is the risk of losing the value of the public justice system and what it stands 
for.712 
The role of law and the rule of law are fundamental to liberal democracies that 
emphasise justice and equality before the law.713 Consensual forms of ADR such as 
negotiation, mediation and conciliation do not contribute to access to the courts 
because it is non-court related.714 It does not contribute to substantive justice because 
parties are encouraged to relinquish their ideas of legal rights and instead focus on 
solving the problem at hand.715 Mediators are not concerned about substantive justice 
because their role is to assist the disputing parties in reaching a settlement.716 They 
do not make judgments about the merits of the case or the quality of the 
settlement.717 The outcome is based on the parties’ willingness to settle and reach an 
agreement that both can live with.718 It is clear from Genn’s commentary that 
Mediation and conciliation may provide a conclusion to the dispute but it does not 
provide access to justice.719 
9.6.1.2 Protecting The Vulnerable 
This critique of ADR as lacking the ability to adequately protect the disadvantaged 
has ‘bite’,720 and there appears to be significant agreement on this issue. There is 
hardly a commentator on ADR that does not acknowledge the potential negative 
effect of ADR on disadvantaged individuals and groups that are poorly resourced. 
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Two dilemmas present themselves when the disadvantaged are considered: first, 
there is an access problem, and then there is the imbalance of power issue. 
Edwards721 is concerned that the use of ADR affects future access and remedies for 
the disadvantaged. He warns that there must be careful attention taken that ADR 
does not diminish the development of legal rights or result in the reduction of 
possibilities for legal redress of wrongs suffered or by the poor, disadvantaged and 
underprivileged under the guise of ‘access to Justice and judicial efficiency.722 
Inexpensive, expeditious and informal adjudication does not always equate with fair 
and just adjudication.723 The practice of diverting cases from litigation limits the 
jurisdiction of the courts and may result in diminished rights for minorities and other 
groups, whose cases are in areas of civil rights, prisoner suits and equal 
opportunity724 and these cases may be the first to be removed from the docket. To 
ensure that justice is served and rights protected, Edwards argues that ADR should 
not replace litigation, but that it should be used to make the traditional court system 
work more efficiently and effectively.725 
Edwards726 also recognises the problems with imbalances in resources. He asserts 
that in imposing ADR, decision makers may not understand the values at stake, as 
there is often a significant imbalance in power between disputing parties. Parties to 
disputes do not always possess equal power and resources, sometimes because of 
inequality, sometimes because of deficiencies in the informal process and sometimes 
because of the lack of procedural protections.727 The critical nature of this imbalance 
lies in the fact that disputing parties many not have equal access to resources, and 
this harms their ability to adequately engage in negotiation.728 Fiss729 recognised this 
issue and argued that if disputes remain in the courts, the judge can level the playing 
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field by asking questions, calling witnesses and asking other people and institutions 
to participate.730 Litigation and ADR are about the ability to access and analyse data 
to develop legal awareness and an informed bargaining position.731 Inequality to 
amass the required data affects the ability to adequately bargain a fair settlement.732 
Without the protection and the formality of the courts, racial and ethnic minorities 
and the economically disadvantaged will be taken advantage of by those more 
powerful within the informal, opaque and confidential settings of ADR.733 ‘Disputes 
between people of unequal power are unlikely to be fairly settled by arbitration or 
mediation unless the force of law is available as a last resort’.734 Weinstein735 like 
Fiss736 believes that the judge has an obligation to mitigate the imbalanced position 
of lesser-resourced disputants. 
In addition to the issues of access to resolution mechanisms and the ability of 
accessing resources and necessary information, other imbalances have significant 
impact. Clarke and Davies 737  contend that where there are psychological or 
emotional imbalances, mediation or conciliation are inappropriate;738 it exacerbates 
power imbalances and favours the emotionally and economically stronger person.739 
This may cause some to settle disputes for much less than they are entitled or would 
receive from a judge in a traditionally adversarial process740 because of the inability 
to withstand long waiting periods for awards or protracted litigation or ADR 
processes.741 ‘Compromise only is an equitable solution between equals; between 
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unequals it inevitably reproduces inequality’.742 The use of alternative mechanisms 
may produce nothing more than inexpensive and ill-informed decisions743 that may 
legitimise the decisions made by the existing power structure within society.744 In 
theory, at least, the established court recognises everyone as equal and by design is 
intended to ‘redress imbalances and protect against manifest injustice’ but this 
protection is absent from many ADR processes.745 Merry746 suggests the claims of 
second-class justice fall on poorer disputants as they are less likely to afford legal 
help in contrast to wealthier disputants who use the alternative processes to sidestep 
expensive litigation747 or settlement. 
This discourse highlights the dilemma of MDWs and the lack of protection offered 
through conciliation. The lack of any structure that considers their disadvantaged 
status, limited legal awareness and the inability to overcome this barrier while 
negotiating with their more powerful employers or effectively argue their position to 
a Conciliation Officer or adjudicator cannot ensure a just outcome. Government 
policy that encourages conciliation without application of law also encourages 
employers to use time to their advantage as MDWs are less likely to withstand long 
waits before resolution and may settle claims for less than they believe they are 
entitled to. 
9.6.1.3 Privatisation: Losses To Society  
The arguments surrounding the private nature of ADR and its use as a redress 
mechanism involve the claims of causing significant damage to the development of 
adequate public law, lack of contribution to society by preventing citizen 
participation, regulation of behaviour, education of the public, and its ability to 
mitigate bias and ensure neutrality and public oversight through the transparency of 
the process. ‘For law to serve its function as giving expression to enforceable 
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behavioural norms, it must be made publicly for all to see’.748 Various forms of 
dispute resolution have different effects on individual disputants and on society as a 
whole.749 When disputes are handled publicly through litigation, the resolution of 
those disputes will have an effect on the whole of society, either formally through 
precedent or informally by notifying wider society how the matter was resolved.750 
Closed processes preclude the public from assessing the qualities of what gains the 
force of law and participation through debating what law ought to require.751 There 
may be benefit to the public to have information revealed in a suit or dispute,752 
involving abuse of workers in corporations, manufacturing or domestic households. 
The diffusion of disputes to a range of private, unknowable alternative adjudicators 
also violates the constitutional protections accorded to the public who have the right 
to observe state-empowered decision makers as they impose binding outcomes on 
disputants.753 It is through public legal proceedings that the court has the opportunity 
to act on the behalf of wider society which is not party to the litigation or dispute but 
may be affected none the less.754 These public processes can inform the public and 
increase awareness of laws, rights and the avenues for seeking remedies and the 
manner in which important legal societal issues are resolved. 
Genn755 explains that the rule of law contributes to society by transcending private 
interests and contributes quietly and significantly to social and economic wellbeing. 
The courts have very important functions in providing protections against arbitrary 
government actions; they promote social order, facilitates the peaceful resolution of 
disputes and protects rights. In the adversarial process, the disputing parties offer 
their version of the facts and the laws that support their argument. The proceedings 
are conducted within established rules and procedures developed over time through 
case law and legislative bodies. In publishing their decisions, courts communicate 
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and reinforce civic values and norms. The state’s responsibility to provide 
‘…effective and peaceful forums for the resolution of disputes is being shrugged off 
through a discourse that locates civil justice as a private matter than as a public and 
socially important good’.756 The private value of civil justice is the resolution of 
disputes, while the public function is linked to adjudication. According to Genn, 757 
authoritative judicial decision serves the public good by creating the framework 
critical in common law systems. It provides the coercive underpinning that brings 
unwilling litigants to the negotiation table and makes it possible for disadvantaged 
litigants to take on more powerful opponents in an attempt to vindicate their rights 
and expose wrongs. 
The reduction in court cases as a result of ADR diminishes the value of public 
adjudication and the loss of precedent that is critical in common law systems. ‘It is 
mostly by chance and individual circumstances which brings cases before the court 
rather than by any design purposefully intended for the planned development of the 
law’.758 Less than three percent of cases make it to trial, resulting in the depravation 
to society of the opportunity to participate in governing, and in the public airing of 
important issues, whether as a result of settlement through mediation, arbitration or 
some other form of non-judicial method.759 Public adjudication is the lifeblood of 
common law, without which it will die.760 A constant stream of cases is necessary to 
continue to provide guidance on the law, refine its application and on occasion make 
new leaps.761 The public determination of legal rights is to provide authoritative 
statements of what the law is, who has rights and how those rights are to be 
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vindicated.762 For civil justice to perform its public role, adjudication and public 
promulgation of decisions is critical.763 
Fiss argues that opposing ADR processes is not intended to force disputants into 
litigation, since that would interfere with their autonomy.764 He suggests that it 
merely means that society gets ‘less than what appears’ at an undetermined cost 
leaving gaps in justice.765 This high rate of resolution seems to support Merry’s766 
research that found individuals preferred to talk over their problems and were not 
overly litigious, however, by the time a dispute has escalated to the point of requiring 
outside intervention, the parties had come to view the dispute in terms of rights and 
principles and no longer wanted to discuss the matter.767 
It can be argued that the lack of recognition of forced labour as a crime and the 
limited use of judicial determination results in a lack of jurisprudence and education 
on an issue that bears significant importance to the public and the more than 350,000 
MDWs in Hong Kong. The preference for conciliation also fails to prevent the 
impunity of violators who subject MDWs to forced labour conditions and reduce the 
high prevalence of forced labour. MDWs who finally decide to file a claim against 
their employers are less likely to be interested in a settlement because it nullifies 
their original financial goals and, if a victim of forced labour, may seek to have their 
employers punished. 
9.6.1.4 Discrimination 
The sections above have addressed concerns of ADR in terms of the functionality of 
the process itself, the effect of the process on its users and on society generally, the 
role of the courts, and issues of access and fairness, legitimacy and transparency. The 
focus on the effectiveness of mitigating these concerns assumes that the mechanisms 
are implemented in its purest form, to say there is no malfeasance in its 
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implementation. The latent prejudice and indifference within the system is often 
overlooked. 
Delgado observed that the issue of racial and ethnic bias was absent from the 
discourse on ADR. 768  Relying on several research theories on the subject of 
prejudice, he concluded that to mitigate the introduction of prejudice in the system, 
disputes were best resolved using the formal court process, especially if there were 
imbalances in status. He argued that responsibility of equalising the imbalances falls 
on the court and the trial judge, using the established rules and applying them even-
handedly. The rules require judges to recuse themselves and jurors to be disqualified 
if there is a conflict of interest or they cannot be impartial. They allow challenges to 
decision makers who may exhibit bias that might affect the fair process or outcome. 
Another manner in which prejudice or bias is mitigated is through judicial decisions: 
‘[i]t puts judges’ reasoning into the public record, allows for appellate review and 
encourages judges to find facts in an unbiased manner.769 Delgado believed that, 
although judicial proceedings do not guarantee an error free process, the use of 
closed door ADR creates greater opportunities for prejudice. Highly prejudiced 
people tend to externalise their prejudice toward groups or individuals who are 
highly visible with little power to retaliate driven by the need for status and power in 
personal relationships, and once acquired, prejudice tends to persist and is reflective 
of the individual’s social group. To reduce the likelihood of prejudice, Delgado 
argued that three conditions need to be met: first there must be equality established 
between the parties; second, the engagement must be seen as mutually beneficial and 
not antagonistic or threatening; and third, individualisation must be established and 
must be intimate rather than casual or impersonal. 770  The court provides the 
atmosphere, rules and expectations to mitigate overt prejudice, and the adversarial 
nature of the court has been shown to limit bias of the decision-maker in that it 
counteracts the natural tendency for swift judgments. When the decision-maker or 
third party in alternative processes are from the superior group or class, the danger of 
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prejudice increases and therefore the disadvantaged disputants should opt for a 
formal adjudicatory process. Delgado concluded that disputants of equal resources 
are more likely to benefit from ADR and any party desiring the assistance of an 
advocate, attorney or experienced representative should have the ability to secure 
one or be provided with one. 
9.6.2 Procedural Justice As Fairness 
Procedural fairness not only recognizes the importance of rules and procedures 
intended to ensure fairness but also the perception of fairness. According to Maiese, 
procedural justice is action in accordance with the requirements of law, and when an 
action seems to violate some universal rule of conduct it is likely to be called 
‘unjust’.771 She contends that justice pays due regard to the proper interests, property, 
and safety of others using rules to ensure that people receive their ‘fair share’ of 
benefits and burdens and adhere to a system of ‘fair play’. The expectation of those 
involved in a dispute is that the process will be fair and that any decision maker will 
treat them equally. Thus, the principles of equity and equality are most relevant in 
the context of distributive justice.772 They focus on the idea that fair treatment is a 
matter of giving people what they deserve. The principles of fairness are also central 
in procedural, retributive, and restorative justice ensuring procedures that generate 
unbiased, consistent, and reliable decisions so that a just outcome might be reached. 
To ensure ADR procedures of negotiation, mediation and conciliation and legal 
proceedings are fair, any third party carrying out the procedures must be impartial 
and be capable of making a just decision based on relevant information; ‘For 
example, judges should be impartial, and facilitators should not exhibit any prejudice 
that gives one party unfair advantages’.773 According to Maiese, rules should also be 
impartial and consistent to ensure equal treatment and do not favour some people 
over others to ensure a level a playing field for all involved, and disputing parties 
want their voices heard and they need to be part of the decision making process. This 
need is referred to as the principle of standing, it suggests that people value their 
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membership in a group and those societal institutions and decision-making 
procedures should affirm their status as members. ‘Fair treatment by an authority can 
reveal that one is a valued, or not valued, member of a group, which in turn has the 
potential to affect one’s self-esteem, one’s sense of self-worth, and one’s social 
identity’.774 
‘In particular, disadvantaged members of a group or society 
should be empowered and given an opportunity to be heard. 
When decision-making procedures treat people with respect and 
dignity, they feel affirmed. A central premise of restorative 
justice, for example, is that those directly affected by the offense 
should have a voice and representation in the decision-making 
process regarding the aftermath of the offense, be it punishment 
and/or restitution’.775 
Disputants want to tell their story to convince a third party about their position, and 
have a decision rendered in their favour. 776  They care whether they had the 
opportunity to tell their version of the story.777 The importance of being heard also 
influences the perception of neutrality in decision-making, because neutrality 
involves the use of ‘objective information about the situation, people are more likely 
to view procedures as neutral when they are given an opportunity to present evidence 
and explain their situation’.778 
A number of experiments involving disputing parties and their opportunity to be 
heard have concluded that it has a significant effect on the perceptions of procedural 
justice:779	
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‘When disputants feel that they have been allowed a full 
opportunity to voice their views, concerns, and evidence, the 
disputing process is seen as fairer and the outcome is more likely 
to be accepted’.780 
The opportunity for voice not only applies in the courtroom or ADR proceedings, but 
also in contact with the police and in political decision making and work in 
organisational decision-making.781 ‘Even in countries where the judicial systems 
typically use non-adversarial procedures, citizens often prefer procedures that allow 
a full opportunity for voice’.782 Both field and laboratory studies have concluded that 
the opportunity for voice heightens judgments of procedural justice even when 
disputants knew that their voice would not influence the final outcome.783 
Procedural justice is concerned with the fairness of the procedures or processes that 
are used to arrive at outcomes. ‘Distributive justice, in contrast, focuses on 
perceptions of and criteria to determine the substantive fairness of the outcomes 
themselves’. 784 
If members of society believe that authorities are concerned with their well-being 
and needs and they are treated with dignity and respect, they are more likely to trust 
the system that is designed to resolve their disputes. One measure of fairness is 
whether people’s judgments of procedural fairness result from perceptions that they 
have been treated ‘honestly, openly, and with consideration’.785 If they believe that 
the authorities took their viewpoints into account and tried to treat them fairly, they 
are more likely to support and engage in the broader social system. Maiese argues 
that, in the absence of fairness, confidence in an organisation’s or society’s 
institutions may be undermined. If procedural justice principles are applied 
effectively, organisations and societies will tend to be more stable and its members 
will feel satisfied and secure.786 
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Procedural justice (fairness of the process) is also of significance as it affects the 
legitimacy of governments and institutions. Gangl’s 787  research finds that 
perceptions of procedural justice are more important than preferred outcome when 
the process is perceived favourably. When disputes are portrayed as balanced and 
inclusive of the differing points of view, people’s assessments of the fairness of the 
process or its procedural justice improves, and they accept the legitimacy of the 
process. In contrast, when issues are closed and partial to one side, people’s policy 
preferences become more important and they question the legitimacy of the process. 
She also found that the type of issue under consideration affects the extent to which 
process considerations rather than the preferred outcome informs people’s legitimacy 
assessments. This imperfect relationship suggests that perceived fairness increases 
the likelihood that people report that the outcome matched their own preferred 
position. It also suggests that people are more likely to accept a decision that is not 
entirely consistent with their own initial policy predispositions when the process is 
perceived favourably. Fair procedures contribute to the legitimacy of and acceptance 
of the decisions reached. 
Gangl’s findings and those of Maiese suggest that fairness, equality in treatment and 
impartiality of the decision maker must be accompanied by transparency of the 
process, participation and a perception of fairness which is critical to lending 
legitimacy to governments and institutions. Sternlight reinforces both Gangl and 
Merry with the assessment that ‘…the subjective perception of fairness is critical, 
because even assuming objective fairness, the system could not function well if it 
were perceived to be unfair or unjust’.788 She further contends that the legal system 
should be designed in such a way that it earns the trust and respect of the society, or 
else lawlessness and violence may occur. Thus, in designing the system, more 
research needs to be done to determine what disputants want, and what they perceive 
to be fair, sufficiently accessible and is perceived to treat like claims equally’.789 
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9.6.3 The Impact of culture 
In examining the place and role individuals play in the dispute process, the impact of 
culture may sharpen the focus on what really leads to settlement. In resolving a 
dispute, an individual essentially has three options, avoidance, mediation or 
conciliation, and adjudication.790 In some cases we can avoid the conflict altogether, 
for example, by simply not patronising a business that we have a dispute with or 
deciding not to file a claim against an employer. Another option is that we mediate, 
using a third-party neutral to secure agreement between disputing parties. There are 
others that may seek the full force of the law and will wait for their day in court and 
seek resolution through adjudication. 
One early theory on cultural ties was proposed by Felstiner791 and focused on ‘social 
organisation’ which determined that successful dispute processing was based on 
multiple variables, influenced by the types of social organisations available for 
dispute resolution and the importance of personal relationships and cultural ties. He 
defined social organisation as any regularity in geographic, economic, kin or other 
relationships among people in a single society. According to Felstiner, there are two 
different types of social organisations when it comes to resolving disputes, the 
Technologically Complex Rich Society (TCRS) and the Technologically Simple 
Poor Society (TSPS). TCRS do not follow the traditional norms as high mobility 
may mean that there are large geographic distances between disputants, and there are 
no bonds between family groups, rather a bond between individuals and there is no 
reliance on the extended family for companionship, economic, political or 
educational support. 
In TSPS, geographical distances are smaller in this group and friends tend to be 
neighbours and rely on each other for support. Work in the community tends to be a 
cooperative effort. The differences in organisation of these two groups (TCRS and 
TSPS) give an understanding of why and how the choice of resolution mechanisms 
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is influenced.792 It also demonstrates that the choice to use litigation has then to do 
with the closeness of individual relationships and sense of community bonds.  
Felstiner identified five variables that he considered critical to successful resolution 
that may suggest that successful resolution which includes the participant’s 
willingness to settle may be best suited to neighbourhood resolution, smaller 
communal groups or people belonging to the native population. The variables 
identified are, geographical distance, the presence or absence of a social group, the 
presence or absence of coercive power, the need to preserve the relationship and a 
willingness to resolve the dispute, all necessary elements to successful resolution of 
the conflict. He concluded that, should the dispute require adjudication by a third 
party, that third party must have available to them a form of coercive power such as 
the court. 
In research conducted on political conflict and violence, Ross793 investigates the 
relationship of cultural and cross-cultural ties to internal and external violence and 
conflict. The research does not specifically refer to Felstiner’s work, but it reaches 
the same conclusion; that is, cross-cultural ‘…ties link different members of the 
same community and different communities in the same society’.794 These cross-
cultural ties limit the existence or severity of conflict, promotes dispute settlement 
through interests shared by the group and individuals. In providing social and 
political links among differing groups and communities there is a reduced risk of 
conflict and polarisation.795 This research, while focusing on a broader social issue of 
cultural dynamics on conflict highlights the importance of exposure to and 
establishment of ties across communities and the individuals place within those 
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communities. Donnelly contributes to this perspective, referring to understanding of 
rights in differing cultures as ‘horizons’. He explains that, in order to effect change 
concerning rights in differing cultures, one may have to ‘cross or penetrate foreign 
horizons to persuade people of another culture to accept certain rights, … rights are 
always understood within a horizon and from a point of view...’. 796 
In contrast to Felstiner’s early theory and Ross’ more recent research, other early 
scholars were more narrowly focused on individual needs in the dispute resolution 
process and recognised the importance of individual relationships. Fuller’s theory 
surrounding social reorientation highlighted this importance. He explained that the 
aim of the mediation process is to re-orient the disputing parties toward each other. 
Because the mediator has no coercive power and thus does not rely on rules to help 
achieve a settlement, they must help develop a renewed perception of their 
relationship and a change in their attitudes toward each other.797 ‘Mediation in 
Fuller’s words is for the “administration and enforcement of rules of social norms” 
between parties, not for the creation of state-made law’.798 
Menkel-Meadow, referring to work by Nader, explains Nader’s conclusion that a 
disputing process and the acceptance of that process by the larger community is 
intimately tied to the culture in which they are situated. 799 The way people process 
conflicts says a great deal about cultural values and its institutions will reflect those 
values. She suggests that introducing and implementing a resolution mechanism that 
is not compatible with existing culture is unwise.800 Sally Engle Merry also argues 
that the ADR movement ‘ignores the social, cultural and political dimensions’ of 
alternative disputing processes and that ‘this neglect accurately represents the 
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unreflective nature of the ADR movement’.801 She argues that the disputing process 
is different for each individual and is significantly affected by the culture in which 
they belong. Disputants with strong multi-stranded social relationships will seek 
resolution through compromise; however, those with single-stranded ties will seek 
victory in an adversarial process ‘To understand disputing or any other social 
process, an observer must get “inside the heads” of the actors to discover what they 
think they are doing and what it means to them’.802 The same can be said for users of 
the formalised justice system with each party having a different idea of what they are 
doing, the reasons for doing it and an expectation of the process.803 Some may be 
concerned about protecting their own rights, while others may have an agenda of 
punishing perceived rule breakers. 
This issue of the impact of culture on the individual’s willingness to settle suggests 
that ADR may be incompatible in some cultures or where the disputing parties have 
conflicting cultural values, weak geographic ties or perceived lower socio-economic 
status and are seen as outsiders. As an example, migrant domestic workers lacking 
geographic proximity to family, perceived lower social status in the foreign 
environment and who are not recognised as members of the local community may 
find conflict with locals and even employers more likely and resolution of conflict 
more difficult, especially if the relationship involves ill treatment. Merry speaks to 
this issue, suggesting that ‘small-scale societies’ (Felstiner’s TSPS) do not typically 
have a ‘highly developed cultural awareness of legal rights, equality, or the rights to 
legal participation’.804 
ADR is not and cannot be expected to be universal, since the manner in which 
disputes are settled is a reflection of the cultural values of a particular society.805 The 
meaning, methods used and willingness to find resolution is intrinsically tied to the 
individual who is significantly influenced by the culture and society to which they 
                                                
801 Sally Engle Merry, ‘Disputing Without Culture’, [1987] Har. Law Rev. vol.100 No.8 p.2060 
802 Ibid p.2064 
803 Ibid 
804 Merry, ‘Disputing without culture’, p.2062 
805 Laura Nader, Harmony Ideology: Justice and Control in a Zapotec Mountain Village [1990] 
Stanford University Press 
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belong.806 The decision to force would-be litigants into the use of this mechanism 
fails to take into account the important role of the individual in the resolution 
process, and the decision to penalise, it is argued, turns a voluntary process into a 
coercive one that denies disputants constitutional protections of rights and 
streamlines court dockets by removing cases that appear trivial in nature.807 It seems 
likely that political leaders will resist the creation of autonomous dispute resolution 
institutions, drawing those that are formed into the orbit of existing state-run 
institutions or relegating to the consideration of ADR only those cases that are 
deemed trivial. 
9.7 Conclusions and Recommendations 
An ILO study published in 2013808 conservatively estimated the domestic worker 
population worldwide to be 53 million; this number represented an increase of 19 
million from the mid-1990s. The study also found that 80% of domestic workers are 
women, with domestic work representing 7.5% of women’s wages from employment 
worldwide. Overall, domestic work accounts for 1.7% of total employment 
worldwide and some 3.6% of all wage employment. Although domestic workers are 
a big part of the global economy, they continue to remain a group very vulnerable to 
exploitation and abuse at the hands of recruitment and employment agencies and 
their employers. The extreme dependency on an employer and the fact that most, if 
not all, of their work is in the privacy of households are huge contributory factors to 
that vulnerability. 
The issues and concerns regarding domestic workers have been documented in 
numerous research studies over the last 70 years; yet these issues, and the abuses, 
continue to remain largely the same. Some of these abusive practices include verbal 
and psychological abuse, non-payment of wages, restrictions on their freedom of 
movement at their places of employment, cases, inadequate and abusive living 
conditions, and debt bondage. In the case of migrant domestic workers in particular, 
                                                
806 Merry, ‘Disputing Without Culture’ p.2063 
807 Ibid p.2069 
808 ILO, Domestic workers across the world: Global and regional statistics and the extent of legal 
protection (ILO Geneva 2013) 
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their unstable immigration status in the host country and their lack of knowledge of 
the local language, customs and laws, substantially adds to their vulnerability. 
While significant strides have been made globally, a lack of prioritisation of the 
issues concerning migrant workers, of which domestic workers are a subset, and a 
failure to enact appropriate legislation or gaps in existing legal schemes, continue to 
make domestic workers vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. Hong Kong’s 
experience with migrant domestic workers is a microcosm of these global issues. 
Although there are a multitude of issues that plague Hong Kong over MDWs, the 
primary concern centres around the lack of a legislative framework that criminalises 
forced labour in accordance with the Forced Labour Convention No.29 (1930) and 
therefore ineffective in providing and effective remedy. This lack of a framework of 
laws and a supporting regulatory scheme effectively disengages the government 
from any aspect of involvement in issues related to the crime of forced labour, either 
proactively or retroactively. Relevant government agencies are not empowered, 
either through the provision of resources, or by an institutional priority, to prevent 
exploitation, to investigate legitimate complaints, or to prosecute those who are 
responsible for abuses, be they employment agencies or private individuals. 
Victims have no real ability to protect themselves due to the policies of the 
government that act as contributory barriers to the existing impediments to accessing 
appropriate assistance. On the occasions that migrant domestic workers seek 
assistance from the police to report abuses, the police response is at times limited to 
a recommendation to the Labour Department of what is viewed as ‘employer – 
employee’ dispute. In most instances of complaints, the authorities do not document 
the complaints and there is almost no follow-up to investigate, to gather evidence, 
and to hold abusive employers accountable. Corrupt or indifferent police officials 
and Conciliation Officers appear to be simply focused on reaching a resolution to a 
case, often putting pressure on MDWs into withdrawing complaints, or siding with 
employers who might pursue false claims as a reprisal against a complaining MDW. 
Viewed on a broader scale, the MDW scheme is designed either accidentally or 
intentionally to ensure subordination of MDWs. From the live-in rule that creates 
multiple dependencies of food, shelter and wages, excessively long working hours 
that remains unregulated, inadequate rest days, and exacerbated by recruitment debt, 
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further exacerbated by limited options of changing employers as a result of 
recruitment agency malfeasance of additional recruitment debt, compounded by the 
‘two-week’ rule and a bias in favour of the employer regarding evidence concerning 
who terminated the contract constitutes the labour conditions minefield. To cap this 
inequitable scheme, MDW are then constantly pressured to negotiate with their 
employers through conciliation about how much of their already-earned wages and 
entitlements they would like to leave with the employer. Every itemised claim to the 
labour department reflects a contractually obligated entitlement. 
When these obstacles are linked to the MDWs’ lack of awareness of their rights, 
perception that they have ‘no choice’, and the cost benefit analysis of continued care 
of their families against pursuing the claim, their decisions to ‘move on’ become 
clear. Some MDWs may decide that it is in their best interest to forego a claim and 
as such conciliation should be available. 
The lack of a comprehensive legal framework that addresses the inequalities 
experienced by MDWs and the privileges extended to employers demonstrate Hong 
Kong’s lack of commitment to the protection of the migrant worker community. 
The use of a form of ADR, conciliation has also added another layer of negative 
issues for the MDW.  By its nature, the process of Conciliation is focused on 
assisting the parties reach agreement and is not concerned about substantive justice 
or even a fair result. Conciliation Officers may also bring their own biases into the 
process and they do not make judgements about the quality of the settlement or 
merits of a case.809 Conciliation results in the reduction of procedural protections for 
redress of wrongs suffered by MDWs in the name of judicial efficiency.810 Although 
judicial proceedings do not guarantee an error free process, the use of informal 
                                                
809 Hazel Genn, 'What is Civil Justice for-Reform, ADR, and Access to Justice' (2012) 24 Yale JL & 
Human 397 
810 Harry T Edwards, 'Alternative dispute resolution: Panacea or anathema?' (1986) 99 Harvard Law 
Review 668 
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processes like ADR creates greater opportunities for prejudice811 and can 'mask a 
world of mischief’.812  
MDWs are at a real disadvantage because of their unequal bargaining positions. 
Their lack of awareness of their rights and the uncertainty of the processes intended 
to resolve their issues, places them in a psychological and emotionally disadvantaged 
position that makes conciliation inappropriate;813 it exacerbates power imbalances 
and favours the emotionally and economically stronger employer.814 Compromise is 
only an equitable solution between equals; between unequals it reproduces 
inequality.815  
MDWs make no distinction between informal and formal processes for handling 
their claims. Prior to attendance to any of the redress forums, they exhibited the same 
high levels of anxiety. Their hope was that the Conciliation Officer, Adjudication 
Officer (MECAB) or the Presiding Officer (LT) was going to listen to them and 
would decide that they deserved to be paid what was allowed under their contract. 
For first time users of these redress mechanisms, one forum was just more formal 
than the others. 
The experiences of MDWs mirror the warnings of Fiss.816 The disparities between 
the parties influence the quality of settlement in three ways. First, the MDW is less 
able to gather and analyze the information needed to secure a successful outcome 
without assistance, and thus starts from a disadvantaged position in the bargaining 
process. Second, they need the awards they seek immediately and thus can be 
induced to settle as a way of accelerating payment, even though the realize they may 
get less now than the might if the awaited judgment. MDWs because of their 
economic situation, they want their damages immediately and this need acts as 
                                                
811 Delgado and others, ‘Fairness and formality: Minimising the risk of prejudice in alternative dispute 
resolution’ p.1367,  
812 Richard C Reuben, 'Constitutional gravity: a unitary theory of alternative dispute resolution and 
public civil justice' (1999) 47 Ucla L Rev 949 
813 Gary R Clarke, Iyla T Davies, ‘ADR-Argument For and Against Use of Mediation Process 
Particularly In Family And Neighborhood Disputes’ QUT LJ. Vol 7 81-86 
814 Ibid quoting Laura Nader, ‘Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and Pacification 
in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology’, 9 Ohio St. J. On Disp. Resol.1, 3 [1993] 
815 Reuben p.968 
816  Fiss, 'Against settlement' p.1076 
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leverage for the employer. Because their need is so great the employer can force 
them to accept a sum that is less than their entitlement. Third, MDWs might be 
forced to settle because they do not have the resources to finance their own expenses 
while seeking a remedy. This last factor is exacerbated by governmental policy 
prohibiting employment while pursuing a claim.  
In ZN v Secretary of Justice,817 the government filed responses to the petitioners 
asserting that while Hong Kong lacked forced labour legislation, they did have 
relevant criminal laws that could be used to prosecute crimes like trafficking and 
forced labour. In rejecting this contention, the court found that the lack of a clear and 
applicable legislative scheme handicapped the government in meeting its 
responsibility to address forced labour. 
As a practical matter, the lack of a legislative scheme puts the government of Hong 
Kong on the side lines when it comes to preventing and effectively addressing the 
crime of forced labour and all of the other related issues of concern. The institutional 
trickle-down effect is significant: 
1. The practices of employment agencies, although regulated, are not closely 
scrutinised. Contracts that the MDWs sign and the terms of those contracts 
are rarely reviewed. Existing legislation that addresses recruitment fees has 
not stopped the pervasive practice of overcharging MDWs for seeking 
employment, creating a modern-day form of debt bondage. This recruitment 
practice ties MDWs to abusive situations for a minimum of 6 to 7 months, 
reducing their ability to leave an abusive employment situation. 
2. Prospective employers are not properly vetted and cleared to hire a MDW. 
The primary criteria is their income and no physical inspection is done to 
ensure suitable accommodation or appropriate living and working 
environment. There is also no continued oversight of the employer once a 
MDW is hired to ensure compliance with applicable labour laws and 
adherence to the terms of the employment contract. 
                                                
817 ZN v Secretary of Justice and Others, HCAL15B/2015 
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3. Immigration workers and police officers who interact with MDWs are not 
trained to recognise evidence of forced labour. Prosecutors in Hong Kong 
have not prosecuted a single case of forced labour in the last decade.  
4. If a compliant is lodged, police officers are not trained adequately to handle 
the complaints, and not trained to provide assistance to victims while 
collecting evidence to support a potential prosecution case. 
In addition to the lack of an appropriate legal framework, Hong Kong’s policies 
regarding MDWs contribute significantly to creating the conditions for exploitation 
by employment agencies, employers in Hong Kong and, in some instances the 
government of Hong Kong. Two of the most egregious are outlined below: 
Paramount among the policies is the ‘live-in’ requirement. This rule instantly creates 
an inequitable employer-employee relationship, handing over the control of almost 
all aspects of the daily lives of the MDW to the employer. One of the biggest issues 
of abuse this creates is that no distinction is made between work and time off. 
Domestic workers are not free to organise their time in any meaningful way, and are 
always at the disposal of the household to respond to possible needs. This stand-by 
duty in domestic work is not regulated, giving rise to misuse in the form of round-
the-clock duty with no additional compensation or arrangements for compensatory 
time off. In addition to the unpredictability of the work hours, there is no adequate 
rest time, greatly affecting the quality of their lives. This routine practice also serves 
as an effective control mechanism for the employers, reducing MDWs’ social 
interactions and isolating them from peers. 
The two-week rule also undermines the ability of the MDWs to address issues 
related to their employment using established adjudication mechanisms. There is no 
provision in the rule for an objective examination of the reasons for the termination, 
or whether any contractual issues remain outstanding. Once a contract is terminated, 
even if for arbitrary reasons, the MDW must either resolve any outstanding issues 
within the 2 weeks allowed, or apply for an extension of their visa, which comes at 
cost. The minimum time frame for any formal adjudication via conciliation, MECAB 
or Labour Tribunal is calculated in months, not weeks, and each extension, with its 
attached costs, and the living expenses associated with a lengthy stay while not 
earning a salary make the use of any adjudication mechanisms prohibitive or at a 
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minimum, daunting. This rule creates an insurmountable financial penalty that 
cannot be recouped. It serves as a strong disincentive, and an almost coercive force 
on the MDW, to pursuing any legal claim, no matter how legitimate. This law also 
places more power in the hands of employment agencies and the employer, who 
fully realise that terminating a contract and ‘waiting out’ the MDW is a very viable 
option that carries no penalties. 
Viewed as a whole, the policies in place are protectionist in nature, providing 
inexpensive labour for the citizens of Hong Kong with minimal regulatory oversight, 
while ensuring that any unwanted immigration is strictly regulated. With the 
employer allowed to hire a maximum of three MDWs per year, and a seemingly 
endless supply of cheap labour available to the employment agencies, the MDW 
becomes a disposable product with no legal rights and no legitimate recourse. 
Hong Kong falls woefully short of its legal obligations on the protection of MDWs. 
Contrary to their binding agreements, no legal scheme is in place to serve as 
guarantor against the abuses of forced labour. The investigation and the criminal 
prosecution of employment agencies and individuals who commit forced labour, or 
may be committing other criminal acts in the recruitment and employment of 
MDWs, is not a priority for the government. This is evident from the lack any of 
regulatory scheme in place to oversee the health and welfare of the sizable MDW 
population in Hong Kong, and no institutional direction in any part of the 
government to proactively prevent the abuse of MDWs. This apparent institutional 
indifference, coupled with the lack of procedural protections of the informal 
adjudication mechanisms in place, effectively render them ineffective and legally 
insufficient. 
Recommendations 
The following recommendations may be a starting point to address the shortcomings 
that have been identified: 
1. Adoption of a comprehensive legislative framework that criminalises 
forced labour and all related criminal conduct; 
2. Enactment of a regulatory scheme that oversees the recruitment and 
employment process, including all pre and post-contract issues, including 
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strict oversight of employers to ensure compliance with all health, welfare 
and labour laws and regulations; 
3. Aggressive enforcement of national labour laws affecting MDWs; 
4. Implementation of standard work hours regulations, with clearly 
articulated and achievable rest periods; 
5. Implementation of a statutory minimum wage, with additional 
compensation for unscheduled work; 
6. Prioritisation of the issues of forced labour and related criminal conduct 
related to employment abuses for investigation and enforcement with all 
relevant government agencies; 
7. Elimination of conciliation as a settlement mechanism for all labour 
complaints, as the issue is payment for work already completed, and the 
result is the MDWs negotiating against themselves; 
8. The expanded use of MECAB or Labour Tribunals to ensure application 
of Labour Ordinance for labour claims to include illegal recruitment 
agency fees; 
9. The addition of interpreters and social workers to MECAB or Labour 
Tribunals to support MDWs when appropriate, particularly when filing 
claims; 
10. The establishment of a government-supported Public Defender type of 
service for legal support of MDWs; 
11. An increase in the enforcement power of the two mechanisms to ensure 
compliance with awards and penalties for non-compliance; 
12. Criminal prosecution for forced labour offences; 
13. Elimination of visa extension fees for MDWs with verified labour claims; 
and 
14. Increased coordination with foreign governments to implement 
complementary rules and regulations to address issues such as 
consistency in the regulation of recruiters and employment agencies, pre-
employment training, educating MDWs on their legal rights and issues 
related to repatriation for health or other reasons. 
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Opportunities for Future Research 
Two possible opportunities for future research are; the links between “Battered 
Woman Syndrome” and Domestic Workers and second, a doctrinal analysis to 
examine what exactly constitutes an widespread and systematic violation. 
During the research many participants did not see themselves as victims. One 
interview in particular suggested a level of dissonance between the MDWs working 
conditions and their perception of autonomy. The participant indicated that they 
could set their own rest hours and decided what time to return home on her rest days. 
During the interview, the participant apparently became aware that her actions were 
in response to the fear of the reaction of her employer. She finally stated, ‘I guess 
I’m not as free as I thought.’ This interview bore similarities to “Battered Woman 
Syndrome” associated with domestic violence cases. The victim, through repeated 
coercive measures such as isolation and sporadic physical and psychological 
violence develops coping mechanisms to deal with the abusive conditions.  
Second, a doctrinal analysis to examine the applicability of the widespread and 
systematic violation of forced labour standard, as articulated by the ILO818 and 
attributed to a state and non-state actors, when the systemic and widespread abuse 
may be a result of actions of the citizens of that state, abetted by the negligence of 
the state in failure to adopt the necessary legislative, administrative and judicial 
framework to prevent, investigate, punish these violation. 
‘A State which supports, instigates, accepts or tolerates forced labour on its 
territory commits a wrongful act and engages its responsibility for the 
violation of a peremptory norm in international law. Whatever may be the 
position in national law with regard to the exaction of forced or compulsory 
labour and the punishment of those responsible for it, any person who 
violates the prohibition of recourse to forced labour under the Convention is 
                                                
818 International Labour Conference (96 Session) ‘Eradication of Forced Labour’ Report III (Part 1B) 
(2007) p.53 
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guilty of an international crime that is also, if committed in a widespread or 
systematic manner, a crime against humanity.’819 
This widespread and systematic use of forced labour paints a picture of large 
numbers of individuals forced to work involuntarily in harsh conditions and 
implemented by the State. Is there a difference between this vision and large 
numbers of individuals forced to work in harsh conditions in private homes without 
interference from the government? Is it the negligence of the government that 
qualifies or is it the number of persons subjected to the violation? 
                                                
819 Ibid 
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Appendix 2 – Information Sheet and Consent Form 
Centre for Applied Human Rights – Research Projects 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM FOR RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 
Information Sheet 
Purpose of the Study. As part of the requirements for Doctor of Philosophy in 
Human Rights at the University of York, I am carrying out a research study that is 
concerned with whether the use of conciliation by the Labour Department in Hong 
Kong meets the international Human Rights standards of providing an effective 
remedy to Migrant workers for violations of human rights (forced labour).  
What will the study involve? The study will involve the documentation of claims 
filed with the Labour Department for violations that are not consistent with 
international human rights law (claims may be a result of instances of forced labour). 
Documentation may involve case studies, case file review, audio interviews and 
surveys. If you participate in a case study, audio interview or survey, it is intended to 
gather information on: your perspective on the fairness of the claim process, the 
impact of time on your decision to settle, the amount claimed versus the amount 
settled and the level of confidence you had in presenting your case. Review of case 
files would reveal the perspective of the employer through any correspondence about 
your claim. It would also provide documentation on the circumstances of your claim 
as presented to the Labour Department in the form of statements and affidavits to 
determine if the contents clearly communicate the indicators of forced labour.  
Why have you been asked to take part? You have been asked to participate in the 
study because you have a case or are planning to file a case with the Hong Kong 
Labour Department that can provide useful information in documenting the process 
used in resolving your case and identify any shortcomings in the resolution process. 
Additionally, based on the screening process completed ___ indicators of forced 
labour have been identified. There are 11 indicators of forced labour as identified by 
the International Labour Organization (See attached Document).  
Do you have to take part? The answer is no! – Participation is strictly voluntary. 
The attached consent form states that you can withdraw from or refuse to participate 
in the study. Refusal will have no impact on the services offered by this (NGO) 
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office in assisting you with your case. You will get to keep this information sheet 
and a copy of the consent form. Where data are identifiable, (e.g. from interviews 
yielding qualitative data), it will be destroyed and not be used in the research.  
Will your participation in the study be kept confidential? Yes! I will ensure that 
no clues to your identity appear in research or any future publication. Your name will 
not be used and any extracts from what you say that are quoted will be entirely 
anonymous and done only with your consent.  
What will happen to the information that you give? All information you provide 
will be kept confidential from third parties (including workers’ superiors, if 
relevant); the data will be kept confidential for the duration of the study. On 
completion of the thesis, the information will be retained for future reference or 
study. If it is not necessary or useful for further analysis, it will be destroyed.  
What will happen to the results? The results will be presented in the dissertation. 
My supervisor will see them, and other University staff required to make 
assessments of my work. It may be read by future students and may be published in 
research journals and be publically available. It may also be presented to 
governmental institutions to effect needed changes in policies, laws and practices 
and also to NGOs as additional information for advocacy purposes.  
What are the possible disadvantages of taking part? Depending on the 
circumstances surrounding your employment, recalling the circumstances may be 
distressing, however, the information you may give could be useful in identifying 
problems experienced by you and other Migrant Workers. If at any time you decide 
that you do not wish to continue taking part in any interview, you have the right to 
discontinue at any time. Your participation in this research or lack thereof will have 
no impact on any service offered by this (NGO) office.  
What if there is a problem? At the end of the interview /process, I will discuss with 
you how you found the experience and how you are feeling. If you subsequently feel 
distressed, you should contact me (Reginald Frection) at 852-9680-6751 or my email 
at rvf502@york.ac.uk. You may also contact my Supervisor Marin Jones at +44 
01904 325834 or email, martin.jones@york.ac.uk.  
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What if I decide later that I do not want my information or circumstances of my 
case included in this research? If after the conclusion of your claim and interviews 
as part of your case, you decide that you no longer want your information or 
circumstances concerning your case included in the study, you will have 3 months 
from the date of the last interview to contact me and terminate your participation. 
Upon confirmation that you no longer desire to be a part of the study, all information 
collected from and about you will be destroyed and will not be included in any form 
as part of the study.  
Who has reviewed this study? The Economics, Law, Management, Politics and 
Sociology (ELMPS) ethics sub-committee, part of the University’s Ethics 
Committee must give approval before studies like this can take place.  
Any further queries? If you need any further information, you can contact: Centre 
for Applied Human Rights, 6 Innovation Close Heslington, York, YO10 5ZF, UK 
work Tel: +44 (0)1904 325830. 
If you agree to take part in the study, please sign the consent form overleaf. 
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CONSENT FORM 
Name of Researcher: Reginald V. Frection 
Participant: __________________________________ 
 
 
I…………………………………………………………agree to participate in the conciliation process research study. 
Please Check box. 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated …………….for the above study. I have had 
the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had them answered satisfactorily. YES
NO 
2. I give permission for my interviews with Reginald Frection to be audio recorded. YESNO 
3. I give permission to access my case file for review of correspondence from my employer, Labour Department and 
review of statements and affidavits.  YES   NO 
4. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, without giving any 
reason. YESNO 
5. I understand that disguised extracts from my interview and other information given by me may be made publicly 
available and or be used in future reports, articles or presentations by the researcher. YESNO 
6. I understand that my full name will not appear in any reports, articles or presentation. YESNO 
7. I understand that I have up to 3 months from the date of my last interview to make contact with the researcher to 
withdraw from the study. YESNO 
8. I agree to take part in the above study. YESNO 
 
________________________ ________________ ________________ 
Name of Participant Date Signature 
 
 
 
_________________________ ________________ ________________ 
Researcher Date  Signature 
 
 
When completed, a copy will be given to the participant and the original to be kept in the file of the researcher.  
 
Participation in this study will have no effect on the provision of or access to NGO services. 
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Appendix 3 – Semi-Structured Interview Questionnaire 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Forced Labour Questionnaire – Semi-Structured Interview 1	
Questions relating to the use of deception when recruiting adults  
Deception can be considered a feature of involuntariness in all cases where, had the worker 
known the real working situation, he/she would not have accepted the job offer..  
The first question seeks to assess the level of information that the worker received from the 
recruiter/employer and the promises made:  
1. For each of the following topics, can you tell me what level of information was given at 
the time of your recruitment? 
 
The term “recruiter” is used here to denote any third party (intermediary) who assists a child or 
adult worker, whether or not in return for a fee, to find or take up a job.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not discussed 
with recruiter or 
employer 
Promised/ 
agreed 
verbally 
Written in 
contract 
Not 
relevant 
Living conditions      
Legal status      
Nature of the job      
Location of the job      
Employer’s 
name/business      
Wages      
Volume of work (per 
day/week/ month/year)      
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Forced Labour Questionnaire – Semi-Structured Interview 2	
2. As compared to the information you received beforehand, was the job you found on 
arrival as represented?”  
 
Much 
worse Worse 
As promised/ 
agreed 
Different but 
equally good or bad 
Somewhat 
better 
Much 
better 
Living conditions       
Legal status       
Nature of the job       
Location of the job       
Employer’s 
name/business       
Wages       
Volume of work (per 
day/week/ month/year)       
 
Questions relating to forced recruitment  
3. Who took the decision that you should work?  
• myself   
• a relative   
• a third party   
• the employer   
 
4, Is the person who signed your contract the person that you perform work for?  YES NO 
5. Who chose the employer?   
• Myself alone or together with the employer   
• a relative   
• a third party   
• the employer alone   
 
6. Were you free to refuse to work for this employer? Yes / No.  
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Forced Labour Questionnaire – Semi-Structured Interview 3	
6(a). If No, what would you have risked in the case of refusal?  
• Nothing, but work opportunities are scarce   
• The employer would have tried to prevent other employers in the area  from hiring me   
• Other people from my family would lose their job   
• My family would have lost access to land or other productive assets   
• Threats of violence against myself or my family 
• Other   
 
Questions relating to working conditions of adults  The main aspects of exploitation that are 
taken into account are related to wages (amount and regularity of payments), hours of work 
(normal and overtime), days of weekly and annual leave, health hazards and protection, sick 
leave, social social security coverage and other benefits.   
Wages  
 7. According to your contract, when did your employment begin? 
• On arrival in Hong Kong 
• On specific date 
• Date Immigration Department approved your visa 
• Unknown 
 
8. Have you been paid from the date specified in your contract?  YES NO
8(a). If no, when did your salary start to be paid and why the delay? 
 
 
9.Is your salary equal to or higher than the statutory minimum wage? YES NO 
 
10. Are illegal deductions from your salary made by the employer? YES NO 
 
11. Are you paid regularly on fixed dates? YES NO 
11(a). If no, why not?  
 
12. Are you provided receipts for wages? YES   NO  
 
13. Are the receipts accurate? YES   NO  
14. Have you been provided with suitable and furnished accommodation? YES   NO  
15. Are you provided with sufficient food? YES   NO  
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Forced Labour Questionnaire – Semi-Structured Interview 4	
Hours of Work 
16. How many hours do you usually work (per day/week)?  _______________ 
17. How many days of leave can you take per week?  _____________________ 
18. How many hours are you actually off on your rest day? _______________ 
 
Questions relating to coercion, threats and penalties  
19. In your job, does the employer force you to do any of the following?  
  
 Never  Sometimes  Regularly  
Perform tasks that are not part of your contract or verbal 
agreement     
Perform hazardous tasks without adequate protection     
Perform work at a place other than the employer’s 
residence?     
Provide sexual services for employer or associates     
Work for another employer without your consent     
Work for a longer period than agreed in order to be paid     
Commit illicit/criminal activities     
 
20. What kind of force does the employer use against you?  
• Physical violence   
• Non-payment of wages   
• Threats against myself   
• Threats against my family   
• Isolation, confinement or surveillance   
• Punishment (deprivation of food, sleep, 
etc.) Confiscation of identity papers or 
travel documents   
• Threats of denunciation to the authorities 
or others   
• Outstanding debt or manipulation of the 
amount owed   
• Fines/financial penalties   
• Other, specify...   
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21. Can you leave your employer?  
• Yes, at any time, as long as the terms of the contract are respected (notice, etc.)           
• No, because there are no jobs available locally   
• No, the employer would not let me go [In this case, go to next question]   
• I don’t know   
 
22. What do you risk if you were to leave?   
• I would have no income   
• I have to return to my home country and start all over  
• The employer would get other employers from the area to boycott me or  my family   
• Violence to myself by the employer or recruiter   
• Violence against my family   
• Denunciation to authorities and possible deportation   
• Other members of my family would be dismissed   
• Loss of benefits for myself/members of my family   
 
 
23. How much was your recruitment fee?  _________________________ 
24. Did you have to borrow money for the recruitment fees? _____________________ 
25. Did you borrow from family members, money lender or loan company? ____________ 
 
26. Why did you decide to stay? (for those remaining with employers and meet the criteria) 	
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